Hanna Notte
@HannaNotte
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Russia's foreign & security policy | Middle East | Nukes | Director for Eurasia @JamesMartinCNS | Snr. Associate @CSIS @csiserep | PhD Oxford Uni | Berlin-based
Berlin
Joined October 2015
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I don't think I've ever seen the Russian strategic community engage in such intense public debate over nuclear use as over the past 1 week.
Here a summary of all contributions, for those who missed it:
(Others, feel free to add pieces I left out to this thread!)
81
544
2K
Leaving Moscow as Russia marks "Defender of the Fatherland Day" with a heavy heart after days of intensive mtgs. Some Russians said I witnessed a historic moment (DNR/LNR recognition) but one devoid of euphoria, unlike 2014. Instead, I sensed disbelief & shrugging shoulders (1/8)
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366
1K
#Russia
-
#Hamas
#HamasAttackOnIsrael
What do we know?
What can we say about
#Russia
's role and cost-benefit assessment regarding this situation?
A 🧵
39
386
1K
Speaking w/some contacts in
#Russia
to try to understand evolving sentiments in society re:
#RussiaUkraineWar
, 3 factors stand out for me:
1. Adaptive behaviour
2. "Besieged fortress"
3. State propaganda working wonders
A thread. /1
21
311
889
All eyes on
#Putin
speech and
#Transnistria
today.
But something else is happening in Moscow:
+10 Palestinian groups - including
#Hamas
& Islamic Jihad (PIJ) - are hosted by Russia for mediation talks.
What's
#Russia
up to? How's it linked to
#Ukraine
? And can it succeed? 🧵/1
16
269
648
Infotweet für diejenigen GEGEN
#Waffenlieferungen
an
#Ukraine
& FÜR sofortige Verhandlungen mit
#Russland
:
„Alles wird mit einem Vertrag enden, aber die Parameter dieses Vertrags werden durch die mil. Situation bestimmt, in der dieser Vertrag Wirklichkeit wird.“ (Lawrow, 25.04.)
28
130
612
The predominant take on this platform is that yesterday's events revealed
#Putin
's weakness & vulnerability. The beginning of the end of his regime.
I think that's premature.
After all, Putin came out on top & there is so much we don't know about what exactly went down. (1/4)
41
109
581
I have seen scores on this platform characterize Monday's events as an inflection point in our relations with Moscow. True, but for many of us long-time Russia-watchers, it's been a rolling inflection point. And I believe the ball is still very much rolling. (8/8)
11
42
433
...a) Russia’s successes in
#Ukraine
's South/East in coming weeks, b) Russia's (mil.) resources (UA totally different ball game than Syria!), c) where we are at with Russia-Ukraine talks in a few weeks. But it’s to caution against assumption that this is over yet.
1
54
418
1. Sequential war: RUS recently termed 1st phase of
#UkraineWar
done, announcing focus on Donbas. In
#Syria
war, Russia had declared new phase in 2017, establishing de-escalation zones (DEZs) in Western parts, which freed up regime resources to take more territory toward the East
4
73
419
Once that was done, regime/Russia turned back & we saw sequential take-over of DEZs (E Ghouta, Homs, Deraa) in 2018 under guise of CT. Not at all to say that sequencing in Ukraine will be the same. Return of larger-scale fighting toward W Ukraine will depend on...
1
55
408
Among more liberal/pro-Western minded, the predominant feeling Monday night was bewilderment - with folks thinking until the last moment that "he's not gonna go there" - mixed with a deepening worry about the future trajectory of the country: domestic & its foreign policy. (2/8)
1
42
389
And meanwhile, many Russians (unlike in 2014, Crimea) seem to ask: "What is all this for?"(or: кому это нужно?) (7/8)
6
65
388
I highly recommend you read this by Dmitri Trenin - just to get an understanding for where influential Russian elites see
#Russia
headed:
-Total break with the current world order and its institutions
-Radical & sustainable reorientation to the non-West
70
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411
What's going on? No useful military role for foreign fighters at this point in the war? Logistical constraints in moving them? Concern about resulting vacuum in Syria and ltd. bandwidth to deal with any instability there? Combination of above? Curious to hear
@RALee85
& others.
4
47
394
The more hawkish felt vindicated by the building of momentum up to Monday (coercive diplomacy needed as gamble toward rectifying past injustices) but were equally caught by surprise by Putin speech (tone & substance). And seem to lack clear sense of where all this will end. (3/8)
1
33
339
However, the U.S. response to whatever will unfold in Israel in coming weeks - coming down hard on the side of Israel - *may* cause an even further Russian drift into Iran's orbit, given the geopolitical dimension here.
