Modern War Institute
@WarInstitute
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Official account of the Modern War Institute at West Point, a research center dedicated to the study of war and warfare. Gov't Org Follow & Likes ≠ Endorsement
West Point, NY
Joined March 2015
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"While Russia may now see the terrain south of Kherson as safe, Ukrainian special operators should see opportunity. With new coastline and fewer opposing forces, the southern Kherson oblast could become a special operations playground."
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"Others, due to unfamiliarity with the manga and anime worlds, are unwittingly missing out on dramatic and thought-provoking expositions on the nature of human conflict."
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What do anthropomorphic Shiba Inu dogs have to do with strategic stability and nuclear signaling? More than you might think.
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One hundred years ago, the Harlem Hellfighters marched up Manhattan's Fifth Avenue after returning from WWI. That anniversary is an important time to reflect on their incredibly battlefield accomplishments.
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“We had the Starlink internet system [during the siege of Mariupol]. That was a huge benefit. If we didn’t have the Starlink, no information would have gotten out whatsoever.”
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John Spencer argues that the Battle of Kyiv was the most decisive battle of the modern era. Listen as he explains why.
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There are only two outcomes of a NATO no-fly zone in Ukraine. Either NATO fires the first shot at a Russian target or the Russians fire the first shot at a NATO target. Both mean an expanded European war.
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Almost immediately when Russian forces invaded Ukraine, it became apparent that Kyiv was a major objective. By April 2, five weeks later, the outcome of the fight for the capital was clear. Russia had lost. Why?
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"The one aspect of deep mechanized operations that gets even less attention than logistics is maintenance. Armored vehicles break down—a lot."
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"Asymmetric wars are not just asymmetric in capability but also in stakes.... Ukraine, as a nation seeing its right to self-determination in mortal danger, will always maintain that advantage against Moscow."
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In urban warfare, defending forces have a clear and important advantage over the attacker. Here's why—and the tactics that make the most of that advantage.
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"Even with the best weapons, the best training, and the best leadership, an armed force can only fight as long as it is fed. One person who has lived that truism every day in Ukraine for the past fourteen months is Chef Zhenya Mykhailenko."
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"They definitely go deeper and deeper. It's like a race, right? The better Israeli detection gets, the deeper Hamas digs."
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"Getting the tanks to Ukraine is one thing. Keeping a flow of parts and ammunition, and getting them where they need to be and when they need to be there in order to have an effect on the battlefield, is another."
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"Hamas will seek to use a defense relying on close combat, strongpoints (heavy buildings made of concrete and steel and often with basements and tunnels), and snipers."
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“We had three tanks firing at us, we had airstrikes, as well as the artillery landing on us. By this point the Russians had managed to enter the city Mariupol—they basically did a pincer move cutting us off.”
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Almost immediately when Russian forces invaded Ukraine, it became apparent that Kyiv was a major objective. By April 2, five weeks later, the outcome of the fight for the capital was clear. Russia had lost. Why?
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"A second line of effort would focus on the Russian public—especially those with relatives among the Russian forces in Ukraine. There are a host of themes well suited for such an audience, but most should involve stark images of the war."
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"Numbers of tanks matter, but the tanks’ specific capabilities matter even more, and method of employment more yet."
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"Slow Burn: How US Security Cooperation Shapes Operational Environments" — Don't miss the latest episode of the
@IrregWarfare
Podcast, featuring
@MarkHertling
and
@DerekSReveron
!
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With Equal Opportunity Comes Equal Responsibility: Lowering Fitness Standards to Accommodate Women Will Hurt the Army—and Women
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“We had the Starlink internet system [during the siege of Mariupol]. That was a huge benefit. If we didn’t have the Starlink, no information would have gotten out whatsoever.”
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Long, violent, and politically messy—if Ukrainians mount an insurgency against Russian forces, writes
@TomPepinsky
, here's what it will look like.
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As soon as Russian forces invaded Ukraine last year, they set out to seize Mariupol. Outnumbered and poorly equipped, the Ukrainian defenders held out in the city for almost three months. One of them shares his experience in this episode.
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John Spencer argues that the Battle of Kyiv was the most decisive battle of the modern era. Listen as he explains why.
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"The logic of nuclear deterrence and mutually assured destruction has not changed" and six other strategic lessons from the opening days of the war in Ukraine.
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"Russia has been perfecting its tactics, using the conflict zone in Ukraine as a low-cost test environment to field new technologies." Especially cyber technologies.
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Since Russia's invasion of Ukraine, it has been clear that Kyiv represents a strategic objective. In this special episode of the Urban Warfare Project Podcast,
@SpencerGuard
describes what to expect from a battle for the city.
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"Even with the best weapons, the best training, and the best leadership, an armed force can only fight as long as it is fed. One person who has lived that truism every day in Ukraine for the past fourteen months is Chef Zhenya Mykhailenko."
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"Albert Einstein once wrote to his biographer, 'I have no special talent; only that I am passionately curious.' Reading is one of the most important ways of feeding this curiosity for members of the profession of arms."
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If US and NATO forces unilaterally withdraw from Afghanistan, extraordinarily hard-fought gains won over nearly two decades on issues like civil liberties and women’s rights will almost certainly disappear.
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Miscalculation and Myopia in Moscow: Understanding Russia’s Regime Change Folly
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The problem of current military intelligence: a wealth of data, a poverty of insight
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"Incredibly, a great power adversary seeking to understand US critical national interests during a time of crisis cannot entirely discount the success of memes as a leading indicator for the direction of US foreign policy."
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The commitment to provide Ukraine with German-made Leopard 2 tanks is significant, but how much they will influence the military balance on the battlefield will depend on these four factors.
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"What happens with urban warfare is that liberal states... start off when they enter these fights with these strong ethical ideals, but the deeper they get bogged into urban fights, the greater the likelihood that they start to let go of those ideals."
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If you communicate, you emit. If you emit, you can be detected. If you're detected, you can be targeted. How do you accomplish your mission?
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The US military's Code of Conduct was written in the aftermath of the Korean War to help servicemembers resist political warfare. Could a new Homeland Code of Conduct help them remain above the fray of political divisiveness at home?
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Israel's Iron Dome is one of the most advanced air defense systems in the world. The fact that Hamas managed to overwhelm it offers a cautionary lesson for those who expect too much of technology in war.
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Eight books to read to better understand Russian information warfare
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Traditionally, war is about seizing key terrain and winning militarily. In the virtual space, it's about something different: social control.
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“You Really Think I’m Irrelevant? LOL.” A Letter to Clausewitz Haters from Beyond The Grave
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The problem of current military intelligence: a wealth of data, a poverty of insight
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With Russian forces advancing toward Kyiv after the February 24 invasion, Ukrainian defenders did something ingenious: they blew up bridges, calibrated the flow from dams to flood areas, and used water as a weapon.
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Leopards Into the Fray: How Will German Tanks Affect the Battlefield Balance in Ukraine?
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When Israeli forces encounter Hamas tunnels, is it feasible to seal them? Can they be destroyed with bunker-buster munitions or other explosives? Are there other ways to render them unusable?
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Israel's Iron Dome is one of the most advanced air defense systems in the world. The fact that Hamas managed to overwhelm it offers a cautionary lesson for those who expect too much of technology in war.
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"Modern sensors can now locate any concentration of enemy forces far beyond the forward positions occupied by ground troops, long-range precision strike systems can effectively target them, and the sensor-to-shooter cycle is greatly accelerating."
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The story of the Battle of Mariupol—told by somebody who fought in it.
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"What was done on October 7th was a division level attack—a division level invasion of Israel by a terrorist army."
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The Coast Guard is the smallest of the armed forces. But don't mistake the role it can play in combating serious threats.
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"Are we at war with Russia? There is little, according to the traditional metrics by which we define 'war,' to suggest that we are. And yet, what if those metrics are outdated?"
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"The platoon leader calls me up and says, 'Hey guys I had somebody take a round. We called a MEDEVAC but he's not gonna make it if we wait.' I turned to my right-seater and said 'let's go.'"
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A modern and effective fighting force has to be able to do a lot of extraordinarily complex things. But first it must be prepared for the seemingly basic tasks—like feeding its people—that can prove difficult on a dynamic and dangerous battlefield.
