William Hurst
@wjhurst
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Chong Hua Professor of Chinese Development @CambridgeFames @Cambridge_Uni Co-Director @CamGeopolitics Fellow @WolfsonCam Senior Associate Fellow @RUSI_org
Joined October 2014
I've been studying various aspects of #protest & contentious #politics in #China for 25 years. What's happening now is novel, interesting, & potentially quite important. But we need to be careful about drawing conclusions or making predictions. A🧵:.1/22.@CamGeopolitics @NCUSCR.
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Without official action by @NorthwesternU, I will offer an in-person independent study (on any topic of their choosing) to any graduate student of @PoliSciatNU who holds an F-1 visa and needs such a class to remain legally in the United States. Please email me if you need this.
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Along with most other scholars of my generation, I've been studying political #economy in #China for more than 25 years. What's happening there is not so simple as 'party's over'. For a little context and analysis, here is a brief 🧵:. 1/25.#Politics @CamGeopolitics @NCUSCR.
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What's happened in the past 24 hours is novel in that protesters have appeared on the streets in multiple cities with apparent knowledge of what is happening in other parts of the country. They're all mobilising around #Covid, but this is refracted through distinct lenses. 10/22.
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Since 1989, we've seen 5 main strands/repertoires of contention in China:. 1) labour protest.2) rural protest.3) student protest.4) urban governance protest.5) systematic political dissent. Each of these has usually been disaggregated locally and separated from the others. 2/22.
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If things fizzle - or even if the strands/repertoires become disentangled - all will return to the somewhat uneasy quotidian of a few weeks ago. If not, this could prove a critical juncture. But not one that will be easy to read in real time or with a happy ending. 22/22 (END).
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By taking up slogans and frames of generalised dissent, as well as at least implicitly signally solidarity with workers' and students' mobilisation, these crowds are crossing a boundary and helping merge four of the five strands/repertoires outlined above. 14/22.
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Finally, we've seen a few sensations incidents of generalised dissent (e.g. 四通桥), but in the past 24 hours crowds in at least one or two cities have appeared overtly calling for #XiJingping to leave office and for the #CCP to lose power. 12/22.
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If we look at this lacklustre response through the lens of experiences across #Indonesia & SE Asia, it might suggest the lurking presence of at least tacit elite allies. Such a factor would substantially complicate the picture. 17/22.
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But, if we assume no elite backers, the most likely scenario I can see is that the protests fizzle out (as most such movements do in most countries). Having erupted spontaneously in a short period, they will fade away without reaching any climax or denouement. 18/22.
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What is also very interesting, though, is that the state response last night was not nearly as harsh, repressive, or even coordinated as we might have predicted. 16/22.
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Workers in Zhengzhou and elsewhere are engaged in labour protests, but with #ZeroCovid as a kind of frame for their grievances. Students across dozens of campuses, similarly are mounting familiar kinds of protest, but also framed around Covid. 11/22.
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The protesters in these crowds don't look to be either workers or students. They appear to have mobilised first around #Covid & urban governance issues - in particular, in reaction to the fire and failed response in Urumqi two days ago. But they've morphed beyond that. 13/22.
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This is what makes the current moment especially interesting and possibly important and dangerous. But the trajectory from here is not certain. I can see at least three possible ways forward, in declining order of likelihood & increasing order of importance/danger. 15/22.
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A third and much less likely option would be concessions or systemic change. This could range from a relaxation of some #ZeroCovid measures to genuine political opening of some sort. I very much do not think this is in the cards, and would peg probability as extremely low. 21/22.
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Labour politics has seen millions of laid-off (xiagang) SOE workers take to the streets, as well as many hundreds of thousands of their counterparts among migrant workers in export-processing manufacturing industries. 3/22.
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A second possibility is some form of comprehensive & decisive repression. This could take the form of a coordinated and possibly quite violent crackdown (as in 1989) or it could be slower-motion and at least somewhat less bloody (as in HK in 2019-2020). 19/22.