And that could have significant implications. /10
16
26
331
There is a wall in Europe, not a Berlin wall, but one between freedom & lack of freedom. And that wall becomes bigger with every decision not taken. We turned to you, warning that North Stream 2 is preparation for war. And you responded: North Stream2 is economy, economy, economy
4
88
319
It is my sense that these factors 1.-3. now constantly reinforce each other & drive apparent (and growing) support for what many in
#Russia
- yes, it's hard to believe - still believe is a "special military operation" with limited scope & aim.
#RussiaUkraineWar
17
34
293
Trying to find explanations, many were hard-pressed. Some suggested that Putin calculated - as he indeed stated before - that Russia will be sanctioned, called "the bad guy", with its interests disregarded by the West, anyway.... So, "he might as well go for it?!" (4/8)
2
23
280
"Putin zündelt auch im Nahen Osten" - mein neuster Gastbeitrag für
@zeitonline
Da leider hinter der Paywall, hier die Hauptargumente 👇🧵/1
21
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290
...regarding December security guarantee demands. If so, that could be dangerous misreading of how Western response is shaping up, in my view. (6/8)
3
19
271
If there was a bigger war in the region,
#Russia
would not have the capacity and bandwidth to deal with it.
And Moscow doesn't need that kind of war - low-level instability suits its needs just fine. /8
3
24
287
Amid a variety of views on what precisely will transpire next, there's consensus that we're far from the end. Either rapid escalation soon, or incremental "tightening the screws" on Ukraine - until, some say, he finally forces the West to "become serious" about talks... (5/8)
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267
..have been more rocky recently (esp. under Bennett & Lapid), but remain extensive: intel sharing, huge Russian diaspora in Israel (which predates the Ukraine war), extensive trade, deconfliction in Syria. Bibi and Putin have personal chemistry. /6
2
18
275
Each time you think
#Russian
disinformation has reached the peak of possible ludicrousness, something else is waiting right around the corner.
#Azovstahl
#Mariupol
#ChemicalWeapons
#RussiaInvadedUkraine
Russia says it cancelled its planned assault on Azovstal steel in Mariupol to prevent the West from using WMDs
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1K
4
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251
Israel-Hamas, Nagorno-Karabakh, Ukraine, Sudan etc
@mkimmage
& I look at today's international order & argue in
@ForeignAffairs
that it is marked by a toxic combination: Great power competition & great power distraction
The result: a profusion of crises
62
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1) Sergey Karaganov, 13.06.2023, "A Difficult but Necessary Decision"
25
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...Add to that, "the West often lies, why would we trust their version...?"
Looking for alternative information is possible, but 1. & 2. increasingly mitigate against an openness to learn about (and then live with!) uncomfortable truths /5
2
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#Einfrieren
Wir haben das ja mal in einem anderen Krieg gesehen, in dem
#Russland
auch meinte, die größeren Interessen und den längeren Atem (uns ggü.) zu haben:
Syrien, 2017-2018
Das Einfrieren hielt nicht lange und war für die Syrer katastrophal.
Kurzer historischer🧵/1
13
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2. Besieged fortress: Adaptive behaviour is amplified by a sense among many Russians that their isolation& life under sanctions will be for a long time. Plus, whether you wanted the war or not, Russia is now "mobilized" against immense outside pressures. Result: consolidation. /3
4
31
227
MUST READ.
#UA
negotiator M. Podolyak gives insights into
#Russia
-
#Ukraine
talks to
@Kommersant
. Bottom line: cautious hope that
#Russian
war aims lowered and negotiated settlement possible over time. Summary of main points from
@kommersant
👇
7
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228
In
@WarOnTheRocks
I reflect on the recent Russian debate on preemptive nuclear use against
#NATO
allies, what it suggests about escalation risks w/
#Russia
, and the nuclear implications of the
#Prigozhin
mutiny:
The West Cannot Cure Russia's Nuclear Fever
10
78
231
Yes.
#Hamas
delegations have been travelling to
#Moscow
for years, sure.
That doesn’t mean you can explain this attack today by lazily pointing the finger at Russia.
That obscures what are more complex dynamics and doesn’t help anyone
Trying to link Hamas to Russia is a pretty desperate manoeuvre, especially considering how warm relations are between Netanyahu and Putin. Don’t take those takes seriously.
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3K
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‼️Personal news: Happy & honoured to be appointed senior associate (non-resident) in
@CSIS
Europe, Russia & Eurasia Program
I look forward to collaborating with
@maxbergmann
@MSnegovaya
@kimmage
& team, while continuing my work w/
@VCDNP
&
@JamesMartinCNS
28
12
227
In my latest for
@WarOnTheRocks
, I argue that the ripple effects of
#RussiaUkraineWar
have reduced Moscow's ability & willingness to lean on
#Iran
to accept restoration of the
#JCPOA
.
