✍️I am overly excited about this paper being out. With vignette experiments both in 🇬🇧 and 🇪🇸, @turnbulldugarte and I show that pro-LGBT+ attitudes are more fragile and conditional than commonly believed. We theorize and provide evidence for the psychology of homonationalism.

RT @Currikitaum: Bad take: "relacionar saunas gay con prostitución es homofobia". Good take: "sobre la prostitución pesa un grave estigma….

RT @Currikitaum: "First pride was a riot" sí, un riot por el desalojo de un bar en el que se hacía cruising y que frecuentaban chaperos y p….

RT @luzsmellado: "Abrió la cortina de la cabina como si abriera el telón de su vida". Juro que esto es cierto. Y que fue precioso. https://….

RT @mfrmarcel: January 6 worked partly because Republicans did not hold Trump accountable for his anti-democratic behavior. My research w/@….

RT @FraileMaldonado: Lean a @bertous en El último internacional en Harvard via @el_pais.

Os comparto tribuna en @el_pais. Investigo en Harvard la instrumentalización de causas liberales. Trump ofrece un caso perfecto: usar la lucha contra el antisemitismo para socavar la autonomía universitaria y expulsar investigadores internacionales.

RT @JohnHolbein1: What happens when @Airbnb enters an area?. Rent and home prices increase as a direct result.

RT @NotLipset: It’s the 1st day of Pride Month🌈 & I'm proud to share my new JOP article. Using a survey experiment, I show: Republicans sti….

RT @PippaN15: Here's Harvard's response to the crisis facing our international students. Can you imagine being a PhD student in the final….

RT @Currikitaum: 🎤 Hoy es más importante que nunca actuar para expulsar a Israel de Eurovisión. ¿Cómo es el pinkwashing de 2025? ¿Qué se ne….

Paper here: . Summary slides here: Coverage here:

Indebted to a huge number of people along the way – in particular the folks at EPSA 2024, ECPR 2024 and the kind people at the EUI, Lund and Uppsala for inviting us to talk about this. We also thank Charlie XCX 💚 for keeping us motivated during the writing process

Far-right normalisation isn’t just happening in parliaments. It’s happening in our bedrooms. This (likely) has consequences downstream. If voters don’t reject the far-right, the electoral incentives for centre-right parties to do the same are undermined.

This isn’t about love for the far right. It’s about a strong negative *rejection* of the other side. Affective polarization makes illiberal actors seem acceptable & even preferable via *disidentification* (defining ourselves by who we are not as opposed to who we are).

If this explanation holds true, we should see evidence in support of two assumptions: 1. Negative affect for centre-left should be greater than positive affect for the far right 2. Centre-right partisans should *expect* in-group members to reward far-right vis-à-vis centre-left.

Why? We argue because political identity now sorts us into two camps — and embracing someone from the other “side” is as seen as worse than embracing someone with extreme views from within your bloc.

Behavioural evidence – which gets around statistical discrimination, information equivalence and reduces social desirability bias – demonstrates that the centre-right treats the far-right just like an in-party peer.

Observational evidence demonstrates that centre-right partisans do not view voting for the far right as a red flag in a potential partner.

Our theoretical claim is that centre-right partisans face competing social norms: a polity norm to reject stigmatised parties and a group-based norm to reject the political out-group.

We asked over 2,000 people in Britain and Spain to swipe on 20,000 AI-generated dating profiles. Each profile randomly varied in traits like job, hobbies, and political party support — including for the far-right.