RT @HowardJShatz: China has grand plans for smart cities, including in the Middle East, where the US is the main security provider and has….

RT @RANDCorporation: Shira Efron, a leading expert in Israeli and Middle Eastern affairs, will return to RAND as the new Distinguished RAND….

What do you want to know?.

RT @scharap: Amazing how we’ve come full circle on this idea. What problem is a brigade of European forces far from the front trying to sol….

RT @ohlennart: The speculated B30A would be a really good chip. “50% off” is false reassurance. -½ B300 performance, ½ price = same value….

Although the current asymmetry in access to knowledge and materials favors defenders, this advantage may be difficult to maintain as biotechnology becomes cheaper, more accessible, and decentralized. To mitigate rising risks, defenders can pursue strategic interventions that.

How do advances in synthetic bio and related technologies affect the offense/defense balance in bio?. "The identification of four out of five asymmetries favoring attackers suggests that biology currently confers a distinct advantage to attackers.".

"When the United States sells chips, they're gone forever—disappearing into data centers with unknown users pursuing unknown goals. There's another option: give users the computing power of chips remotely.". Terrific point by @janet_e_egan and @ohlennart.

RT @RANDCorporation: New report outlines four clear astrographic regions for the new space era:. 🌌 surface environment.🌌 near-body space.🌌….

RT @ohlennart: Now also reposted on the a16z feed!

RT @RANDCorporation: As AGI emerges, what might cause conflict, competition, or even cooperation between the U.S. and China?. RAND's Michae….

"As of early 2025, the PLA appears to be taking a different approach to MUM-T than the U.S. Air Force, focusing more on enhancing software and algorithms to enable unmanned systems to support and augment manned platforms. While both militaries prioritize cost-effective CCA-type.

“The classic insider threat is a malicious or negligent employee. The playbook for managing these types of insider threats are well-understood. But the agentic insider threat is different: it’s a well-intentioned employee guided toward a risky action by a non-human accomplice”.

RT @ohlennart: If the goal is dependency and revenue from China's AI market, why sell? .Cloud/remote access delivers both without giving aw….

The good news is that the risks we identify appear to be manageable if governments adopt prudent policies. (The bad news is that governments do not always adopt prudent policies.). To hedge against AI causing unfavorable shifts in the balance of power, we recommend that the.

The second is the novel challenge that AI could alter human strategic judgment in ways that fuel misperceptions and miscalculations. If leaders start to lean heavily on AI to analyze information and recommend courses of action, that introduces a vector for AI to distort.

Two hypotheses stand out as particularly concerning and deserving greater attention. The first is the traditional challenge that technological breakthroughs could lead to destabilizing shifts in the balance of power among states. If some militaries are better able to leverage.

Zach Burdette, Karl Mueller, @lilyhoak and I generate six hypotheses about pathways by which AI might trigger a war. AI is unlikely to directly trigger a major war, but it could add fuel to the fire and increase instability if governments manage the technology poorly. /2.

Could advances in AI trigger a major war? . In a new article for the @BulletinAtomic, we develop a framework to evaluate the risk that AI could increase instability and make international conflict more likely. /1.

RT @Dimi: SCOOP - @Nvidia has done deal with Trump administration to pay US government 15% of revenues from #China H20 sales, in unpreceden….

Danzig's central message is clear: in the race to harness AI for cybersecurity, speed is the most critical variable. The time for the U.S. to act is now. /end.