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Most demanded workplace protections, union rights, or welfare benefits. But they didn't usually link up cross-regionally or seek common cause with rural residents, students, or others. One significant exception was the so-called Jasic Incident and its aftermath in 2018. 4/22.
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Generalised political dissent is very rare in its expression, but we've seen it from time to time, as in the Charter 08 movement & other manifestations. Usually repressed quickly and harshly, its impact has mostly been confined to a small set of cosmopolitan intellectuals. 8/22.
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Rural protests have tended to revolve around payment for grain (IOU Crisis), "peasant burdens" (农民负担), provision of essential public goods, or corruption/malfeasance by local officials. These often have significant impact locally, but seldom beyond. 5/22.
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Either form of repression would be extremely costly for the state, however (both in fiscal and reputational terms). It would not be undertaken lightly, as it would also raise the stakes. It's thus a decidedly second-best option and not as likely as the protests fizzling. 20/22.
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Indonesia is very far from perfect!. But, over the 20 years that I've been studying its politics & institutions carefully, I've never failed to be impressed by how well things actually do work. Poor performance still can exceed even lower expectations.
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Aside from these, we've also seen ethnic/minority protest (e.g. among Uyghurs or Tibetans), but this has had very limited resonance across the wider population. It's also been extremely harshly repressed, especially since about 2013. 9/22.
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Student protests have been rarer, but usually either about campus issues or general and philosophical in nature. Occasionally, as in the Jasic Incident, they can be in solidarity with workers, villagers, or others. But they've been largely less significant since June 4. 6/22.
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Many have also noted the prevalence of protests around urban governance and the provision of basic public goods and services - from neighbourhood services to environmental protection, even education and healthcare. These also have tended to be local and specific in nature. 7/22.
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Thank you @PoliSciatNU for a great 8 years, on this my official last day!. Delighted to get started (officially) tomorrow at @Dept_of_POLIS!.
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This should be said loudly and repeatedly!. Political science will die if it continues much further down the path of obsessing over methodological minutiae & persnickety nitpicking over causal inference - all centred on analysis of more & trivial questions no one cares about. .
Some wise advice by Theda Skocpol about scholarship.👇. From Skocpol’s 2017 interview with Eric Schickler:
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@polisciprofhi Something like "take your time early on & don't think about comprehensive exams until you're in at least your third year". That's backwards. Students should jump through the hoops of coursework & exams expeditiously, but slow down later with their fieldwork & dissertations.
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#XiJinping's trip to #Russia is not bold or radical, but conservative. #China is not aiming to do what some media reports imply. A short 🧵:. 1/11.#Politics @CambridgeFames @NCUSCR.
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I’ve been studying various aspects of social movements and contentious politics for almost 30 years. At one point, I taught a class comparing & analysing forms of student protest/campus activism. Here’s a brief thread on making sense of what’s going on across US campuses:. 1/26.
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The People's Republic of #China is 75. What does this mean for its political future?. A short 🧵:. Having lasted longer than did the USSR, China stands today at an inflection point, ready to seize momentum on a new trajectory. Xi Jinping is trying to achieve this, but. 1/17.
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I've said for many years that the single most important book in English on Chinese politics is Franz Schurmann's "Ideology and Organization in Communist China". I still stand by that advice.
@BryanVanNorden @DanielleWenner @DavidLSmith_Iam @Katja_Thieme @AjaanMark @Webwight @JustinSkirry @SangBina @hughmarlowe2 @EKKnappenberger @Skye_Cleary Quote tweet an image of a great book. Do not explain. Nominate at least six others. Nominating @yuenyuenang @DavidGAtwill @jayjamescarter @dianafutweets @GeZhaoguang @hillmg1 @LetaHong @wjhurst @iandenisjohnson @limlouisa @JimMillward @PM_Thornton @jwassers @isabellamweber
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Not just theory, also empirics!. Original data collection, fieldwork, and deep area studies knowledge & contributions are also being undervalued (probably even more than theory). If we don't know anything, it's hard to come up with interesting Ideas.
