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Ada pola baru dari aparat dalam merespons unjuk rasa. Anak-anak muda jadi sasaran perburuan. Permata Adinda menelusuri data 329 orang yang jadi tahanan politik pasca-demonstrasi Agustus-September 2025, dan menemukan nyaris 90% di antaranya adalah Gen Z.

If you are not a business owner or entrepreneur, then you are a part of the labor force. Therefore, you should applaud their success against an exploitative relationship between the capital owner and labor workers.

Udah kayak pengungsi anjir, baju cuma bawa sebiji

Interesting. So instead of state expenditure efficiency, they decided to raise the price of subsidized fuel? Expect massive rejection from the common citizen.

A wider deficit requires increased issuance of Government Securities (SBN), testing domestic liquidity and foreign portfolio appetite amid an already volatile global monetary environment.

The Ministry of Finance is attempting to arbitrage the fiscal space, betting that the marginal GDP growth generated by deficit spending will outpace the elevated cost of debt servicing.

The 3% deficit limit (Law No. 17/2003) has served as Indonesia’s premier institutional anchor, historically shielding the sovereign from risk-premium spikes and capital flight, particularly during emerging market sell-offs.

Global oil prices near $100/barrel exert immense pressure on the APBN, specifically inflating the energy subsidy and compensation burden, forcing a choice between a wider deficit or an inflationary domestic energy price hike.

Unless strictly channeled into high-multiplier capital formation rather than consumptive expenditure such as free meal program and subsidies.

Comparing Indonesia’s fiscal posture to higher-deficit, high-growth peers like India and Vietnam is theoretically sound. However, abandoning the 3% anchor risks structural yield curve steepening and sovereign rating downgrades.

Breaching the statutory 3% ceiling (Law No. 17/2003) trades institutional credibility for short-term countercyclical breathing room.

Indonesia's DPR pay isn't "too much" in absolute global terms, but yes; too much relative to citizens' situation and results delivered. Public trust erodes when elites seem out of touch. Fix? Competitive but capped multiples + real accountability.

Singapore proves high pay can deter corruption IF oversight is ironclad. Indonesia needs: transparent benchmarks, performance-linked bonuses, zero-tolerance anti-graft. Not just formulas.

Tying pay strictly to average income might force empathy, but risks populist lowballing => weaker leaders, more graft.

Singapore: sky-high pay, but GDP/capita 17x Indonesia's → low corruption works. Malaysia/Thailand: lower multiples, more in line with their economies. Indonesia: disproportionately high relative to our income level. We pay similar/more than richer neighbors for MPs.

Compare that to average Indonesian income: around Rp 3–6.5 juta/month (depending on region/stats). So DPR pay is 10–20x the average citizen's earnings. In 2025 protests erupted over Rp 50 juta housing allowance alone, nearly 10x Jakarta min wage. Public fury was real.

Indonesia: DPR members' basic salary is +-Rp 4.2 juta/month (below Jakarta's minimum wage). But with allowances/tunjangan? Take-home often hits Rp 65–70 juta/month net. Some estimates went way higher before protests forced adjustments. Still massive.

But in reality? It could backfire hard: low pay attracts the wrong talent and often breeds more corruption. Better: competitive pay + strict accountability.

Should politicians' salaries be tied directly to the average citizen's income? Sounds fair, make them feel the same economic pain as the people.

While B50 remains a strategic long-term goal to reduce reliance on foreign oil, the numbers simply do not support it as a viable short-term emergency measure for the current crisis.