Some preliminary thoughts on the relationship between Iran’s nuclear program (the “nuclear crisis”) and the Israel-Hamas war and related dynamics (the “regional crisis”). 🧵 It would be too much of a stretch to say the current war is unfolding under the “nuclear shadow”…1/

Iran’s new cooperation framework with the IAEA isn’t enough to avert the snapback of UN sanctions. Those sanctions, says @BrewerEricM, may slow Tehran’s nuclear ambitions but are unlikely to stop them. https://t.co/g4D6BeyHck

“Iran does not need a separate arrangement – Iran’s Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement has provisions for the implementation of safeguards under special circumstances, and the IAEA is well equipped to conduct its work in difficult conditions.” https://t.co/MCOFH0ebZN

Now would be a great time to have a functioning National Security Council.

Polish PM Tusk: "I have no reason to claim we're on the brink of war, but a line has been crossed, and it's incomparably more dangerous than before. This situation brings us the closest we have been to open conflict since World War Two".

If this is true, all we’ll see before snapback’s deadline, if we’re lucky, is that Iranian report. And even then, the most Iran is willing to commit to in exchange for snapback extension is that it will *negotiate* over whether/how the IAEA can verify.

So the gist of this is @araghchi and @rafaelmgrossi are announcing an agreement and providing not one shred of detail of what that agreement actually is. What Iran has agreed to do. I am not surprised Iran gave scant details but from @rafaelmgrossi? Wow.

Iran's willingness to report on its uranium stockpiles is a necessary step, but it is insufficient. Granting the IAEA the access necessary to implement Iran's comprehensive safeguards agreement is key & long overdue. The greater the delay on inspections, the greater the risks.

🎯

Maybe I’m wrong, but I’m not sure calling the E3 a lapdog of the United States and rubbing their noses in the (very real) challenges of managing the alliance with the U.S. under Trump will dissuade them from snapback. https://t.co/HCLez062WR

check what Iran had reported to it and conduct further inspections. In other words, Iran wanted to draw out giving any info to IAEA on damaged sites then hold the key hand in negotiations thereafter on how its activities could be inspected. Unsurprisingly, IAEA said no.-12-

That all seems quite complex to decipher but if I am understanding right, Iran was saying no inspections of damaged key sites. Iran would submit a report a month after IAEA accepted Iran's arranged proposal. And then the two sides would agree on how to proceed for IAEA to -11-

of this new Arrangement. The IAEA reported Iran proposing that "following the submission of such a report, Iran and the Agency would “negotiate and agree on the arrangements for cooperation”. -10-

Iran on Aug 14 proposed “a new Arrangement”. Iran proposed that, for undamaged facilities, the Agency shall submit its inspection requests on " a case by case basis.” For the key damaged facilities, Iran said it would provide a report "up to one month after the finalization"-9-

The Agency details in its reports some of the back and forth with Tehran over how to conduct inspections going ahead. Agency makes repeatedly clear any new arrangements to take into account Iran security must be within bounds of the safeguards regime. Iran had its own ideas...-8-

While we don’t know what criteria those initial, longer lists were based on (eg, people who can operate a reactor or those engaged in weapons work), this could support the theory that Iran retains a significant bench of weapons-relevant expertise. 2/2

Incredible details in this story on Operation Rising Lion. Among them: Israel initially compiled a list of 400 nuclear scientists for assassination, which was then winnowed to 100, and then ultimately 13. 1/ https://t.co/iaDQ9MyQmQ

Iran might pull the plug on the NPT after snapback, but history shows Iran has a preference for finding some middle option that muddies the waters and allows it to gain some of the benefits of non-compliance without outright abandoning and agreements and treaties. 6/6

Of course, NPT withdrawal would make Iran’s current CSA null and void. It would not be impossible in that case for Iran to negotiate a new arrangement with the IAEA that allowed some type of access. But very hard to see that happening in this environment. 5/

Iran hasn’t formally terminated its CSA, but it has suspended IAEA access to Iranian nuclear sites (aside from the visit to BNPP). So while the basic legal structure is there, and inspections could resume in theory, the impact on IAEA access to date is akin to termination. 4/

So if you already plan on pulling out of the NPT and ending cooperation with the IAEA, it’s unnecessary to say you will also end the AP, as it’s implied. 3/