Shahryar Pasandideh
@shahpas
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🇨🇦 Military and technology analyst. Fellow @BGCCIH. PhD from @GWtweets. Previously @BelferCenter @UofT. Media: send a DM
Toronto
Joined August 2013
Seeing how it seemingly needs saying with respect to some of my posts on Iran, I focus on organized mass violence involving two or more parties. I am generally agnostic as to the means/weapons/technologies used in organized mass violence of this sort. I do not focus on domestic
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🇮🇷🇦🇪 Dramatic scenes of air defence activity reportedly from the UAE. As I've said before, claimed interception rates are interesting and important, but we need to know the exchange rate (i.e., the ratio of inbound Iranian strike munitions launched to air defence/ballistic
🇮🇷🇦🇪 This video was reportedly recorded by the Chinese crew of a merchant ship near Fujairah. Note the ratio of inbound Iranian ballistic missiles to Emirati surface-to-air missiles. Should Iran be able to sustain such exchange ratios, the Gulf Arab states are in trouble.
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🇮🇷🇮🇱 Iran's "60th wave" of missile launches. According to state media, Khorramshahr-4/Kheibar ballistic missiles of the submunition-dispensing variety were used (which tracks with videos from Israel, see video 2), alongside Emad, Ghadr, and Kheibar Shekan missiles.
🇮🇷 Iran's "59th wave" of ballistic missile launches. This marks the public debut of the solid-fuelled Haj Qasem long-range ballistic missile in this war. The Haj Qasem amounts to a substantially larger and heavier design than the solid-fuelled Kheibar Shekan family.
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Regarding the nature of the claims and evidence of Russian components showing up in Iranian Shahed-136 strike drones employed in the current war: https://t.co/XXK2bJiXUv
🇮🇷🇷🇺🇺🇦🇺🇸 Another day, and another claim that Russia is sharing components through which Iran can improve the performance of its Shahed-136 strike drones for use against the United States, Israel, and the Gulf Arab states. I remain cautiously skeptical in the absence of (A)
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🇮🇷🇷🇺🇺🇸 This WSJ report claims that Russia may have helped Iran target the American AN/TPY-2 radar in Jordan. Perhaps. But as I recall, the first Iranian claim of having targeted that radar came within the first ~72-96 hours of the war. Russia would have had to act fast ... and
I have seen these claims and sat images re UAE AN/TPY-2/THAAD, but await corroborating evidence. Unless you are planning to launch Iranian ballistic missiles yourself, you can continue to spectate & await confirmation through one type of source/means or another. To be determined.
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The issue is that major American satellite imagery providers are not offering recent satellite imagery so as not to assist Iran in battle damage assessment (BDA). https://t.co/MCjFAsQ2G2
Suppose that you are an oil trader, hedge fund, or other market participant who wants to independently verify claims, including claims from the oil company in question, as to the extent of damage resulting from an Iranian attack. Now you have to wait 14 days for Planet imagery.
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🇮🇷🇷🇺🇺🇸🇦🇪 There are a great many undamaged fuel storage tanks at Fujairah. As things stand, oil traders, hedge funds, and other market participants may turn to Chinese, Russian, and other satellite imagery providers to independently assess damage to oil and gas facilities. 1/
Sputnix satellite Zorky-2M rushes to fill the void of absent images form the Middle East. Fujairah, UAE, 16.03.2026.
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On the issue of Russia's longstanding search for a proxy conflict through which to retaliate against the United States and Europe for their support of Ukraine, see:
🇮🇷🇷🇺🇺🇸 Russia has been searching for a proxy conflict through which to retaliate against the United States and European countries for their military support to Ukraine. This has been very difficult for Russia, given how American and European forces exited Afghanistan in August
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My post/thread from 15 March. Note how it includes screenshots from Iranian launch videos that do not indicate the use of (A) Russian-built Gerean-2 airframes or Garpiya airframes of recent vintage or (B) Russian 12-element or 16-element CRPA GNSS antennas
🇮🇷🇷🇺🇺🇦 I keep seeing this claim, including from Zelensky, that Iran is using Russian-built Shahed-136/Geran-2 strike drones in this war. Where is the evidence? Recently-built Russian Geran-2 (produced at Alabuga, Tatarstan) and the related but distinct Garpiya (produced at
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🇮🇷🇷🇺🇺🇦🇺🇸 Another day, and another claim that Russia is sharing components through which Iran can improve the performance of its Shahed-136 strike drones for use against the United States, Israel, and the Gulf Arab states. I remain cautiously skeptical in the absence of (A)
Breaking: Russia is secretly providing satellite imagery and sharing drone technology to help Iran target U.S. forces in the region
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🇮🇷🇮🇱🇱🇧 A new Hizballah video shows nighttime electrically powered Sayyad-107 strike drone launches against reported targets around Nahariya. Note how Hizballah can launch such strike drones against targets across northern Israel from launch positions north of the Litani River.
