My latest argues Op Sindoor is an evolution of Indian strategy against Pakistan. The goal is no longer to deter future attacks - they’ll keep coming - but to degrade enemy capacity. This “mowing the grass” has been used by Israel, but it’s hard & risky.

EAM Jaishankar goes further than the joint statement, stating clearly & repeatedly that the Quad’s main organizing principle is “strategic stability.” It’s no longer “international public goods.” Have other Quad members been this blunt?.

I'd love to see more initiatives on prudent strategic & operational cooperation, to deter military aggression. Everything from DIB stockpiling to seamless data-sharing between aircraft. More on that soon. (6/6).

This is a good signal, locking in a clearer security focus for the Quad. I'll be curious about what they do about it now, as they prep for the Delhi summit. Any more ambition for the summit? Will they expand what they mean by "security"? (5/6).

ASEAN centrality etc is still there -- fine. But Rubio's pre-meeting statement was more explicit that the Quad members need to do what's in their interests, & that will go a long way to delivering FOIP too. ASEAN shouldn't get a veto. (4/6).

No talk today about rules-based order, sustainable development, democracy, inclusivity, etc. No surprise. That's been replaced by clearer language on security & stability being the foundations of FOIP. More explicit mention of water canons, unsafe naval acty, etc. Good. (3/6).

Most apparently, there is a new focus on security. This locks in the trend we sniffed from the last meet on 21 Jan. See today's joint statement, & compare it to those from Delaware (summit) & last FMM. Its a clear shift. (2/6).

A modest step in the right direction. Quad has now "streamlined" its agenda to 4x lines of effort: maritime security, economic security, critical tech, & HADR. But the ambition is modest - no new projects announced except on critical minerals. What does this mean? (1/6).

I had a chance to speak with @McFaul about the recent India-Pakistan conflict, Op Sindoor - what it means for their rivalry, for great power relations, etc. Take a look. cc @FSIStanford .

RT @dougblandry: I just got back from the Trump parade and I have to say it was legitimately the worst executed mass attendance event I’ve….

Masterclass by @ShivshankaMenon on Op Sindoor, including on India's goal: to impose costs, not dissuade aggression. Also important observations on the Ind-Pak hyphenation (its not a thing) & China's role (most definitely a thing).

On the 5th anniversary of the Galwan clash, watch @YkJoshi5 offer recollections - including some interesting details about Op Snow Leopard, India's QPQ action in late Aug.

Chief IDS reiterates the main strategic signal of Op SINDOOR: terrorists can no longer count on a safe haven in Pakistan. They will have to expend effort on survival. For more on these "survival costs," see:

If I was a planner in Beijing, I’d be quite happy to talk up new Pakistani capabilities, to stoke Indian concerns. More new kit in Pak must be countered by more new kit in India - which means less Indian capacity for power projection.

America has lost its mind. We can draw a straight line from the over-militarization of the GWOT era to this.

UnAmerican.

Yes, India expects to be the leading regional power. But equally, the Raj was a colonial enterprise, and India stood against colonialism & for states’ equality. Different Indian govts have taken different positions on this tricky balance.

Sindoor showed the value of strong air defenses. Challenge for Indian planners will be to not over-learn these lessons; figuring out how to not plan for the last conflict, but anticipate a future one (with China).

A strain of Indian thinking, more open these days, suggests that India should command a sphere of influence in its region. A subset of that thinks the US is what stands in India’s way. Unreal.

Big news. I wonder why is has to be one or the other and not both. I wonder if the trainees will get CI training.

RT @LeRubicon_org: « Il est tentant de considérer cette dernière crise comme une version légèrement amplifiée de la précédente crise indo-….