Hiroto Sawada
@sawada_hiroto
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Ph.D. student @PUPolitics; former research fellow @Nids1952; political economy of armed conflict, IR, formal political theory, climate & conflict, TIEM
Uozu/Unazuki→Tokyo→Princeton
Joined May 2022
I’m on the job market!! Using formal political theory, my JMP shows how climate disasters systematically make empirical evidence on climate and conflict mixed.
In his job market paper, @sawada_hiroto presents a formal model to explain (i) when a climate disaster triggers armed conflict and (ii) why empirical evidence on climate and conflict seems mixed. His research can be found at https://t.co/oNC6C0bZei
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Thanks @PUPolitics! Curious about my research on race, religion, and international politics? Check it out here: https://t.co/N0N5PLkb6w Includes co-authored work with @YusakuHoriuchi , Chris Blair, Soohyun Cho, Simone Dietrich, and others!
rikioinouye.org
@RikioInouye examines how the racial and religious identities of countries in conflict shape public support for them. He argues identity isn’t just another factor, but a lens through which people interpret strategic and material information, with real consequences for conflict
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I’m sure hiring departments will find out how good Rikio’s research and presentation are. But here’s a bonus: he’s also a genuinely dedicated teacher and mentor!!
@RikioInouye examines how the racial and religious identities of countries in conflict shape public support for them. He argues identity isn’t just another factor, but a lens through which people interpret strategic and material information, with real consequences for conflict
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Our recent paper with @thescottwolford sheds light on this unique problem! https://t.co/W53gENWc8D
onlinelibrary.wiley.com
We analyze a model in which shifting power undermines foreign states’ commitments to the status quo, yet domestic leaders cannot credibly communicate the true scale of averted power shifts after...
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Is Netanyahu exaggerating the Iranian nuclear threat? One challenge is that we never observe the counterfactual power shifts because Israel’s alleged preventive action stopped such shifts. How do citizens judge leaders under such uncertainty?
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I will be following news and analyses by Japanese domestic politics experts in the coming days, but two variables are important in analyzing the electoral result's implications for the US-Japan alliance. First, I exclude domestic opposition to the US-Japan alliance. This is an
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Need a break from the US election, but not from elections per se? Well, Japan has a big election, happening *tomorrow*. It looks like voters may finally hold the ruling party to account (first time in 15 yrs), and "populism" isn't the answer. So... why? (START THREAD)
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A new piece with @CarlyNWayne @jkertzer @Prof_MHolmes is now out @AJPS_Editor . Inspired by genome sequence analyses, we conducted an unusually granular analysis of how groups assess resolve and costly signals differently than individuals. https://t.co/hfWn0Lpkhq
onlinelibrary.wiley.com
Assessing resolve and interpreting costly signals are crucial tasks for leaders engaging in international diplomacy. However, leaders rarely make these decisions in isolation, relying on advisers to...
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I am pleased to share that my paper has been published on #FirstView @PSRMJournal . In this paper, I identify mechanisms by which sanctions targeting specific leaders incite violent political conflict within target countries. https://t.co/0iYxq2nicf
cambridge.org
Leader-contingent sanctions as a cause of violent political conflict - Volume 13 Issue 1
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Though currently not OA, the WP version ↓ https://t.co/z0N9Gez5hD
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My paper on the unintended consequences of military humanitarian intervention is now online @ISQ_Jrnl!! https://t.co/wHNuwMo0sT
academic.oup.com
Abstract. The debate on whether military humanitarian intervention and anti-atrocity norms, such as the responsibility to protect, cause perverse incentive
Excited that my paper “The Mercurial Commitment: Revisiting the Unintended Consequences of Military Humanitarian Intervention and Anti-atrocity Norms” has been accepted @ISQ_Jrnl!! https://t.co/z0N9GezD7b
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Rina Gonoi, former Japan forces member, gets women of courage award #KyodoNewsPlus
https://t.co/Vb1vfADPGf
english.kyodonews.net
Rina Gonoi, a former member of Japan's armed forces, received the U.S. Secretary of State's International Women of Courage Award for leading a public campaign against sexual harassment, the State...
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I thought the moral hazard debate regarding humanitarian intervention had gone stale due to a lack of evidence and theoretical gridlock, but this nice new paper brings a fresh perspective.
Excited that my paper “The Mercurial Commitment: Revisiting the Unintended Consequences of Military Humanitarian Intervention and Anti-atrocity Norms” has been accepted @ISQ_Jrnl!! https://t.co/z0N9GezD7b
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I hope this is a nice companion paper for the growing (resurgent?) recent literature on third-party intervention and civil wars (e.g., Kydd, 2022 IO; Meirowitz et al., 2022 QJPS; Spaniel & Savun, 2023 JCR; Gibilisco & Montero, 2022 JOP)!
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An implication: if we interpret a low cost of intervention as the level of institutionalization of anti-atrocity norms and the “readiness” of international society to act to prevent atrocities, efforts to establish institutions to punish atrocities might backfire.
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In that case, (pro-rebel) external interventions only leave the adverse incentive for provocative rebellion.
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This intricate relationship arises because, (i) while a larger scale of pro-rebel intervention offsets (or pushes back) a disadvantageous “domestic” commitment problem (government consolidation of power), (ii) there is not much to offset when such power consolidation is absent.
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(3) The model presents a novel implication that lowering the intervention cost can exacerbate the adverse incentive when a domestic commitment problem caused by the consolidation of government power is not severe.
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This result is in stark contrast to the standard logic of domestically generated commitment problems, where an inherently stronger group has the incentive for a preventive war (e.g., Fearon's 1998 book chapter).
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