Decker Eveleth
@dex_eve
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Nukes & deterrence analyst at @CNA_org. @reed_college_, @MIIS alum. Former @JamesMartinCNS. Bylines @NKNewsorg @ForeignPolicy. Views my own.
Washington, DC
Joined September 2016
Delighted to see my words in Foreign Policy, where I discuss the likely technical limitations of the Burevestnik system. It's no silver bullet.
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I increasingly worry about an Eastern European state moving first without NATO coordination. This is why I'm open to a forward deployed French nuclear force - IF that French nuclear force comes with assurances from hosts that France has effectively veto power on any offensive.
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What I mean by this is, both sides are going to have a lot of missiles positioned very close to each other, increasing first mover advantage. The biggest flashpoint in European security may not be 2000km missiles, but 200km missiles.
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The problem we have now is that Eastern Europe, with NATO members rapidly arming and Russia kicking missile production into high gear, is going to increasingly look like the Korean peninsula over the next decade.
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I think a lot of us who look at European security are still too focused on flight times between European capitals and Moscow. We talk about escalation risks of long-range cruise, etc. I think this is outdated.
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Golden Dome proves the United States does not have a secret weather control weapon because if we did we could use it to mess up adversary missile guidence with sudden pressure changes. QED.
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RT @KomissarWhipla: Lukashenko reiterates plans to deploy Oreshnik IRBM in Belarus by the end of this year.
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There is no evidence to support this statement.
Israeli journo Raviv Drucker reports many Iranian strikes hit IDF bases & strategic sites but went unreported. He says Israel was deterred too. Israel's censors mask damage to project invincibility—meant to prevent panic, capital flight & emigration. Most analysts miss this.
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Full DF-31AG launcher company.
Starting the week sipping coffee and blasting the new Rocket Force battle song. @dex_eve @jordanschnyc
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RT @John_Hudson: SCOOP: The United States obtained intercepted communication between senior Iranian officials discussing this month’s milit….
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RT @NicoleGrajewski: A lot of technical assessments of Iran’s nuclear program feel rushed. There’s an overreliance on fuel cycle basics and….
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This is correct. Many technical assessments have already been proven wrong because the data underlying them turned out to be wrong. Most cannot be wrong or right because they are so vague as to be meaningless.
Iran may still pursue nuclear weapons but assumptions need to be grounded in what we don’t know, not fantasies of what we’d like to warn about. That means cutting through noise, resisting alarmist simplifications, and asking better questions.
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This is where things are headed, and I don't dispute the need. I do hope we are thinking early about the NATO cohesion risks this capability being common will produce in certain contingencies.
I think if Europe is serious about wanting to combat Russia, they should be investing extremely heavily in long range weapons. Ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and attack drones. Invest in turbine production and rocket production. Aim to create the cheapest jet turbines in.
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🚨 | Helmut Marko is unimpressed by the Verstappen and Mercedes rumours. "Russell does talk. I thought he had a fixed contract for next year. "That must have changed after Montreal. "Russell says so much.". [@GPblog_com].
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I am referring to PLARF analysts exclusively as "the carrier-killer hipsters" from now on.
The "carrier-killer" hipsters will be quick to point out that PLARF has far better BMs and is part of a far superior "system of systems". But a CSG/SAG moves, and can fire back. The "Find" element of the kill chain has been made easier, but the "Fix" element remains a challenge.
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First blog post in a series about the 12-Day War, this first one on Iranian breakout, and why I think people are a little too eager to assume the worst on Iranian breakout speed:
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If we are imagining that damage to a specific military target is the success case, that number drops to about 1%.
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If we are imagining that all impacts of such nature are "successes," then Iranian missiles have about a 9% success rate against Israeli defenses. If we imagine that any success against a populated target is a success, then the figure drops to about 6%.
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Basically all the military impacts are effectively misses. The impacts at civilian sites are also largely misses. The Glilot salvo did not seem to hit the intended target for example.
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