The diet of social scientists is tilted heavily toward methods (for empirical research) relative to theory. As a result, few cultivate the theoretical imagination and our disciplines are comparatively theory-poor. Am I wrong? If not, what can be done to bring theory back in?
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The situation in China today is thus not a surprise or a suddenly erupting crisis. Rather, it's the result of a long slow burn and a confluence of many factors. The bottom line, though, is a fundamental dilemma: short-term remedy versus long-term structural shift. 18/25.
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Indeed, by 2011, multiple sources indicate that Chinese local governments were deriving at least 70% of their revenue from land use transfers, real estate transfer taxes, & the like. Other data indicated that upwards of 60% of Chinese household wealth was in real estate. 10/25.
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China experienced rapid economic growth in the 1980s, but with declining government revenue, high inflation, and significant political/social upheaval. Growth was driven mainly by expansion of non-plan activities ('growing out of the plan'). All this changed in 1994. 2/25.
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Delighted to be named Senior Associate Fellow of @RUSI_org!. @CamGeopolitics @CambridgeFames @NCUSCR .#politics #Asia #China #Indonesia #InternationalRelations.
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Very surprised this isn't getting more coverage in Western media. Very odd and definitely out of character. Potentially also concerning, though impossible to tell as yet (could well be just the flu). #China #BRICSSummit2023 #Politics.@CamGeopolitics.
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Still, China famously averted recession in 2008/9. It did this by adopting a policy of truly impressive levels of demand stimulus in the form of government spending, grants, and policy-directed lending. 7/25.
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Whatever other faults we find, I think it's obvious that the government has accomplished something truly amazing in turning around Beijing air quality. I was there earlier this month & even the "bad" days were still closer to @KennedyCSIS's photo than what was typical years ago.
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But any really big macro-level change will be slower in coming & harder to see in real-time. 25/25.
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For an excellent explanation of what's been going on with the #protests in #China, this video from @DrJaneHayward at @lauchinainst is one of the best resources around:.
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Yes! . Every PhD student thinking about dissertation topics absolutely needs to put this quote up on their wall and then read and meditate briefly on it at least ten times each day:.
Theda Skocpol: “Recognize that a good enough answer to an important question, important both substantively in the field and in the real world, has more value than a definite answer to a trivial question.” Amen to that. More here:
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60% of household wealth in real estate is really high. The comparable figure in the US from around 2005 or 2006 (height of its bubble) was 30%. And this was more than a decade ago. 11/25.
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In 1994, China's government enacted both fiscal and monetary reform. Fiscal reform centralised revenues, balanced Beijing's budget, but left local governments with tons of unfunded mandates. 3/25.
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All points on the slide are absolutely correct. But they're also what many of us have been saying for 20 years. I don't think China's leaders are ignorant of any of this. Rather they either don't know how to implement them or perceive insurmountable political risks to doing so.
Professor Christine Wong calls for a major fiscal reform in China at the @ANUCrawford China Update Conference.
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All this lending staved off recession, but it seriously undermined the banks that the Chinese government had spend much of the period from roughly 1995-2005 trying desperately (and ultimately successfully) to recapitalise and stabilise). 8/25.
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The problem has long been that more government spending and loose lending only make the bubbles worse, crowd out consumption, and don't especially promote the most productive investment or foster sufficient innovation for across-the-board upgrading. 14/25.
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The only way to fix things immediately would be massive injection of central government cash. This could backstop and clear bad debts in the real estate sector, bail out insolvent shadow banks, boost aggregate demand and forestall economic slow-down, etc. 19/25.
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The next 15 years saw a tremendous boom, driven by FDI & exports, & focused in 'export-processing manufacturing'. This drove GDP growth rates of 10% or more, but also led to sharp and widespread social dislocation (not least among the tens of millions losing jobs in SOEs). 5/25.
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I had a lot of fun thinking back over ‘Seeing Like a State” and its influence on thinking across the discipline. Hope the article makes for similarly enjoyable reading!. #politics #polisciresearch #PoliSci #development.
