Thrilled to find that my new article "Appeasing Workers without Great Loss: Autocracy and Progressive Labor Legislation" is coming out in Comparative Politics @Journal_CompPol .🧵.

RT @GRAPHhk: Thanks Edmund Cheng and Samson Yuen @SamsonYuen852 for writing such a great book:.

RT @HongshenZhu: In December 2022, Chinese official propaganda on COVID policy made a sharp U-turn. How did these contradictory messages fr….

Thrilled to see our work out in Journal of Politics! We theorize how autocrats use redistributive messaging to claim democratic legitimacy—and show it can shape public opinion. Grateful for the journey with @eddySFYeung and the support we received throughout.

RT @Handi_Rita_Li: After five years from the first draft, my job market paper is finally forthcoming @World_Pol. I greatly appreciate all w….

RT @NoamGidron: 🚨Why do masses support democratic backsliding?🚨.A new @AJPS_Editor paper with Yotam Margalit, @LiorSheffer and @ItamarYakir….

RT @BJPolS: NEW -. The Demand Side of Democratic Backsliding: How Divergent Understandings of Democracy Shape Political Choice - https://t.….

RT @billkakenmaster: Why do some authoritarian regimes contribute more to climate change than others?. I examine this question in a new art….

Thank you @CPRPVirtual for inviting me to present my research! It was great to see again @Yujeong1107 and @PaulSchuler10, who saw the project idea started and evolving from the very beginning :D.

RT @XiaoboLu1: Our CPRP Fall schedule is all set. Hope to see you in one of these exciting talks in the fall.

RT @rubenbmathisen: Would the rich pay more in tax if public opinion decided? . My new article "Taxing the 1 per cent: Public Opinion vs Pu….

RT @milo_phd: Our @EmoryPolisci doctoral candidates are researching and publishing SOLO like mad! Note: Yumin is entering the 2023-24 acade….

RT @ferdinandeibl: Thrilled to see this paper with @NeilKetchley and @GunningJeroen in FirstView at @JPR_journal. Using the 1977 Egyptian….

I also thank the conference discussants who ever commented on this project; they are @PaulSchuler10, @Manfred_E, @brett_l_carter, and @Yujeong1107. Their insightful feedback and constructive comments greatly contributed to the improvement of this study.

I would like to express my gratitude to my department @EmoryPolisci and my dissertation committee members, Jennifer Gandhi, Jeff Staton, @ruedamiguel13, and @nataliasbueno, for their invaluable encouragement, guidance, and support throughout the process.

conduct a survey experiment, and develop a novel latent measure of mass threats. You can check out my website for more details about my dissertation project.

In this article, I put forth the primary argument and present empirical evidence derived from a large-N cross-national analysis, as well as an illustrative case study on China's Labor Contract Law. In other sections of my dissertation, I analyze labor litigation outcomes,.

(2) tilt the balance in favor of labor, particularly when social stability concerns loom large. I argue that such judicial flexibility helps autocrats better manage the dual challenges in (re)distributive policy disputes.

Pro-worker reforms are possible only with judicial balancing: limited independent judiciaries that provide autocrats with the flexibility to either (1) mitigate elites’ losses resulting from pro-worker legislation or.

To do nothing would provoke mass unrest, but to enact pro-worker reforms would provoke elite resistance. I develop a theory of how autocratic governments are able to enact redistributive measures that balance the demands of both workers and employers.

This article emphasizes the strategic importance of limited independent judiciaries in incentivizing autocrats to enact pro-worker legislation in response to bottom-up demand. I argue that heightened mass threats create a key dilemma for autocrats:.