New pinned tweet, as the links broke for the old one: "Petroleum and Progress in #Iran: Oil, Development, and the Cold War." https://t.co/jeVAp8VXbz "The Struggle for #Iran: Oil, Autocracy, and the Cold War, 1951-1954." https://t.co/WIet3Z6z3e

Anyone going into 2025 thinking China was going to ride to LNG's rescue should have their head examined.

Affiliates and subsidiaries of Mahan have been sanctioned in connection to other areas (including the movement of money/material in support of the Assad regime in Syria). But none of the actors involved in this transaction have been sanctioned, afaik.

The planes were purchased in Asia and moved, discreetly, via African intermediaries into Iran in July (incidentally, shortly after the war with Israel). Mahan and other carriers are barred from acquiring aircraft directly from Western companies.

Fun fact: despite sanctions and ongoing Ukrainian attacks, Russia currently has about 100 million bbls scheduled for export between now and end of Q1. Only half of the deliveries have a listed destination, however.

Incidentally, this is the crux of my argument: Sanctions *are* effective at shaping markets, but they fall short of changing state behavior. As tools of economic statecraft, they have utility; as tools of coercive diplomacy, they fall short.

If the US goal is to eliminate Iran barrels from the market, that goal has not been realized. If the goal was to produce fiscal pressure, the US can claim partial victory. Iran is weakened, but has not changed its negotiating position on the issues that matter to the US.

There remain major limitations: Iran can sell to only one customer, the business of moving the oil is expensive and time-consuming, Iran must accept steep discounts, its market is unlikely to grow, and the movement of hard currency from oil sales into Iran itself is a challenge.

The reduction of its regional proxies, the war with Israel, the degradation of its nuclear program and the return of UN sanctions in September has had no appreciable impact on Iran's ability to produce or export crude oil. #OOTT

Thus far, the only US comment (afaik) on the situation in Yemen has been an expression of support for the government in Aden led by the Presidential Leadership Council.

Rubio spoke with Saudi FM by phone. They discussed "urgent" need for peace in Sudan, and also the situation in Yemen. Both countries, fwiw, feature UAE-backed groups making gains against int'l recognized govts.

Why gas folks are so bullish about data center demand, as well as LNG. The back-log of CCGT orders has been the main story, but alternatives are emerging that could fill the behind-the-meter requirements of data centers without needing utility scale capacity.

Trump will give China access to the most advanced US chips, on behalf of the American worker and in the name of national security.

Wow

It's not a forgone conclusion, but the direction of travel suggests partition, with a new state declared in South Yemen. Which, once they make peace with Saudi, would leave Ansarallah/the Houthis in full control of north Yemen. A state in all but name.

Two years of war did not destroy Hamas, which remains the dominant force in Gaza.

"While Iran does not appear to be rapidly advancing its nuclear program, its “top priority” is restoring the ballistic missile project — a capability that Israeli and U.S. officials say would significantly shape the outcome of any future confrontation."

Key takeaways from @BashaReport, whose coverage of this conflict is absolutely critical. FWIW if Riyadh recognizes Houthi authority in the north, and STC dominance is consolidated in the S and E, suggests Yemen is on its way back to pre-1990 partition.

Apparently this operation is being undertaken on behalf of the Kingdom of Jerusalem (c. 1099-1291).

Iran's resources, size, geographic location, and ambitions make it a major regional actor--not just in MENA but in Central and South Asia, the Caspial littoral, and the Caucasus. The days where it dominated regional diplomacy, however, are probably over.

That is not to say Iran has become irrelevant. While it's been jettisoned from Damascus, Iran still has significant sway in Lebanon, an ally in Yemen that is clearly not going anywhere, and a number of powerful partners in Iraq. It's capabilities in the Gulf cannot be ignored.