Oriana Skylar Mastro
@osmastro
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Political scientist @stanford , China expert @Carnegieendow , Officer @USAFReserve . Author of Upstart: How China Became a Great Power. Views don’t rep instit'ns.
Palo Alto, CA
Joined October 2015
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18 years ago, I moved to DC to be a junior fellow at Carnegie (first day pic below!). What a dream to now join the team as a nonresident scholar!
@FSIStanford
@Stanford
@OxUniPress
@Princeton
@USAFReserve
@APSAtweets
4: And Oriana is part of a trio of all-star China security hires that we've made in the last 18 months at
#CarnegieAsia
. I'm really thrilled to have the outstanding trio of
@IBKardon
@osmastro
and
@SheenaGreitens
anchoring our team.
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You think China would never take Taiwan by force? Think again. My piece in the next issue of
@ForeignAffairs
:
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Call me crazy but today Xi Jinping did not sound like someone that wants to avoid war at all costs. He reiterated his 'unshakeable commitment to unification with Taiwan and warned foreigners that 'bully' China will be met with 'great wall of steel.'
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Chinese State Council issued a report last week on human rights violations in the US. They don't seem to understand the irony that all their cited information comes from the US - gov reports and the free press!
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Super excited to receive Scott Kastner’s new book on Taiwan - such an important topic done by an excellent political scientist!
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"The Chinese government is engaged in the most sustained, scaled and sophisticated theft of intellectual property and expertise in human history"
Five Eyes spy chiefs warn Silicon Valley of Chinese threat from quantum computing and AI to synthetic biology:
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I’ve always thought of Xi as ruthless but pragmatic. Hu was not a threat - he no longer had his own power base. This makes me think Xi has indeed lost it.
Hu Jintao, the former Chinese leader, was unexpectedly escorted out of the Communist Party congress without explanation. He appeared to pause to speak to President Xi Jinping before leaving.
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I could not be more excited about embarking on the next stage of my career
@Stanford
@StanfordSAPARC
@StanfordCISAC
. Thx to all
@FSIStanford
for the opportunity and support in making it happen!
We are excited to announce that China and East Asian security expert Oriana Skylar Mastro
@osmastro
will join us as a Center Fellow beginning this August!
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So excited to start the next stage of my career at Stanford!
Welcome
@osmastro
! The CISAC community is happy to welcome such a highly regarded scholar who focuses on Chinese military and security policy, Asia-Pacific security issues, great power relations, war termination, and coercive diplomacy.
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You think we've rebalanced? Shocking stat I read in a report today: the U.S. Air Force has the same number of Foreign Area Officer billets for Chinese specialists as it does for Portuguese speakers.
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Anyone who says China would never attack Guam has never engaged w/ PRC military or read authoritative writings. Nothing is off the table. Although exact targets depend on what US needs most to operate.
@TBowmanNPR
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In September, NATO members hosted their first dedicated session on the Chinese threat to Taiwan - from
@dimi
and
@HenryJFoy
@FT
. Positive news for the US efforts to get NATO allies on-side in a potential Taiwan conflict.
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Thinking innovative about how to work with allies is the best way to enhance deterrence across the Taiwan Strait. My thoughts
@australian
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As I've argued before, the US cannot deter a Chinese invasion of Taiwan alone -- we need the full support of our allies, especially Japan. Check out my piece in
@washingtonpost
to see how Tokyo could contribute to a defense of Taiwan.
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The U.S. has no hope of competing with China and ensuring Taiwan’s defense if it is distracted elsewhere,
@ElbridgeColby
and I argue
@WSJ
.
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Writing for
@TheEconomist
, I argue that the danger of China's recent military exercises near Taiwan stems from creating a new normal. If greater Chinese activity around Taiwan becomes normalized, a real invasion will be harder to spot.
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American companies engaged in artificial intelligence, quantum computing, biotechnology, semiconductors, and autonomous systems have to be more cautious when doing business with China.
@Dimi
@FinancialTimes
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These rumors of a coup in China are insane. If anything did happen, the military would be at the center of it. That’s also why it’s so unbelievable - Xi has worked hard to control the military through appointing loyalists and getting rid of dissenters.
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The situation in Ukraine does not necessarily give China pause in its own plans to take Taiwan. Read my arg why
@ForeignAffairs
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Biden’s pick for SecDef shows he isn’t serious about making China the strategic priority. My thoughts
@washingtonpost
:
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I'll be arguing that within the next five years, China will use significant military force against a country on its periphery -
@fravel
will take the opposing position. Should be interesting!
Mark your 📅s! On 12/9, join
@MIT_SSP
director & China expert,
@fravel
, &
@FSIStanford
's
@osmastro
for a fantastic debate as part of
@ChinaPowerCSIS
' debate series!
Details: .
