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Harry Halem

@WarIntellectual

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@YorktownInst, @LSEIRDept. Author of Arsenal of Democracy (Hoover Press, November 2025), Breaking the New Axis (Naval Institute Press, April 2026)

Joined January 2012
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@WarIntellectual
Harry Halem
11 days
RT @HooverInst: How can the United States deter war with China in an era of rapid technological change and industrial imbalance?. Pre-order….
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@WarIntellectual
Harry Halem
2 months
RT @Tatarigami_UA: Kirill Dmitriev, who was involved in earlier talks with Witkoff, is now trying to salvage the situation. Russia always i….
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@WarIntellectual
Harry Halem
3 months
A pleasure to write alongside @nfergus again, this time in @TheFP on Israel’s spectacular assault on Iran. Israeli victory would be a decisive blow against the Eurasian Axis.
@TheFP
The Free Press
3 months
“As we have seen more than once in the past year, Bibi Does Not Chicken Out. And that means that, whether it was intended or not, the United States and its principal Middle Eastern ally have today taken a vital first step toward restoring the credibility of the West.”.
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@WarIntellectual
Harry Halem
3 months
RT @milstrategymag: It’s been a while since we’ve posted on naval strategy, especially one on US strategy in Asia. This is an interesting r….
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@WarIntellectual
Harry Halem
3 months
And the blame for failure will be placed squarely at Washington’s feet.
@nfergus
Niall Ferguson
3 months
"Diplomacy turns out to be quite different from reality TV and real estate. The best diplomacy is conducted secretly, not on live TV. And when a national security strategy goes awry, bankruptcy is not an option. There is no Chapter 11 for a failed foreign policy." 10/11.
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@WarIntellectual
Harry Halem
3 months
RT @GElefteriu: SPACE in #SDR2025. Top 3 'calls-for':.1⃣ 'counterspace systems (both co-orbital and Earth-based)'.2⃣ space-based ISR [w/ al….
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@WarIntellectual
Harry Halem
3 months
None of this matters without cash. There's no evidence either way that the SDR will provide the relevant cash for any kind of force that meets UK defence requirements./7 END.
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@WarIntellectual
Harry Halem
3 months
But if the UK faces an acute near-term threat from Russia, expanding ground forces is probably the only way to secure British interests, especially in a broader diplomatic framework with European powers./6.
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@WarIntellectual
Harry Halem
3 months
In the medium-term, UK should recapitalise its air force and navy (and invest in extensive space-based capabilities, for which @GElefteriu has led the charge for years). Some short-term investment can matter, esp for space./5.
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@WarIntellectual
Harry Halem
3 months
It is impossible to resurrect British naval (and air) power in just 24-36 months after 20 years plus of strategic neglect and industrial atrophy. It is possible, with cash and focus, to expand the Army to meet a continental threat./4.
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@WarIntellectual
Harry Halem
3 months
However, naval power takes years (decades) to cultivate. And UK may not have that time. The Russia threat is acute, and near-term. Russia has a short window, under a decade, maybe under 5 years, to transform European security./3.
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@WarIntellectual
Harry Halem
3 months
British strategic history makes the UK the modern world's premier naval power. The UK is strategically positioned in the European littoral to dominate naval routes in northern Europe. With capacity, it could also influence Med/Near East./2.
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@WarIntellectual
Harry Halem
3 months
This comment points to a fundamental tension in British defence policy that stems from decades of military neglect. Simply put, the UK might be a natural and historical maritime power, but it faces acute contemporary threats that demand land power./1.
@shetlerjones
Philip Shetler-Jones
3 months
@ThreshedThought Yes but we are an island and should not be over invested in the capability to fight land wars at the expense of sea power, air and cyber.
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@WarIntellectual
Harry Halem
3 months
RT @WSJopinion: Critics and fans alike treat Trump’s Russia policy as revolutionary. In reality, it’s a thoroughly conventional policy, and….
wsj.com
His Moscow overtures are little different from those of Bush, Clinton, Biden and Obama. All failed.
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@WarIntellectual
Harry Halem
3 months
Radical policy would be a break from fruitless outreach to Russia and instead a focus on Eastern European resistance to Russian expansion and avarice. This makes Ukraine and Poland key to US European policy. /3.
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@WarIntellectual
Harry Halem
3 months
Since the end of the Cold War, every American administration has tried to “reset” or “rebuild” relations with Russia. This has failed because Russian interests are fundamentally hostile to American interests in Europe. /2.
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@WarIntellectual
Harry Halem
3 months
Latest in @WSJopinion with @sethcropsey - Trump’s Russia policy is well in line with historical trends, and mistakes, from the US. Breaking with irrational prioritization of Russian interests, would truly be radical! /1.
@WSJopinion
Wall Street Journal Opinion
3 months
It will take more than sanctions, which work too slowly, to force Russia to the table. A truly revolutionary policy would require that Washington give Ukraine, Poland and the Baltic states priority over Russia, write @sethcropsey and @WarIntellectual .
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@WarIntellectual
Harry Halem
3 months
A lesson to observers of the largest ground conflict in this century: do not underestimate mutual attrition over time, particularly for the attacker. It has a profound impact on combat capacity and operational choices. /4 END.
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@WarIntellectual
Harry Halem
3 months
There’s good reason to think no - how does one exploit a breakthrough here even if it’s generated? If the goal is to compromise the remaining Donbas defensive belt then perhaps this approach works. Although Ukraine’s defense is adaptable as well. /3.
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@WarIntellectual
Harry Halem
3 months
The question isn’t “will this new Russian tactic transform the war,” but “will an essentially identical approach employed for three years with minimal results finally yield operational gains?” /2.
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