What was missed in the early interpretations of James C. Scott’s "instant classic" Seeing Like a State? Check out @wjhurst article on Scott’s classic work available here:
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@LauraK_Nelson Too much pressure-->too many crap submission-->too much reviewer fatigue and bad reviews-->less good published work-->students wasting too much time and not actually learning anything.
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Ultimately, inflection points and critical junctures can only be clearly spotted in hindsight. But, what we're seeing in China is not the start of something new and probably not the very end of an unwinding of export-led growth that began 15 years ago. 23/25.
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Massive new spending and/or lending now would make those asset price bubbles even worse. It would continue to crowd out consumption and more productive investments. And it would make it more difficult & costly down the road (maybe even prohibitively so) to do this again. 21/25.
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Around the same time (2010 or so), the Chinese government also began speaking publicly about the need to: 1) increase consumption; 2) upgrade to higher value-added sectors; 3) improve aggregate return on investment; and 4) rein in the bubbles, especially in real estate. 12/25.
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Just finished watching "The Long Season" (漫长的季节). Recommend it very highly. A bit long at 12 episodes and I was not 100% taken with every one of the plot threads. But, it was definitely among the best TV dramas I've seen in any language for quite some years.
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The export-led boom ended abruptly in 2008 with the world financial crisis. Exports declined very sharply in that year and in 2009 and many sectors never recovered. Millions of jobs were lost and the process of offshoring lower value-added production accelerated. 6/25.
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Monetary reform, inter alia, made the RMB at least somewhat convertible for the first time. This opened the floodgates for foreign direct investment (FDI) and greatly facilitated growth in Chinese exports. 4/25.
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I’m creating a list on Indonesian Studies. Please consider subscribing if you’re interested in #Indonesia. Also, if you have or know of an account I should add, please don’t hesitate to message me. Thanks!. @wjhurst/Indonesian-Studies.
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This was the genesis of the 'Made in China 2025' programme (about upgrading and increasing consumption), the 'One Belt, One Road' Initiative (about seeking higher investment returns, as well as extending soft power), and other major policies. 13/25.
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But lack of continued spending and lending could seriously destabilise the economy, even to the point of provoking a crisis. We saw a similar moment of real dilemmas and difficulties in 2015. We're seeing essentially something similar now. But Covid also intervened. 15/25.
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Very sad news. Lowell was on my committee, co-authored an article with me, and on several occasions treated me & numerous other grad students to home-made ice cream at his house. He will be sorely missed in Berkeley, China, and around the world.
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Received an invitation from my university's provost to some torpid "conversation on the art of saying 'no'". The only reaction that popped into my head was, "thank you, no". I bet the organizers never dreamed their event would be so successful before it even happened!.
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@APSAtweets Who wrote this?. How do they find it reasonable to suggest that "both sides" need to do better?. The only 'two sides" here are the side of law and democracy and the side of fascism and barbarism. Which side is APSA on???.
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The trade wars beginning around 2017 have also persisted, drawing in countries beyond the US & prompting tighter & broader restrictions, e.g. like those linked to the #CHIPS Act. China wants very much to re-engage economically, but it isn't so easy & gains have been slow. 17/25.
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Sadly lost in the shuffle is China's re-engagement (at least economically and socially) with the rest of the world. This won't happen if the Chinese economy is in decline (or crisis) and won't be prioritised if its government opts of massive new stimulus. 22/25.
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During the pandemic, China's central government response ensured that local government budgets were not directly at immediate risk, but #ZeroCovid also effectively killed consumption for more than 2 1/2 years and made international trade and investment dramatically harder. 16/25.
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I love Chongqing. One of the most underrated cities in China.
Everyday Life in Chongqing重庆, a city built on mountains. Photo credit: LRB 642969381.
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#Indonesia enacted a new Criminal Code toaday & there's been lots of commentary about historical precedent and earlier codes going back to the era of #Dutch #Colonialism. Read this (esp. pp.68-86) for my take on & explanation of this history:. #Law.
