Pour_EVA Profile Banner
PourEVA ♡ ✏ Profile
PourEVA ♡ ✏

@Pour_EVA

Followers
113
Following
449
Media
46
Statuses
2K

Pour une Ethique du Vote Automatisé

Belgium
Joined September 2012
Don't wanna be here? Send us removal request.
@Pour_EVA
PourEVA ♡ ✏
6 years
Voici en trois minutes de quoi réfléchir sur le vote électronique à Bruxelles et en Flandre :.
0
3
3
@Pour_EVA
PourEVA ♡ ✏
10 months
Hackers will never know that on election day, all Belgian localities will have to connect via the internet to the regional instance of MARTINE to upload their results. A DDoS attack would only ruin the election night. Bugs and misconfiguration do that too.
sudinfo.be
Les cyberattaques perpétrées ces dernières heures à l’encontre de sites internet d’institutions belges « ne pourront en aucune manière interférer sur les élections » communales et provinciales de...
0
2
0
@Pour_EVA
PourEVA ♡ ✏
1 year
Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT) saves the day when voting machines results differs from paper count. For Paper to be useful:.1) The human readable vote should be the true record, not a QR code.2) Risk-Limiting Audit (RLA) must be performed. Belgium does none of that. .
@RobertKennedyJr
Robert F. Kennedy Jr
1 year
Puerto Rico’s primary elections just experienced hundreds of voting irregularities related to electronic voting machines, according to the Associated Press. Luckily, there was a paper trail so the problem was identified and vote tallies corrected. What happens in jurisdictions.
0
1
3
@Pour_EVA
PourEVA ♡ ✏
1 year
Autant pour les ordinateurs de vote, notre action en justice et notre lobbying a permis d'obtenir le code source (malheureusement publié uniquement après les élections). pour MARTINE on n'a rien, tout se passe côté serveur. C'est connecté à internet, et tout est possible!.
0
0
1
@Pour_EVA
PourEVA ♡ ✏
1 year
On vous parle beaucoup des machines à voter, car c'est ce que l'électeur voit et lui permet de se poser des questions sur le manque de transparence du vote électronique. Mais il y a aussi MARTINE qui est utilisé pour tous les types de dépouillement:.
2
2
2
@Pour_EVA
PourEVA ♡ ✏
1 year
Pour les élections, vous êtes plutôt "bon vieux papier" que tout le monde peut vérifier ou "QR code" illisible venant d'une machine incontrôlable?.
0
0
1
@Pour_EVA
PourEVA ♡ ✏
1 year
Observing #evoting is challenging because once running you cannot tell what software is running. even if you were presented with some source code. Apparently some do not want more transparency and the likely negative publicity that more eyeballs at the system would bring.
@trtram
Märt Põder / @[email protected]
1 year
Election observers with more than 1000 signatories petitioned @Riigikogu constitutional committee to "render #evoting meaningfully observable", but in January 2024 after six months of silent processing the proposals were dismissed without an explanation.
0
0
2
@Pour_EVA
PourEVA ♡ ✏
2 years
A touch screen voting machine, activated by a chip card, that produce a QR as the trace/proof of the vote. and the QR code is not human readable, and the machine can be hacked. A very Belgian scenario, but this is a US trial to get rid of the machine.
Tweet card summary image
worldtribune.com
by WorldTribune Staff, January 23, 2024 A voting systems expert demonstrated in a Georgia court on Jan. 18 that Dominion Voting Systems machines can easily be hacked. University of Michigan Profess…
0
1
4
@Pour_EVA
PourEVA ♡ ✏
2 years
RT @zoobab: eVoting in Estonia: "but electoral complaints filed about such electronic votes were dismissed without explanation of why ballo….
0
1
0
@Pour_EVA
PourEVA ♡ ✏
2 years
All of the IT aspects in election are risk and make control by the citizen difficult or impossible. This is true for voting machines, e-counting, internet voting and digital transmission of election results. Basic tabulation can go wrong. The problem is similar, solutions differ.
@ChrFolini
Christian Folini
2 years
Brief thread on @StatSchweiz miscalculating🇨🇭election results. I let this rest for a few days, but I think we see clearer now. I have a gut feeling this has been the biggest blow to #EVoting that has been dealt so far. In a very indirect way, but intimidating nevertheless. 1/🧵.
0
0
3
@Pour_EVA
PourEVA ♡ ✏
2 years
Flipping bit in computer used to be hard, random and requiring high energy cosmic ray to have a cascade effect (affecting eVoting):. (Radioactive material could also help but seems impractical and dangerous). Those days are gone:.
Tweet card summary image
radiolab.org
What do a hacked Belgian election, a falling airplane and a fleet of runaway cars all have in common? The answer just might lie in the stars.
0
0
1
@Pour_EVA
PourEVA ♡ ✏
2 years
Il y a 11 ans PouEVA a décidé d'être présent sur Twitter pour pouvoir communiquer avec d'autres associations similaires, des chercheurs, des politiciens, des journalistes. tous ceux qui parlent de ou devraient connaître les dangers du vote électronique. CM: @DavidGlaude
Tweet media one
0
1
1
@Pour_EVA
PourEVA ♡ ✏
2 years
It was not safe, cannot be made safe:."The current cybersecurity environment and state of technology make it infeasible for the Working Group to draft responsible standards to support the use of internet ballot return in U.S. public elections at this time".
Tweet card summary image
opb.org
The advice from cybersecurity experts is unanimous: Internet voting is a bad idea. But it's already happening in every federal election. In 2020, more than 300,000 Americans cast ballots online.
0
0
1
@Pour_EVA
PourEVA ♡ ✏
2 years
I would have love to retweet this from #DEFCON31.@VotingVillageDC , but quick search did it find it.
0
0
0
@Pour_EVA
PourEVA ♡ ✏
2 years
RT @SuitSentient: You're probably wondering if voting machines are more secure this year. No. #DEFCON31 #electionsecurity .
0
10
0
@Pour_EVA
PourEVA ♡ ✏
2 years
RT @MarilynRMarks1: If you are at DEFCON and interested in election security, this important panel is happening tomorrow. @VotingVillageD….
0
13
0
@Pour_EVA
PourEVA ♡ ✏
2 years
Paper based elections are more secure. "The London-based body added that the largely paper-based process of elections meant it would be 'very hard' for hackers to influence the outcome of a vote.".
@OpenRightsGroup
Open Rights Group
2 years
"According to UK data protection law, a data breach of such an extraordinary scale and risk should've been notified immediately, yet we've been informed about it seven months after it was identified and two years after it happened.". 🗣️ ORG's @ds_m4riano.
0
2
3
@Pour_EVA
PourEVA ♡ ✏
2 years
"attackers could exploit the flaws to change votes or affect election outcomes, e.g., by changing ballot QR codes, which are what scanners count".You would think any country using QR code on printed ballots would check a significant number of ballots for this risk. NOT BELGIUM!.
@jhalderm
J. Alex Halderman
2 years
This makes it possible to attack BMDs at scale, over a wide area, without needing physical access to them. Our report explains how attackers could exploit the flaws to change votes or affect election outcomes, e.g., by changing ballot QR codes, which are what scanners count.
Tweet media one
0
0
0
@Pour_EVA
PourEVA ♡ ✏
2 years
RT @jhalderm: Today, the Federal District Court for the Northern District of Georgia unsealed a 96-page report that I wrote w/ Prof. @_aasp….
0
2K
0