@CSIS
#China
#Asia
#military
#government
#AcademicTwitter
#foreignpolicy
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“Beijing has concluded that the Quad represents one of the most consequential challenges to Chinese ambitions in the years ahead,” writes
@MrKRudd
@ForeignAffairs
:
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I think China’s use of force over Taiwan during Xi’s tenure is more likely than other experts quoted in
@NickKristof
story:
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Chinese military leaders believe that they will have the capabilities to force unification with Taiwan within a year—we need to act now.
@WSJ
,
@AlastairGale
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Security tensions between China and the United States are likely to rise, especially with respect to Taiwan and the South China Sea. My predictions in the Economist’s In the World 2020:
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China isn’t revising the Intl order as much as its exploiting its gaps, ambiguities and lack of consensus.
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State Dept has released new document on the China challenge: . Is anyone else a bit tired of the constant restating of the problem without any real movement towards doing something about it?
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Take a look at my new piece
@nytimes
on how Afghanistan won't embolden Beijing to attack Taiwan: ?
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I argue in a new piece in
@Journal_IS
that China is likely to intervene militarily in a Korea contingency and given their capabilities to deal with nuclear weapons, this could be a good thing.
The fall issue of International Security is now online: . Read articles by Michael Beckley; Asfandyar Mir (
@asfandyarmir
); Oriana Skylar Mastro; (
@osmastro
); Matthew Adam Kocher, Adria K. Lawrence (
@ALintheMagreb
), and Nuno P. Monteiro; and Reid B.C. Pauly.
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Read my prize-winning article on China’s strategy here:
A big congratulations to
@FSIStanford
's incoming Center Fellow
@osmastro
for her award-winning article, "The Stealth Superpower: How China Hid Its Global Ambitions," which won the 2020
#AWC
Article Prize for "Best Policy Article on U.S Foreign Policy and Grand Strategy!"
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My critics are right - Xi talks about peaceful reunification more often and directly than allusions to armed reunification. But if your spouse tells you often they love you, and only mentions a handful of times that they want a divorce, are you reassured?
@osmastro
@ForeignAffairs
Thanks to all the authors for an excellent discussion of the issue. I still disagree with
@osmastro
's claim that Xi "has made numerous statements that suggest he wants to achieve unification during his reign." Xi has been deliberately ambiguous.
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I seriously doubt it. China/Russia arent even at the stage of having embeds/liaisons within each other's organizations. US doesn't even do joint contingency planning with many of its allies! It's just two difficult countries being difficult.
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I realize I’m late to the party, but
@SheenaGreitens
report on Chinese global surveillance is a must read. Perfect example of rigorous scholarship with real world impact.
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A “multilateral front” that includes Australia would deter an aggressive China.
@GeraldC_Brown
@Dimi
@FinancialTimes
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If no one gave into China's demands, China would stop making them. Movie production companies around the world need to stand up for what's right.
'Mulan' is a movie about what Hollywood will do to stay in China (like ignoring
#HongKongProtests
& Xinjiang human rights abuses) now that the US box office is a COVID-era debacle. My newest in
@washingtonpost
with many thanks to editor
@sophiah_n
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Excited to take on new projects on China military and security issues at Stanford starting next week!
Delighted to welcome China and East Asian security expert
@osmastro
as
@FSIStanford
Center Fellow at APARC, starting Aug 1. In our Q&A, we talk w/ Oriana about Chinese aims, worsening U.S.-China relations, her military career and research, and more. Read:
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Thrilled to announced that I’ve been named individual reservist of the year (FGO)- a huge shout out to
@INDOPACOM
@FSIStanford
@AEIfdp
for all their support!
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I’ll be testifying for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on competition with China tomorrow at 1015. Tune in!
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Chinese flights over Taiwan are more than just a strong signal, such operations allow China to hone its military capabilities
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Speaking to
@FareedZakaria
on
@CNN
, I analyzed the differences between China's most recent exercises and those that triggered the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis more than 25 years ago. The Chinese military now is clearly much more capable and much closer to being able to take Taiwan.
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The Quad is becoming more strategically important. . 69% percent of ASEAN policy elites believe the Quad should “play a role in enforcing rules-based order”, like ensuring freedom of navigation against Chinese maritime claims.
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If you were thinking 'you know, I haven't heard enough about Taiwan from Oriana,' you are in luck! My response to critics is out in the new issue of
@ForeignAffairs
:
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I argued
@HouseForeign
() that China wants to control the South China Sea but Only wants to be one of many operating in the rest of the world’s oceans. Failing to understand this distinction can lead to bad strategies and poor prioritization.
Chinese investment in the Maldives is a frequent subject of concern. But the available data suggests that fears of military access are overblown, and that Chinese development projects, such as the resort on Feydhoo Finolhu, are no more than they appear:
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I will be heading to China to attend the 10th Beijing Xiangshan Forum, where I will speak on the rapid advancements in AI technology, the unforeseeable security challenges they entail, and strategies for their mitigation and management.
