RT @kearney_melissa: ‼️New paper from ⁦@lisajdettling⁩ & me finds that the govt backed low down payment mortgages introduced by FHA & VA in….

RT @mayara_pfs: ❤️❤️❤️. Thank you @nberpubs for live-streaming our presentations on youtube! . Folks: you can watch all presentations of th….

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Please submit your amazing papers to the 1st Asian Conference on Org Econ in March 13-14, 2025!!.

RT @lugaricano: Can Europe match the US in paying top academics? Why is it so hard for continental Europe to build world-class universities….

Worth a read.

So pleased to see this finally forthcoming! Hard to believe that this project started 10 years ago. 😃.

Many more results in the paper re: skill specialization, market size, distributional consequences, market-level spillovers. Link: Thanks to Bob Gibbons, Jin Li, @FahnMatthias, @Marta_TroyaM, many others for helpful comments. (8/8).

You might be surprised! Many observed determinants and effects of managerial coordination can be explained by a simple repeated-game model. In contrast to theories based on search frictions or adverse selection, intermediation may increase as communication frictions fall. (7/8).

However, intermediaries themselves require an incentive rent. Therefore, buyers self-select into market-based allocation and centralized managerial coordination. (6/8)

We propose a theory of intermediation in markets for relational contracts. We find that in environments that lack trust, intermediaries can reduce misallocation and lower incentive rents by aggregating fluctuating demand and coordinating assignments. (5/8).

Such intermediaries are everywhere in the economy (e.g., professional service firms, global sourcing firms). But explanations of their existence often lack game-theoretic micro-foundations. (4/8).

Many papers study the factors that shape the *asset ownership* of firms. It is less clear why agents sometimes choose to use *intermediaries* that coordinate allocations and monitor performance. (3/8).

Since Coase, economists have wondered why some goods are allocated by the “invisible hand” of markets, while others through the “visible hand” of managers. For example, an entrepreneur may either directly employ a lawyer or contract with a law firm that manages lawyers. (2/8).

🎉🎉🎉🎉🎉🎉🎉.Excited to share a new working paper “A Theory of the Visible Hand: Intermediation and Coordination in Markets for Relational Contracts” (with @duoxili).🎉🎉🎉🎉🎉🎉🎉 (1/8)

RT @emilyxxie: I'm honored to have presented my artwork at the UN Headquarters in NYC as part of the Woman Trailblazer Award for @UNPeaceke….

Chinese version:

English version:

The proliferation of coffin homes in Hong Kong is commonly seen as an intractable policy problem. This is not the case. In a short new paper, I propose two simple policy fixes that will quickly alleviate reduce the suffering of poor households at little cost to gov't.

RT @davidautor: Although I know it's unfashionable to be optimistic about AI's potential for work and workers, here's why I think AI offers….

RT @lugaricano: Applications open for @UChicago price theory summer camp for PhD students. Reasons to attend:.1. Kevin Murphy is, by far, t….