1/ Check out my new article in @jststs (open access) w/@Elliotshuwei_Ji: “When competition becomes contagious." In it, we investigate how the emergence of conventional counterforce systems is shaping nuclear competition and alliance politics. https://t.co/jCQAaXk0gE

"I'm going to Boston ... for the food!" is basically a code phrase that you've been kidnapped.

I don’t think the Trump administration will attack Denmark either. But I don’t for a minute blame Denmark for taking the threats seriously. More importantly, this “oh he’s just threatening to attack a NATO ally in service to his own narcissistic craving for legacy acquisitions,

Around the introduction of GDPR: US investors stopped investing in Europe, but increased their investment in the US. European investors stopped funding startups both in Europe and in the US.

EXCLUSIVE: Negotiations for the UK to join the EU’s flagship defence fund SAFE have failed, people familiar with the matter said, a major blow to European security. Despite talks between officials this week, the two sides remained far apart on the financial contribution Britain

My brother in Christ, this is quite literally your fault.

Really quite ticked off with @British_Airways, which demands to know where I'll be staying in the US (CDC requirement, I know) but then stupidly does not allow me to enter any address in DC. Like, BA flies to DC, so why on earth have they failed to realize DC exists!?

UK is now so poor that earning £45k ($60k) makes you "rich".

Georgetown University Walsh School of Foreign Service (SFS) is hiring an assistant professor in security studies! Application requirements and additional details are in the link. We are accepting applications through Oct. 17: https://t.co/pQDhJlwz82.

If he had outsourced it to a random PR team: PELENNOR FIELDS, Third Age 3019 — Today we are thrilled to share that we are deepening our partnership with Gondor. Our team of talented Rohirrim is excited to support Gondor’s inspiring mission through close collaborative efforts

Summer 2025 issue preview @IntSecHarvard @mitpress! S. Phillips & D. Tower➡️ISIS @daveckang, @SiuHeiWong2, @ZenobiaChan➡️What does China want? Wu Riqiang➡️China on arms control @nickdanderson & D. Press➡️Military primacy in Asia H. Hiim & O. Tunsjo➡️Limited war in E. Asia

1/ Check out my new article in @jststs (open access) w/@Elliotshuwei_Ji: “When competition becomes contagious." In it, we investigate how the emergence of conventional counterforce systems is shaping nuclear competition and alliance politics. https://t.co/jCQAaXk0gE

I feel like a substantial amount of creativity comes literally just from knowing a lot of stuff. If you know like, three paintings, history looks like a linear progression from painting 1 to 2 to 3. If you see like 3 million paintings, you have a richer understanding of history

8/ Bottom line: Korean arms racing spills over. Even if Washington restrains itself, Korean and other allied capabilities can still trigger PRC reactions that force a U.S. response. That’s entrapment without a shot fired.

7/ What does this mean in practice? Bilateral U.S.–China fixes won’t cut it. Any real analysis has to consider allied conventional capabilities (long-range precision missiles, ISR, and BMD) as strategic variables, not rounding errors.

6/ This dynamic also has broader implications for IR theory insofar as it merges the classic security dilemma with Snyder's alliance security dilemma. Allies don’t need nukes to drag patrons into costly arms races anymore; highly accurate conventional strike + BMD will do.

5/ Net effect: a Chinese version of the “two-peer problem." This incentivizes faster PRC nuclear expansion and launch-on-warning maturation — and a hotter Sino-U.S. nuclear competition than a purely bilateral model predicts.

4/ But those same ROK systems can reach Chinese nuclear assets. China’s farthest new ICBM silos sit within ~3,000 km of western ROK — and several PRC brigades are much closer. Thus, ROK systems generate direct pressure on perceived PRC second-strike survivability.

3/ Case in point: the Korean Peninsula. Seoul’s answer to DPRK nukes = a conventional counterforce toolkit (esp. Hyunmoo missiles) plus layered BMD (U.S. THAAD, ROK L-SAM). This raises denial/punishment options and hedges against abandonment.

2/ Our central claim is that advanced conventional strike and missile defense let non-nuclear allies shape the nuclear balance. That means arms races in one dyad can spill over and warp another — and junior allies can entrap patrons in strategic arms racing.