RT @ionmarandici: If you are interested in understanding what goes on in post-communist #Moldova subscribe to the Moldovan Analytical Diges….

RT @RegulaZwahlen: Mit Beiträgen von Jan Matti Dollbaum @JanMattiD , Svetlana Erpyleva, Roland Götz, Anna Schor-Tschudnowskaja, Sandra Dahl….

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A fun study that's currently more relevant than we all had hoped!.

While large at times, countermobilization in Dresden was more sporadic and divided because it lacked these three factors, which reinforced each other. We thus argue for the fundamental importance of place characteristics in local protest organization.

In Leipzig, activists (1) were able to build on and quickly reactivate preceding broad coalitions, (2) found a supportive city identity that motivated the mobilizers and convinced them they'd be successful, and (3) had constant and visible support from local political elites.

Pegida often dominated numerically, and there was a split between resisting groups on tactics and message. We argue that this diverging structure of countermobilization was the result of three interrelating city-level factors:.

. the counterprotest looked very different: In Leipzig, it was sustained over a long period, combined demonstrative and contentious tactics, and included a broad alliance from far left to center right. In Dresden, there were some large demonstrative events, but in between,

We study anti-far-right mobilization in 2014/15 against the "Pegida" movement in Dresden and its Leipzig offshoot. The cities – back then – had similar local and national voting patterns, similar policing, and both had leftist orgs in place to organize resistance. Yet . .

New paper with Larissa Meier, Priska Daphi and @sehaunss in @MobyJournal: "Resisting the Far-Right: Explaining Divergent Countermobilization Trajectories in Two German Cities"

This is part of a special issue coordinated by Seraphine F. Maerz and @LaserGabi. Thanks for taking us on board!.

We find that, in authoritarian Russia and in hybrid Ukraine, support for the political leader is strongly correlated with support for electronic voting technologies. In Belarus, it's driven instead by a preference for the (new) opposition. The findings hold across six surveys.

We argue that in authoritarian regimes or in contexts with a recent history of electoral fraud and anti-fraud protests, new voting technologies are not politically neutral. For public support it therefore matters greatly who introduces the suggestion into public discourse.

RT @m_lallouet: One year after the death of Alexey Navalny, a few thoughts on the crisis at the FBK, the organisation he founded. https://t….

RT @CristianCantir: An update here: the pro-Russian PRIM party (Irina Vlah) has asked PSRM (Igor Dodon), Our Party (Renato Usatîi), and MAN….

RT @ionmarandici: Stay informed about developments in #Moldova & don’t miss the Moldovan Analytical Digest! The 1st issue is out with great….

Proud to have this great piece by @isadesisto and @grigopop in the first issue of the Moldovan Analytical Digest, out today! 🇲🇩.

RT @MoscowTimes: .@JanMattiD, a prominent scholar of contemporary Russian politics, discusses how Russia's opposition has evolved since the….

If you want to be an author on politics, society, economics, history, security of Moldova, reach out!.

Coordinated at the Research Centre for East European Studies at U Bremen (@laenderanalysen), the Center for Eastern European Studies (CEES) @UZH_en and @CSS_ETHZurich, supported by @unifr and the Elitenetzwerk Bayern.

I’m super happy that so many excellent colleagues have agreed to serve on the editorial board: Svetlana Suveica (@LeibnizIOS), @ellie_knott, @ionmarandici, @ursprung_daniel, Jeronim Perović, @DorinaBaltag, plus Amy Eaglestone as co-corresponding editor.