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@JaneFerguson5 Thank you for your consistently outstanding reporting on the vitally important issues & events unfolding in Afghanistan under extremely challenging & dangerous conditions!.Crises like these are when we need journalists the most & the world owes you a tremendous debt of gratitude.
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Combined with Hu Jintao's crack down from 2006 on excessive/illicit local taxes and fees, the lending helped drive rapid inflation of serious asset price bubbles, especially in real estate and housing. 9/25.
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It could also continue promoting the growth of important new higher value-added sectors, from green tech & EVs, to AI and e-commerce. But this would come at very significant cost to longer-term structural goals. 20/25.
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We'll likely see serious debate (or at least evidence that it's happening behind the scenes) and possibly a meaningful shift in at least short-term economic policy in China over the coming days and weeks. 24/25.
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As so many wring hands and talk of ‘backsliding’, it’s worth noting from a different perspective that a former president’s arraignment on criminal charges marks a milestone for American democratisation. One reached by Taiwan and South Korea a decade or two ago.
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@tigerstr @gideonrachman @emilvv7 Reagan in 1984. Obama's victory in 2008 was also larger . This was a decisive win. But, as original post said, maybe not a watershed or sea change. .
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📅save the date!.The first installment of the CCCS public lecture series this year will be on Monday 23 Jan: Prof @wjhurst @Dept_of_POLIS will give a talk on land politics and trajectories of political change in Asia. All welcome!.@Durham_SGIA
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99% of this post is obvious (or should be) to anyone who works (or has colleagues who work) across different parts of the world. But it’s vitally important for all scholars to understand the issues in play & to do their best to work against the problem:.
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Academic journal publishing is an exploitative oligopoly of for-profit, mostly corporate, presses. Considering reviewers and most editors aren't paid and production costs are very low, journal content should ideally all be open access. If not, subscriptions should be very cheap.
UK universities will cancel journal subscriptions unless publishers reduce their prices to reflect financial pressures amid the pandemic, three organisations representing librarians and higher education managers have warned.
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Extremely sad news. I coedited a book with Professor Li nearly 20 years ago. That was in part the result of him being willing to take time out in summer to meet with a random PhD student who cold called him and then arrived 30 minutes late. There were never many like him.
Mourning Professor Li Qiang, formerly Dean of Social Sciences at Qinghua University and a pioneer in rebuilding sociology and social sciences more generally in China and especially Qinghua. He was 73.
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It's a mistake to say #China is 'abandoning #ZeroCovid in response to recent #protests'. More likely, vaccination drive for elderly was long planned to start on 1 December to get ready for #chinesenewyear. Other measures have long ebbed and flowed.
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Video of my discussion with the incredibly insightful @fravel earlier this week about #China’s upcoming Party Congress:. #politics @CambridgeFames @Dept_of_POLIS @NCUSCR @CamGeopolitics @MITPoliSci.
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I have not yet read the full (paywalled) WSJ article. But even just the headline implies a couple of things I'd at least partially disagree with:. 1) China has not experienced a '40year boom'. and. 2) It's not suddenly all over. For more, see:.
Superb summary of China's current policy predicament from @Lingling_Wei and @yifanxie --. Captures both the current moment, and set of decisions over the last twenty years that created today's unbalanced Chinese economy. 1/.
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It will be a difficult dance for China simultaneously to prevent Russia's defeat, avoid overtly supporting Russia militarily, reassure Ukraine of its neutrality, impress its domestic and friendly international audiences, & steer clear of further agitating the US & others. 11/END.
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Many are now proclaiming #China #reopen from #covid as of the lifting of #quarantine for international arrivals set for 8 January. Not so fast. This is a most welcome first step. but (a short thread 🧵):. 1. PCR nonsense/theatre remains. 1/4. @CamGeopolitics @NCUSCR.
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Launching a new #youtubechannel, "Politics Explained"!. Trailer will go live at Midnight UK Time!. Please Subscribe (more videos to follow soon):.
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Thrilled to see my book, “Ruling Before the #Law: the #Politics of Legal Regimes in #China and #Indonesia”, pass 9000 downloads and 17000 views!. #polisciresearch.
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