So, don't expect Russian help on the nuclear deal after the US midterms.
11
53
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PERSONAL NEWS: Extremely happy to be directing
@JamesMartinCNS
's work on Eurasia & Russia going forward -- based out of Berlin.
I look forward to continued collaboration with my former
@VCDNP
colleagues, as I embark on this new chapter.
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12
215
10 yrs ago today -on Aug 21, 2013- the Syrian regime used chemical weapons (CW) against its people in
#EasternGhouta
.
#Syria
has yet to be held to account for its CW attacks & for its retention of CW.
But
#Russia
is trying to remove the issue from the international agenda (1/)
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86
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3) Ivan Timofeev, 20.06.2023, "A Preemptive Nuclear Strike? No!"
1
22
198
My debut on
@nytimes
op-ed pages on
#Russia
benefiting from the
#IsraelGazaWar
:
Ukraine has receded into the background; U.S.-led diplomacy in the Middle East is in disarray; and the West & the rest face each other over an abyss of mutual incomprehension
18
51
198
2) Dmitri Trenin, 20.06.2023, "The Ukraine Crisis and Nuclear Weapons" (in RUS)
1
21
194
6) Alexey Arbatov,
@KomissarWhipla
, Konstantin Bogdanov, 21.06.2023, "Nuclear war is a bad way to solve problems" (in RUS)
2
19
190
7) Fyodor Lukyanov, 21.06.2023, "Why we can't "sober up the West" with a nuclear bomb" (in RUS)
2
19
182
4) Alexey Arbatov, 19.06.2023, "A Preemptive Strike of Retribution"
2
17
176
My latest research report - "Dangerous Decline" - looks at the future of
#Russia
's military & security influence across the Global South (arms sales, Wagner/PMCs, other military activities) & the implications for the United States.
5 key take-aways:🧵
3
67
176
8) And on Karaganov's piece, and Putin's flippant remarks on nuclear arms control in St. Petersburg last week,
@ElenaChernenko
for
@kommersant
, 20.06.2023,
6
15
166
Over just the past week
-US announced withdrawal from
#Niger
-
#Chad
sent letter to US threatening to cancel Status of Forces Agreement
-
#BurkinaFaso
expelled another 3 French diplomats
Dynamic situation in Central Africa & Sahel, where
#Russia
is steadily consolidating influence
4
54
169
Much will surely depend on what happens in Russia's war against
#Ukraine
.
#Prigozhin
's appeal partially stemmed from the fact that the war is not going well - he put his finger on the issues, unapologetically, openly. (3/4)
1
14
164
It's conceivable that the corrosion of his rule is in motion. And more importantly, that the process will continue.
But there's also the possibility that the immense dysfunctionality of the system we observed yday can prove quite durable & not become dangerous to
#Putin
. (2/4)
4
12
161
NOW:
#Ukraine
President
#Zelenskyy
addressing the German
#Bundestag
via video broadcast. I speak to you, the German people, as Russia bombards us, destroys everything that we have built in our country. Over past 3 weeks, 1000s of Ukrainians have been killed, incl. 800 children.
6
48
155
Many worry that
#Russia
might turn to
#ChemicalWeapons
in
#Ukraine
, as things go increasingly poorly for it on the battlefield.
In my latest for the
@washingtonpost
, I examine the (limited) options to deter/punish such a horrible scenario:
🧵/1
16
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154
5) Deputy Foreign Minister Ryabkov (not an expert of course, but an official), 20.06.2023, Speech at PIR Center,
1
14
151
Not good: Satellite images show increased activity at nuclear test sites in Russia, China and US
Kudos to
@ArmsControlWonk
& his team at
@JamesMartinCNS
for uncovering this
7
75
148
On balance, I still believe
#Russia
stands to gain more than to lose from a protracted conflict in
#IsraelGaza
.
But there are risks & vulnerabilities, as became clear yesterday, when an antisemitic mob stormed the
#Makhachkala
airport in Dagestan, looking for Jews.
A 🧵
6
52
149
What is this historical responsibility (of Germany) before Ukraine after these past 80 years? We need help, Europe cannot preserve its values otherwise. I say to you, Chancellor Scholz: Destroy the wall, give Germany the role to lead, which it deserves, Support UA, stop this war.
3
18
138
S Karaganov doubles down on the nuclear scare, after he got some pushback by serious scholars in Russia's strategic community (👇earlier thread):
"There's no choice: Russia will have to launch a nuclear strike on Europe"
h/t
@lapszynski
Summary👇(1/10)
I don't think I've ever seen the Russian strategic community engage in such intense public debate over nuclear use as over the past 1 week.
