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Additional analyses identify one of the key explanations for this result. Conspiracy-related appear to messages increase campaign contributions for Republicans but not Democrats.

This pattern, however, is only observed among Republican members. The Democrats discussing conspiracy theories do not appear to do so in response to the primary election calendar.

Furthermore, members who discuss conspiracy theories are much more likely to do so in the month before their primary election date, and this drops off quickly afterward.

Consistent with the authors' theory, members representing more partisan constituencies are notably more likely to post conspiracy-related messages.

The authors collect data on public messages from members of Congress that promote or relate to conspiracy theories. They identify conspiracy-related messages from both the left (e.g., Russia-Trump collusion) and the right (e.g., stolen 2020 election).

Why and when do politicians promote conspiracy theories? Hilden and Kistner argue that conspiracy theories help politicians to raise money and mobilize supporters, but they might also have a backlash effect among the broader electorate.

From the latest issue of the QJPS, “Promoting Conspiracy Theories Strategically” by @David_J_Hilden and @MichaelRKistner. A thread.

RT @avishwanath28: New York City is using RCV tomorrow to choose its nominees. Over the past decade, reformers have hoped that RCV would im….

The new issue of the Q is now out. We have great papers from @David_J_Hilden, @MichaelRKistner; Karekurve-Ramachandra; @Jferrer505; @avishwanath28. We will tweet a thread about each paper in the coming weeks. Stay tuned. For now, you can access them at:

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However, this didn’t have the electoral effects that Ginsburg and activists feared. The authors find no effect on Black-white turnout or registration gaps, nor do they detect any effect on the race or party of elected representatives.

For example, affected jurisdictions became much more likely to implement photo ID laws after the Shelby decision.

Using a differences-in-differences design that compares trends in places that were and were not subject to preclearance, the authors find that preclearance did, indeed, deter jurisdictions from implementing certain electoral reforms.

So who was right? Komisarchick and White answer this question by studying the effects of Shelby in the four major federal elections after the decision.

Ruth Bader Ginsburg, writing the minority opinion, argued that the lack of blatant discrimination could be the result of preclearance. Removing a law that’s working as intended, Ginsburg argued, “is like throwing away your umbrella in a rainstorm because you are not getting wet.”.

John Roberts, writing the majority opinion, argued that we no longer see the same kind of discrimination that justified preclearance in 1965.

The 2013 Shelby decision ended the preclearance process that required certain jurisdictions to seek federal approval before making any changes to their electoral system.

From the latest issue of the QJPS, “Throwing Away the Umbrella: Minority Voting after the Supreme Court’s Shelby Decision” by Mayya Komisarchik and @ArielRWhite. A thread.

The paper contains many other interesting findings (including a survey of the general population rather than students). To learn more about this great article, check it out on our website: