Paper by our fellows Lima De Miranda & @DJSnower published in @PNASNews: "The societal responses to COVID-19: Evidence from G7 countries". Countries reacted similarly on GDP & emissions, but tribalism increased overall. 1/

RT @SteveStuWill: Six fundamental beliefs that bias our view of the world:. 1. My experience is a reasonable reference. 2. I make correct a….

"The policiticized pandemic":Article by our fellows @davidpipke & @GGrimalda published in European Economic Review. Temporary embargo-free version accessible 👉Joint with @MatthiasSutter @LPBetterWorld @MattSutter_MPI & Fabrice Murtin @OECD.

RT @Econ_4_Everyone: Fascinating figure on readability from Plavén-Sigray et al. (2017), who analyzed 700k+ abstracts published between 188….

This data was collected in collaboration with other early carrier scientists from @leuphana University, Senckenberg Institute @geobiodiversity & @uni_kassel and provides input for at least 9 PhD thesis’s and hopefully many more papers.(2/2)”

Our research fellows Susann Adloff & Aloyce Patrick successfully completed 700+ interviews from people who work, live and travel at mount Kilimanjaro for the interdisciplinary project Kili SES👉🏽exploring the relationship between people and nature. (1/2)”

Considering bpth solidarity and agency (confidence in empowering institutions, freedom of life choice, vulnerable employment, life expectancy), G7 countries have considerably different patterns of fragmentation/cohesiveness and empowering/disempowering impacts. 3/

Tribalism is defined as the difference between ingroup solidarity (i.e. social support received by friends and family) and outgroup solidarity (giving behavior, satisfaction with efforts to deal with the poor, and minority rights). 2/

Fascinating keynote by Gabriele Camera (@ChapmanU) in last keynote of @EcScienceAssoc conference: Money (=symbolic object with no instrinsic value)⬆️ cooperation even when reciprocity is impossible, through transmitting information on past cooperative behavior. #esabologna

RT @davidwmoreau: Doing a meta-analysis but need a little help? We've shared 9 templates for you to use, from prereg to code to data. Hopef….

Considerable misalignment exists between investment in "attack" & "defense" in international experimental simulations of war:@a_romano90 .@ICSD_Conference #ICDCPH.This & amount invested in attack/defense is explained by macro-factors such as instuttional quality & reputation.

Conclusions👇. Different social norms depending on structure of the game (coordination Vs. cooperation or both). Excessive focus on linear public goods game. Many times the interaction is one of coordination (ex. switching to efficient technologies to avoid climate change).👏12/

Some stickiness is also found in lab experiments, but it doesn't last too long. After an environment switch, players adapt to the new situation relatively quickly, even in the presence of asymmetry. 11/

Norms can be sticky: They can persist even when reality has changed in a way that they are inefficient or maladaptive, such as the Second Amendment on right to carry weapons in the US. 10/

In lab experiments, when costs are symmetric, individuals take turn in punishing norm violators, achieving both efficiency and fairness. When costs are asymmetric, the person with lower punishment costs is normally the only punishing, achieving efficiency but not fairness. 9/

Nevertheless, in many situations in real-life, we observe norms being violated with not much third-party or second-party punishment. Still, in field experiment we observe that punishment is substantial even in real life. 8/

In the "stealing game" individuals show willingness to punish a stealer with high frequency. 7/

In asymmetric Volunteers' Dilemma, when one player has lower costs, groups generally converge to the most efficient equilibrium. 6/

This costly coordination problem is solved among animals,when one monkey sends alert about a danger (presence of snakes) to benefit the whole group. When the danger increases (more snakes) alarm (in the form of shouting) decreases. 5/

Many collective action problems have both a coordination component and a cooperation component. In the Volunteers' Dilemma, one individual paying a cost suffices to bring about a benefit to the whole group. 4/