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Writing in
@ForeignAffairs
,
@ElbridgeColby
argues that the US must do more to prepare for war over Taiwan. In the
@nytimes
, I also argued that words in support of Taiwan is dangerous without the military capabilities to protect it.
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The conventional wisdom on China and North Korea is dangerously out of date. I argue
@ForeignAffairs
(Jan/Feb issue) that if conflict breaks on the peninsula, China is likely to intervene extensively and militarily.
China is no longer wedded to North Korea's survival.
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Unfortunately I don’t think there’s much we can do to change China’s approach to Hong Kong, but we can make it costly. Sanctions are a good first step. .
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Looks like US-India defense cooperation has gotten attention in Beijing. A fellow at influential Chinese think tank CICIR calls the relationship a de facto alliance: .
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Great piece on China’s failed attempt to bully Australia. After seven years of marriage to an Australian, I could’ve told Beijing this wasn’t going to go well…
@MichaelSchuman
@TheAtlantic
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.
@RushDoshi
has written an accessible work for the scholar and non-expert alike. Read my review for
@NBRnews
here:
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The US is definitely better than China at building military infrastructure. We should take this deal. And offer a similar deal to other countries!
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“The goal should be to weave Taiwan more deeply into the community of nations and to ensure that more countries have a greater interest in Taiwan’s ultimate fate, thereby making Chinese decision-making vis-à-vis Taiwan more complicated,”
@mike_mazza
:
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Couldn’t agree more w/ NSA Jake Sullivan: US “should put less focus on trying to slow China down and more emphasis on trying to run faster ourselves,”
@michaelcrowley
,
@SangerNYT
,
@nytimes
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My latest with Bonnie Glaser - not only did Beijing get everything it wanted out of the summit, it leveraged its relationship with North Korea to ensure that outcome. The repercussions go far beyond the Korean peninsula to our great power competition with China.
The Big Winner of the Singapore Summit: How China Ended Up Getting the Best Deal
@osmastro
@BonnieGlaser
@ForeignAffairs
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In 2020, China stepped up military maneuvers near Taiwan. Its goal? Make these types of operations routine so that everyone just accepts this increased presence, I argue in
@WSJ
.
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My latest article in
@SecStudies_Jrnl
, where I contend that China & Russia are deeply aligned and moving toward an even closer relationship. However, their military cooperation primarily aims to support China's challenge of US hegemony in Asia.
Read here:
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Rebuilding US deterrence in Asia is how we maintain peace. Listen to my discussion with
@McFaul
about the future of US-China relations.
On a new
#WorldClassPodcast
episode:
@osmastro
discusses the tension between China and Taiwan and why it matters for the U.S. and the world. She also predicts for how relations between Washington and Beijing will look during the Biden administration ⬇️
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Great website for anyone curious about who is ruling China:
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We need to stop this narrative that Biden’s domestic focus means that “there may not be bandwidth” to compete with China:
The greatest nation in the world can walk and chew gum at the same time.
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The US needs based overseas to remain a Pacific power - China doesn’t. The narrative in the US too often forgets we didn’t establish alliances out of altruism, but as a strategic necessity. We need Australia just as much as they need us.
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“We won’t have five years from China’s first missile launch. We may not have five months,” writes
@sethcropsey
@HudsonInstitute
@WSJ
:
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Thanks to
@Stanford
for sharing about my career as an academic scholar and a member of U.S. Air Force:
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Couldn’t agree more that the Us has an attitude, not strategy, for dealing with an increasingly powerful China.
We are seeing a flurry of punitive measures, and strident speeches, against the CCP from the Trump administration. A tougher approach to China is overdue. But as we wrote this week, I think the recent moves add up to an attitude more than a strategy
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My take on why we should urgently focus on Taiwan.
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I write
@ForeignPolicy
that if Kim is incapacitated and instability unfolds in North Korea, the US is not adequately prepared:
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This is a must read: . But takeaway is NOT that the US wins. It says 1)if Taiwan resists successfully 2)US intervenes en mass 3) and quickly 4) Japan fights with us, we win.Problem: currently none of these conditions are true.
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What is going on?! I really thought China was acting out of insecurity, but maybe I was wrong: This is much more aggressive than I would've predicted.
20 Indian soldiers dead after clash with Chinese troops high in the Himalayas, Indian army says
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Tensions are high between the US and China. According to
@SusanVLawrence
@CRS4Congress
, since 1995, China has never issued more than two consecutive Foreign Ministry statements related to a single country. China has now issued five in a row about the US:
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On
@BBCWorld
with
@SallyBundockBBC
, I predicted that China would take the current situation as an opportunity to test out their military capabilities but do nothing to threaten Speaker Pelosi's safety while she is in Taiwan.
