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Special thanks to @RyeGriffiths, @ALanoszka, @daniel_mcdowell, and twitterless Giles David Arceneaux, Shana Gadarian, and Amy King.

In sum: during crises, allies want to see credible, costly signals, and the United States has a range of military and diplomatic toolkits. Insights from costly signaling theories apply well to alliance reassurance.

Interestingly, all three effective tools had substantively similar effects. Military signals (conventional or nuclear) and public remarks seem substitutable—in contrast to claims that actions always outweigh words. But diplomatic overtures towards adversary fail to reassure.

I examined how each U.S. policy response influences the perceived safety of South Korea from DPRK aggression—a direct measure of reassurance. The results:.Conventional and nuclear signals work;.Public statements of support also work; but.Diplomatic overtures do NOT work.

To address this gap, I fielded a survey experiment with South Korean citizens during a hypothetical North Korea–ROK–U.S. crisis. I tested four tools: conventional signals, nuclear signals, statements of support, and diplomatic overtures to the adversary.

So what reassures allies in times of crisis? Most research examines reassurance success indirectly (e.g., allies don’t proliferate, so they are reassured). Policy tools for reassurance are many, but empirical evidence is thin.

In fact, reassurance may matter most when allies face imminent threats during crises—precisely when allies want their patron’s support most. Failure to reassure at those critical moments could have lasting impacts.

Skeptics may wonder if Washington will care about reassuring its allies (given its recent behavior). But I find it unlikely that the U.S. would sit idle if a core ally is caught in a serious crisis.

When alliances serve your strategic interests, reassuring allies is key to managing them well. So it's important to understand what tools help a patron like the U.S. actually reassure its allies.

Thrilled to share my new EJIR article on what reassures U.S. allies in crises. It’s Open Access: A short thread 🧵.

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