New piece from me weighs in on the important brewing debate over corporate Scope 2 clean electricity crediting (GHGP2). I argue that it’s obviously better for clean energy innovation to require companies to buy hourly and regionally-matched clean power to make green claims. 🧵

(This strategy hasn't helped Japan scale transmission, but then again load there is declining. Anyways, was watching Gekkan Shoujo Nozaki-kun with the gf last night + couldn't help but notice episode 1 featured quite a lot of high-voltage lines!) My Neighbor Totoro approves:

"Would Americans be so accepting if, instead of observing the detached remoteness of a missile from the clouds, we watched our servicemen board the vessels and simply execute everyone on board without asking a single question?" Here is my recent oped discussing the summary

Grand plan to end opposition to transmission projects: Romanticize the heck out of transmission. Loving shots of transmission in backdrop/enviro shots of every movie, TV show + commercial until people subliminally get warm fuzzy feelings every time they see high-voltage pylons.

It’s time for folks working on climate + clean energy to get real about China, climate and clean energy techs. People want a fast energy transition but also talk about one that's fair + just. The prevailing selective discourse re: China risks a future with neither. New by me: 🧵

Another fantastic thread from Seaver that should prompt some introspection.

"In practice, the idea that China’s clean technology successes have uncovered a more hopeful recipe for climate salvation is wrong." Read @wang_seaver's latest for The Ecomodernist: https://t.co/b6IoaaExht

I feel it stems from being so intent on maximizing GW of solar deployed + bringing battery costs down that we forget why we’re decarbonizing to start with—to reduce negative climate impacts amid our larger pursuit of a better, more hopeful future. (END) https://t.co/Zw7tvhv0pz

The natural outcome of such an inconsistent stance results in Asian peoples in and around China disproportionately bearing the costs of energy transition efforts, while problematic supply chains further concentrate in China. That is a profoundly unfair dynamic we must rethink.

I work a lot on minerals + heavy industry now. What bothers me is a dynamic where folks vocally demand better mining + a just transition in general but get uncomfortable when asked if imported BYD cars use aluminum from Xinjiang or Myanmar rare earths. https://t.co/RnBEH6UXaV

Yet I feel climate advocates *reject* utilitarianism. Some fret over a rare flower a lithium mine may threaten, or condemn a wind farm Sami reindeer herders oppose, or see nuclear power as forever bearing an original sin from historic uranium mining on Navajo + Hopi lands.

Recent events highlight a pattern: concerning online behavior often appears before real-world incidents. This isn't political—it's about protecting people and workplaces. Screen for patterns, not just history.

Why am I raining on the parade? I worry about a climate movement that can’t decide if it's utilitarian or principled. Some seem desperate to field every solar panel or EV China can produce, no questions asked. Yet it’s unclear this even buys them the climate outcomes they want.

6th, overcentration of the world’s clean technology eggs in one country is both profoundly risky + a sign of problems underlying the energy transition. This along with commitments to better supply chain sourcing should motivate us to diversify clean tech manufacturing globally.

5th, if one believes that an energy transition must strive to do right, then one cannot advance a responsible transition without addressing the over concentration of problematic critical mineral + clean tech supply chains through an opaque China. https://t.co/wYpEdY7UfE

My 3rd/4th points discuss how climate issues just simply won’t dictate int’l diplomacy/trade. Govts don’t really see climate as a big enough threat to overcome rivalrous dynamics. Next-gen energy techs will change the world + it thus makes sense for countries to spar over them.

Second, we must better address how China’s industrial system + policies make decarbonization harder in key sectors. For industries like steel, magnesium, polysilicon, or PVC, cheap carbon-intensive Chinese industry impedes the business case for pursuing greener approaches.

A few key points. 1st, the 1.5C target is now impossible. For lower warming still <2C, China’s industry produces our greatest tools but also poses a large carbon obstacle. Glaze China’s clean energy success at your own peril—this only gives Beijing political license to coast.

And if one does care about more things than temperature in 2100, then China’s repressive government and position as the opaque + unaccountable global manufacturer of record for clean technologies + all sorts of other goods adds difficulties to charting a just energy transition.

By such a standard, there are no climate leaders, and arguably China is holding back from pursuing an energy transition as fast as it perhaps could. Many major industries concentrated in China offer as many obstacles to global decarbonization as China offers solutions elsewhere.

A utilitarian who defines the success of climate efforts single-mindedly on global warming by 2100 of no warmer than 1.5C-1.9C must face the reality that China is not doing enough—really no major countries are. https://t.co/nlJM7D1bWM

My critique is that this is incomplete thinking. - Are we actually on track for our goals? - What would it take to put the world on track? - Why are we doing all of this chasing of targets + deploying of technologies in the first place again? - Where does China fit in all this?

“We need the good numbers to go up as fast as possible, and China has the biggest good numbers. It’s time to accept this and roll with it if we want to have any hope of going where we want to go” is how I’d describe a common sentiment right now. https://t.co/Zw7tvhvyf7