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The State Department approved the sale of ammunition and logistics support to Taiwan in two separate deals valued at up to $440 million.
It may not be flashy, but this sort of US support helps build up Taiwan’s resilience in a shooting war.
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On Sunday, I spoke to
@FareedZakaria
on
@CNN
's GPS about Beijing's live fire exercises in response to Speaker Pelosi's visit. These exercises are not just a show of force, but have likely helped China test out their various capabilities en route to taking Taiwan.
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More often than not, China isn’t outcompeting the US. The US just isn’t really competing.
My 2017 essay on China as a strategic revisionist. The last of the six sections still captures some key challenges I see for the next administration, no matter who wins the election next week. To compete with China, America needs to actually compete:
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While I respect both the authors this is just outdated analysis. US could’ve easily defended Taiwan 20 years ago. But no longer. Or perhaps they know something the Pentagon or the PLA doesn’t?
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US helping Taiwan step up asymmetric capabilities. Stingers, Javelins, ISR––a great start.
@jongrevatt
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I just don't know. Which is worse, having a president that threatens our democratic institutions, or the fact that so many Americans voted for him. Again. It's hard to keep the faith.
Bed time. I’m fairly confident our 224 year-old democratic experiment will still be here in the morning.
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How did I miss this? This would be game changing. For the future of America’s children. For working women.
@NickKristof
,
@nytopinion
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I love my country. But here in Australia they have jungle gyms for kids in bars. So there’s that.
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“Once China moves in, it doesn't leave. It might decrease the numbers. It might play nice for a little while. Maybe it ratchets down the tension for short-term political gain. But it is unlikely to vacate this reef,”
@GregPoling
on PRC aggression toward PH:
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Conventional wisdom is Chinese leaders think US is on the decline—interesting alternative view from
@yuenyuenang
:
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What can the US expect in terms of support from allies and partners in a Taiwan contingency? Not much. An important analysis by
@ZackCooper
and
@SheenaGreitens
@NuclearPolicy
:
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Strengthening the alliance one lecture at a time. I learned a lot
@DeptDefence
, and I even got to hold a Joey!
Best lunch this week, listening to
@osmastro
on
#SouthChinaSea
- thanks for your insight and expertise, and coming all the way from 🇺🇲 , with toddler and baby to share with us. Looking forward to
@CWPColumbia
next week
@anu_china
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Important reminder to keep our eye on Chinese use of economic tools to expand power. But how effective are they? I was in Djibouti yesterday- and all I heard was resentment about the big loans they have to repay for a railroad that doesn’t work and doesn’t even go to the ports!
“The Chinese are devoting billions of dollars not to just transportation infra but also to acquiring port facilities…there’s an integration here.” -David Lampton
@SAISHopkins
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“The primary cause of inequality in China is entrenched privileges for state-owned enterprises and the well-connected at the expense of the truly private economy.” What does the Evergrande crisis imply?
@WSJ
:
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US and its allies need to make such tactics costly for China. We need to revitalize alliances so they protect against all forms of coercion, not just military invasions.
China steps up pressure on Australia, ordering traders to stop purchasing at least seven categories of Australian commodities. Intended to warn other countries of the consequences of challenging Chinese interests.
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“The question that keeps me up at night is, what happens when our diplomats no longer have the might of the U.S. military or our economy as their backstop?” Chief of Staff Gen. Charles “CQ” Brown said Aug. 6.
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Compared to Taiwan, China has six times the warships, six times the warplanes and eight times the tanks. China’s defence budget, merely double Taiwan’s at the end of the 1990s, is now 25 times greater.
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If an all male panel is a manel, what do we call edited volumes with only male contributors?
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China expertise is not just useful, it’s the only way we are going to get our China policy right. My thoughts
@DefenseOne
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It’s true that Hong Kong’s autonomy is gravely at risk, but it’s hard to see how demoting our trade relationship won’t hurt the very people we would like to help.
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For non-Chinese speakers, here’s a decent English version of an important and recent PLA strategy document
@CASI_Research
.
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We can forgo a year or two of joint military exercises before there is an impact on readiness. But the US willingness to negotiate on these points undermines the narrative that the US role is necessary for regional peace and security. China must be ecstatic.
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“China seeks to build a conventional force capable of establishing temporary military superiority over the United States in a specific geographic area and for a period of time sufficient to achieve its military and political objectives, ”
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Official U.S. Taiwan policy is to prevent unification by force, not to prevent it by any means. If we are going to prevent a war, we need to get this right along with a strong military deterrent. For more, see my piece in today's
@nytimes
:
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The best way to prevent conflict is to convince China that the US will fight and prevail if Beijing decides to use force.
My main concern is US conventional deterrence is eroding. My comment about Vietnam was to highlight that there is little sense of urgency about changing these trends. If there were, we would be more innovative to maintain mil advantage.
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