RT @SCWObservatory: Europe's internet depends on a vast network of undersea internet cables that, as our research associate @joschabels exp….

RT @pat_kaczmarczyk: Fazit zu Punkt 1: Die argentinische Politik hat mit den "Erfolgen bei der Inflationsbekämpfung" nur insoweit zu tun, a….

RT @steve_rolf: NEW ARTICLE: In a piece published today in @GlobalizationsJ, @Seth_Schindler and I grapple with the changing contours of th….

RT @IntlCrimCourt: Situation in the State of Palestine:.#ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I rejects the State of Israel’s challenges to jurisdiction a….

RT @BernieSanders: It should come as no great surprise that a Democratic Party which has abandoned working class people would find that the….

RT @jasonhickel: All the takes are correct and yet they also miss the point. Yes, it was insane for the Democrats to think they could win….

RT @Natascha_Strobl: Es ist eben nicht alles gut. Die meisten Menschen sind aufgerieben, haben Angst, merken, dass was nicht stimmt. Die ex….

RT @visevic: @MyriamThyes @IT_Digital_AC Diese Modelle wurden entwickelt und auf den Markt gebracht, die Marge bei den Verbrennern war aber….

RT @MFratzscher: Der deutsche Staat hätte 2-3% des BIP, also € 80 bis € 120 Mrd., mehr an Steuereinnahmen, wenn Deutschland Vermögen so sta….

RT @CogitatioPaG: Will geoeconomic transformation reinforce or redefine global power?. As we examine the emerging turn in global political….

could be of interest to some scholars I cited / built my argument on:.@FabioBulfone @DanielaGabor @LucasSchramm91 @aejuncos @lmuehlen @ShaharHameiri @Luukschmitz @tmrergen (and others).

A second implication is that expectation that states will rebalance scarce budgets towards geoeconomically relevant investments is unlikely to be fulfilled. Instead, the EU runs the risk of further deindustrialization and infrastructural decay.

A first implication is that EU economic policy is in an intermediate state: the recovery fund was used to finance strategic measures. Yet, we currently see a rollback of these forms of public financing, indecisive reforms, and a return to national fiscal consolidation.

European capital seeks to seize this deadlock and get the best out of both worlds: consolidation via the expenditure side and a delegitimization of non-investment spending, coupled with public funds that make private investment in infrastructure more lucrative and de-risk it.

While an influential group of southern ministries, DGs, center-left parties, and trade unions is promoting strategic autonomy, fiscal austerity is backed by relevant veto players: the German finance ministry as well as the conservative and right-wing parties.

The article undertakes a content analysis reconstructing the positions ministries, Commission DGs, European parties, business and employer associations, as well as trade unions take on this issue. The findings (once again) highlight the power of European capital in EU policy.

Austerity and strategic autonomy are two seminal ideas that have highly conflicting perceptions of economic policy. My historical data of infrastructure investments confirms that they are also practically incompatible: austerity disproportionately reduces strategic investments.

Scholars often stress market-liberalism as the main antagonist to strategic autonomy in contemporary EU policy. I argue that its a lot harder to move the EU away from its fiscally austere traditions than from some kind of free-trade nostalgia. A short 🧵 about my findings.

📢 New article is out with @CompChange !.It's open access 🌐 Did you ever wonder how the EU, dead set on a return to austerity, seeks to realize essential investments? I did too, so I analyzed the positions of EU actors and European capital on this issue.

RT @IsabellaMWeber: I couldn’t even tweet yesterday when I saw the results in Thuringia and Sachsen. This was so predictable. Germany i….