New book-alert: this is the culmination of several years of collaborating with great scholars on the forms of conflict that is non-military (I’m also happy to finally get Lermontov in the title). Here’s a little thread about what we’ve been thinking about —>

So to sum up: - Plan leaks - US confirms plan real - (Some) senators condemn plan - Senators say Rubio calls them, denies it’s real plan - White House denies that denial - Rubio says yes it is real starting plan

BREAKING: After talking to @SecRubio, @SenatorRounds announces that the 28 point plan was a Russian document, not a US document. Full @SenatorRounds: "@SecRubio did make a phone call to us this afternoon. I think he made it very clear to us that we are the recipients of a

Känner BÄVAN inför årets Spotify Wrapped.

"the proportion of non-performing loans made up 12.9% of all outstanding unsecured consumer debt. That is the highest it’s been since the central bank began publishing comparable data six years ago, and up significantly from 7.9% a year earlier" https://t.co/BseqMjRqus

Russia’s advance this year has been lackluster, especially along the axes they prioritized. The costs have been high as well relative to the amount of terrain gained. But Pokrovsk can be an unfortunate postscript to that story, especially if it results in unnecessary losses. 29/

The AFU continues to adapt. For example through widespread use of UGVs for logistics, and in some assault roles. Most units now have a UGV platoon, company, or battalion. These require greater skill and training to employ, but hold considerable promise, reducing casualties. 8/

Inte dumt

According to regional budget data, Russia continues to recruit approximately 30,000 men per month. This may explain why Russia is willing to lose thousands of soldiers each month in its assault on Ukraine, essentially treating its soldiers as "living munitions."

Russian oil and gas revenues in October 2025 were 888.6 billion rubles ($10.9 billion), or 27% below October 2024.

Pokrovsk is not insignificant, but the economic and logistical value of the city was lost long ago last fall. Losing the city now is far less critical than preserving the force to ensure a sustainable defense in the medium to long term. 13/

På frågan vad som är sämst med att arbeta i akademin svarade jag ”sovjetisk planekonomisk livegenskap” men det klipptes bort.

https://t.co/7sIOXgkKVr

Talar ut om Ryssland och livet i akademin för Universitetsläraren.

Some observers have described the fall of Pokrovsk as “sudden.” That may be true if one followed the wrong analysts. In reality, the defense deterioration was apparent as early as 2024 and became unmistakable by 2025, as the underlying dynamics made the outcome nearly inevitable:

Interesting read by @peterpomeranzev and Sviatoslav Hnizdovskyi. Readissimo.

"Ukrainska Pravda has learnt that at least 250 Russian troops are in Pokrovsk – they are engaging in firefights and killing Ukrainian soldiers, particularly drone operators, at their positions. Logistics into the city are fully controlled by Russian drones, forcing Ukrainian

The situation in Pokrovsk is becoming increasingly difficult as Russian forces continue to accumulate presence in the city via infiltration.

Varmt välkommen till FHS för boksamtal med Gudrun Persson om hennes nya bok. Skynda på, min bedömning är att det blir fullproppat på nolltid. https://t.co/MGEHsU2EGb

"Science and technology companies were hardest hit. Their profits were down 20% and material costs rose by 30%, highlighting the difficulty of securing critical resources. Companies in the defense sector lost about 15% of their sales due to sanctions"

Inte dumt