🇮🇷🇮🇱🇱🇧 A new Hizballah video of electrically-powered Sayyad-107 short-range strike drone launches. The target was reportedly in the Haifa area, some 35 km from the border.
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Above all, the Gulf Arab states have transitioned from a decidedly qualified/bounded form of pre-war neutrality to a very limited form of military involvement in the American & Israeli war against Iran because everything can still get so much worse: https://t.co/pc3QC7ec3i
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The same can be said about escalation dynamics in the Persian Gulf more generally: https://t.co/Xhmx4A2BG2
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The role of the Gulf Arab states in setting up, enabling, and abetting the American and Israeli war against Iran does not receive enough attention: https://t.co/TO9ZiJ3aUr
🇧🇭🇮🇷🇰🇼🇶🇦🇸🇦🇦🇪🇺🇸 A reminder that there are many overly simplistic, if not outright nonsensical, characterizations of the decidedly bounded form of "neutrality" that the Gulf Arab states pursued vis-a-vis Iran through 28 February 2026. The Gulf Arab states appear to have learnt
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🇧🇭🇮🇷🇰🇼🇶🇦🇸🇦🇦🇪🇺🇸 There are multiple explanations for the Gulf Arab states' observed hesitancy to join the American and Israeli war against Iran, even as they have become the targets of sustained Iranian attacks as part of Iran's deliberate horizontal and vertical escalation of the
Impatient with Iran’s attacks, the Gulf states have multiple options if they wish to increase the costs for Tehran, but they would run the risk of escalating the conflict. ➡️ Read the latest analysis by Dr Hasan Alhasan (@HTAlhasan): https://t.co/OL3PZpz5nQ
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ended some time ago. There is also evidence of US ground-launched ballistic missiles being used against Iran from launch positions in Bahrain & Kuwait, and perhaps also the UAE. The Gulf Arabs may not be directly attacking Iran, but this is not neutrality. https://t.co/7lLHFQCvwW
🇧🇭🇮🇷🇺🇸 This video reportedly shows an expended MGM-160 ATACMS launch container/pod in Bahrain, where American M142 HIMARS launchers appear to be operating from/launching ballistic missiles against Iran, including the new longer-range PrSM ballistic missile. There is a small
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There is, moreover, now evidence indicating that the US Air Force is using Gulf Arab airspace to attack targets in Iran. Yes, this started after the war started and Iran attacked the Gulf Arab states, but true/bona fide Gulf Arab neutrality in this war https://t.co/y3qDVhgXRr
🇮🇷🇸🇦🇺🇸 American military aircraft are voluntarily broadcasting their positions via ADS-B with the aim of avoiding aerial collisions and friendly fire. A side effect is that the world now gets to see the United States make use of Saudi airspace to bomb targets in Iran.
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Note that Gulf Arab complicity in this war is not limited to restricting their involvement to hosting non-combat U.S. military aircraft, including those undertaking intelligence collection against Iran. It also extends to letting Jordan host the USAF: https://t.co/aMoYtf11Q0
🇮🇷🇯🇴🇺🇸 Perhaps the most remarkable fact about the American and Israeli war against Iran concerns how Jordan has not only remained very quiet over the course of the war, but has also not paid a major cost for its actions and inactions, even as the externalities of this war grow
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🇧🇭🇮🇷🇰🇼🇶🇦🇸🇦🇦🇪🇺🇸 A reminder that there are many overly simplistic, if not outright nonsensical, characterizations of the decidedly bounded form of "neutrality" that the Gulf Arab states pursued vis-a-vis Iran through 28 February 2026. The Gulf Arab states appear to have learnt
Gulf states press US to neutralise Iran for good as Hormuz crisis deepens https://t.co/XHbMT83f6D
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🇮🇷🇮🇱🇱🇧🇸🇾🇺🇸 Seeing as how we do not have enough chaos—even after the seemingly aborted American and Israeli orchestrated Kurdish separatist invasion of Iran—the White House now wants to turn the "clock" back to 1976 and, more generally, the 1980s. Note also a prospective Israeli
Exclusive: The US has encouraged Syria to consider sending forces into eastern Lebanon to help disarm Hezbollah, but Damascus is reluctant to embark on such a mission for fear of being sucked into the war and inflaming sectarian tensions, sources said
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