Here a summary of all contributions, for those who missed it:
(Others, feel free to add pieces I left out to this thread!)
81
544
2K
9
57
142
"We could..face a nuclear confrontation w/Russia, after which, assuming we emerged 'victorious,' we immediately faced a 2nd nuclear confrontation w/China"
Who's gonna tell John Bolton that, after nuclear war w/Russia, we won't be doing much of anything?
17
29
139
"Western sanctions mean the Russian economy is securely insulated from global shocks. If there is no sudden fall in oil prices, or anything similarly catastrophic, there is enough money to maintain current spending for about 2 years"
Always read
@amenka
11
55
141
I implore you in the name of the older Ukrainian generation, who survived Babi Yar. Every year politicians here say: 'Never again'. But now we see that these words count for nothing.
1
17
139
What a timely visit -
#Iran
's chief of police, Ahmad-Reza Radan, is in Moscow to meet with
#Patrushev
& Russian National Guard head
#Zolotov
.
Sharing best practices on how to suppress various domestic threats to regime stability?
5
65
132
The implications for
#Ukraine
– and for global order – would be far-reaching and, I would submit, not pretty. (11/11)
6
12
132
So honoured & excited to attend next week's
@MunSecConf
as Munich Young Leader 2024!
Meet the Munich Young Leaders 2024:
@HannaNotte
is the Director of the Eurasia Nonproliferation Program at the
@JamesMartinCNS
and a senior associate at
@CSIS
. Her work focuses on Russia, the Middle East, and arms control. Read more:
#msc_myl
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2
15
10
8
137
Second, perceptions matter: if feeling of Western societies tiring—only 3 months into this war—seeps in and dominates narrative across "non-West", conclusions drawn will include: Russia “hangs in there” vs. West is “decadent and weak”.
Plus, “aggressors can get away”. (10/11)
3
26
129
The temptation to exploit anti-Western sentiments over
#Gaza
has been so powerful that Russia has been willing to sacrifice its (once good) relations w/
#Israel
These relations have been very rocky since Oct 7 & we probably haven't reached the bottom: /6
Yesterday, Israel's representative at the UN called Ukraine an ally, denounced Ru's invasion, and promised to provide an early warning system to UKR. Israel's approach to Ru is shifting rapidly, with officials drawing a link btw October 7 and Ru's invasion
1
14
22
3
19
133
If you've been following
#Prigozhin
/
#Wagner
over the past months (in fact, years - and activities not just in
#Ukraine
, but
#Syria
,
#Libya
, elsewhere in Africa) - and you're still cheering his proclaimed "march of justice" onto Moscow on from the sidelines - maybe think again.
12
31
131
You wanted to be economically active with Russia and kept putting off sanctions.
2
9
129
The intra-Palestinian meeting in Moscow has precedent
Russia's hosted such meetings in the past, most recently Feb 2019
Russia has long lamented the US' "monopolization" of the peace process & tried to carve out a niche for itself: mediating among the disunited Palestinians/2
2
12
130
This report has the *most alarming* recommendations re
#nuclear
issues: Russia should
-leave MTCR
-help
#Iran
build nuclear weapon (if it renounces intent to destroy Israel)
-convince 'global majority' that ltd. nuclear strikes against states supporting Ukraine might be necessary
A leaked report by Sergey Karaganov (co-authored by Aleksandr Kramarenko, Fyodor Lukyanov and Dmitry Trenin) (h/t
@KassenovaNargis
, link below) is the quintessence of Karaganov's school of foreign policy. A lot of acid stuff, but in the end of the day it's all about love. 1/7
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778
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57
128
Though it may go unnoticed in our
#West
-centric bubble,
#Russia
is now highly active diplomatically to ensure the “non-West” continues this “fence-sitting”.
Just look at who
#Lavrov
& RUS diplomats meet with these days.
Scroll though
@mfa_russia
website to get a sense. (5/11)
2
33
124
Let’s take
#MiddleEast
: Sure, there’s few staunch supporters of
#Russia
(Syria). Most "sit on the fence": Reluctant to join sanctions; Saudis/UAE won't pump more oil; Even
#NATO
ally (!)
#Turkey
& closest US ally
#Israel
tread cautiously due to security concerns vis Russia (3/11)
5
11
121
Why is Russia hosting this meeting now?
First, this is a continuation of
#Russia
's pro-Palestinian posturing since Oct 7.
Russia's slowness and reluctance to call out Hamas' terrorism broke with historical precedent, as I showed here: /4
1
16
121