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[I mostly use other platforms now so don't post here much; but this topic is a bit of an exception. ].

China won't want significant escalation (few do) but I suspect won’t mind the chance to test Chinese against Western weapons on India's side. I doubt Beijing will see the Indian strikes as excessively escalatory. A kind of re-run of 2019 would IMO be fine from China’s perspective.

Further back in time, there was some coordination between Chinese and US approaches (see Kargil, Twin Peaks, even Mumbai). But that hasn’t been the case since Uri- now China’s expectation is that US will provide forms of support to India, and it will do likewise for Pakistan 9/10.

China will certainly tilt clearly in Pakistan’s direction though - I expect providing intelligence support and diplomatic support (as we’ve already seen at the UN). This isn’t just about China-Pak relations, but demonstration effect to others that they “look after their friends”.

China won’t want to be too visibly embroiled in Pak response (beyond unavoidable fact that they will be using Chinese weapons): it's trying to stabilize ties with India now (as w/others) to consolidate China's position to face the US so will tread slightly delicately 7/10.

That doesn’t change the role that Pakistan plays for China as counterbalance / second front pressure on India. And Beijing never minded a bit of “re-hyphenation” of India with Pakistan- same holds now at a moment characterized by huge strategic (esp econ) opportunity for India 6/.

China-Pak ties are worse than a decade ago. Beijing’s disappointment with CPEC, concerns about failure to protect Chinese nationals, unhappiness with Pak internal security landscape, economic & political situation, put relations on a lower ebb (though they don’t dramatize that).

CPEC added a new factor: in the early years, as investments surged, China put extra stress on Pakistan maintaining stability with India to ensure their economic interests weren’t harmed. But CPEC has stalled and the importance of the economic relationship has dipped again. 4/10.

The Chinese kit is much better, and the balance of the weapons systems that Pakistan uses is now far more China-centric (also a byproduct of developments in US-Pak & US-India ties). Old version was low-end plus nukes / delivery systems; new version includes advanced platforms. 3/.

Fundamentals are the same as they have been for a long time: China supports Pakistan with military kit, diplomatic shielding, does not provide outright assistance to Pakistan in conflict scenarios beyond that. But lots of developments in last decade to note. 2/10.

A few quick thoughts on how China is likely to deal with the current situation in South Asia (since I am getting some questions along the lines of: "is the Chinese approach still the same as the one laid out in your book?" which is now more than ten years old. ) 1/10.

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The goal of the fellowship was not just to bring additional China expertise in house - it was also to help inform wider EU policy debates once fellows "re-emerged". Hoping to do my bit to contribute to that, and on many broader China and transatlantic issues, now I'm out. 3/3.