My article on parliamentarism in founding era India is now out with @AJPS_Editor. And it’s open access!

It’s been a pleasure being part of the @pact_project’s exhibition on the Indian constitution at @SOAS. Folks in/around London, don’t miss this! Open till 20 Sep (except Sundays and Mondays) at the SOAS gallery.

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RT @BrunoLeipold: Recommend checking out the @pact_project exhibition at SOAS on 75 years of India’s constitution h….

Pleased to say that I’m joining @Kingspol_econ @kings_poltheory this September. Sad to leave an exceptional community of political theorists at York. Looking forward to the next phase.

We do talk about Bruno. And @BrunoLeipold’s an ace.

The authors and I have a different view on the appropriate alternative: their view foregrounds polarisation; mine urges attention to internal party functioning. Either way, the party and its relationship with parliament requires far more attention than it has received. (11/11).

In any case, this is a productive debate and one that needs to be taken more seriously. For too long, the anti-defection law has been accepted as a non-ideal but necessary safeguard for parliamentary democracy in contexts like India. (10/11).

In sum, parties can claim full internal autonomy grounded in ideological/religious/other considerations, as long as they don’t possess a constitutional claim over law-making. (9/11).

Even if we think there are pro tanto reasons to give leeway to ideological/religious considerations, these can be defeated by the procedural requirements attached to legislative decision-making. (8/11).

Again, I think Issacharoff’s suggestion has greater bite when parties are not governed by anti-defection laws. Constitutionalied party discipline fundamentally alters the normative matrix here. (7/11).

They also cite Issacharoff's idea that the "requirement that parties have open and democratic internal structures would put at risk ideological and religious parties that may be organized around certain fixed principles not amenable to internal majoritarian override.” (6/11).

The important question, I think, is not whether the party should or not be treated analogous to a state. Rather, it is whether the law should acknowledge this is the case when the anti-defection law makes it the case. (5/11).

I agree. But “the effort to make the political party an institution of the state” has already succeeded once an anti-defection law is in place. (4/11).

Acc. to Khosla & Vaishnav "The effort to make the political party an institution of the state is likely to undermine both the idea of a party. and the idea of state institutions, whose public character comes with distinct characteristics”. (3/11).

I agree with much of their analysis except when they address an argument I’ve made elsewhere:  "Because, for all practical purposes, parties have substituted the legislature, we should conceive of them as having a kind of “legislative status”. (2/11).

In their recent paper (which I highly recommend reading), Khosla & Vaishnav @MilanV address the issue of defections. They make an original and provocative argument which emphasises the value of political polarisation in addressing defections. (1/11).

Formerly a door stopper. Now a philosophy book. The Oxford Examination Regulations, versatile as always.

@Camila_Vergara @SAsiaLSE @qmulsaf @UCLPublicLaw.

@BrunoLeipold @whowhywherewhen @DrRBajpai @tarunkhaitan @jinaldadiya @stevenmklein @RaphaelSusewind @KingsIndiaInst.

Delighted to host @sandiptodg for a talk on his book, Legalizing the Revolution @CUP_PoliSci on Monday, 9 Dec in London. Register here for the talk:

@pavlosvas1.