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A modern and effective fighting force has to be able to do a lot of extraordinarily complex things. But first it must be prepared for the seemingly basic tasks—like feeding its people—that can prove difficult on a dynamic and dangerous battlefield.
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John Spencer argues that the Battle of Kyiv was the most decisive battle of the modern era. Listen as he explains why.
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"There are treasures to be found in used bookstores, especially for those looking to expand the boundaries of their professional reading—whether you’re a military member, a national security wonk, or a history buff"
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"Even if you think there is just one million in Kyiv. If you can weaponize 1/10 of those. You just turned 3,000-person military, your 12,000 TDF or civilian volunteer fighters to 120,000. So what they did was hand out massive amounts of AK-47s."
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"You won’t find any commander within the IDF infantry that will tell you they are entering the urban terrain without tanks."
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The Battle of Mariupol saw some of the most intense urban combat of the war in Ukraine. A veteran of that battle joins this episode of the Urban Warfare Project Podcast.
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From strongpoints to mouseholes to hit-and-run ambushes, these are the tactics that have repeatedly and successfully been used by defending forces throughout the history of modern urban warfare.
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Don't miss this episode of the Urban Warfare Project Podcast!
@cossackgundi
joins
@SpencerGuard
to share his firsthand account of the Battle of Mariupol and much more.
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"Getting the tanks to Ukraine is one thing. Keeping a flow of parts and ammunition, and getting them where they need to be and when they need to be there in order to have an effect on the battlefield, is another."
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"This is not science fiction. It is the tale of a Ukrainian mechanized battalion in the Donbass, smashed to pieces by massed, long-range Russian rocket artillery."
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"During the 1994–95 First Battle of Grozny," explain
@SpencerGuard
and
@JaysonGeroux
, "Chechen separatists perfected the use of antiarmor ambushes against Russian conventional forces attempting to seize the city."
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There's only one course in the entire world aimed at preparing brigade and division staff officers and NCOs for the challenges of urban warfare, and the third iteration is about to get underway.
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"Many of my fellow Ukrainians endured a much more severe abuse than I did and were also struggling with both the trauma from the experience and the weight of having been released when others remained in captivity."
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"Numbers of tanks matter, but the tanks’ specific capabilities matter even more, and method of employment more yet."
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This Ukrainian defender of Mariupol took part in the battle, was captured and tortured, escaped, and survived in the rubble for nine months.
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"This conflict has confirmed that besides a small number of large European countries such as Poland, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom, for most there is no point in building and maintaining more conventional military forces."
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“We had three tanks firing at us, we had airstrikes, as well as the artillery landing on us. By this point the Russians had managed to enter the city Mariupol—they basically did a pincer move cutting us off.”
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When Israeli forces encounter Hamas tunnels, is it feasible to seal them? Can they be destroyed with bunker-buster munitions or other explosives? Are there other ways to render them unusable?
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Don't miss the conclusion of
@IrregWarfare
's two-part series on irregular warfare in Ukraine: "Political Warfare and the Road to Invasion: Irregular Warfare in Ukraine since 2014"
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By some estimates, Ukrainian forces are losing ten thousand drones a month. That's indicative of a saturation that US air defense capabilities aren't ready for.
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"When General William E. DePuy made his famous 1974 statement—'What can be seen, can be hit. What can be hit, can be killed'—advancements in reconnaissance, surveillance, and target-acquisition capabilities were still in their infancy."
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Clausewitz's writings are dense and often difficult to read. Here's some help.
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"I think that the way the phrase war crime has been tossed around as of late has done a disservice to everyone including the victims of war crimes."
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"The Army said 'we know the Soviet Union doesn't have the training to operate effectively at night.' And so it decided to 'own the night.' If it did the same thing—'we're going to own robotic warfare'—it would allow us to really cause the Russians pause."
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We no longer have the armored cavalry units that enabled the sweeping battlefield victory in Desert Storm, but we're going to need them again soon
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The Illusion of Conventional War: Europe Is Learning the Wrong Lessons from the Conflict in Ukraine
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"It appears the Kinzhal is likely to join the Su-57, T-14 Armata, and BMPT Terminator in the dustbin of vaunted Russian weapons that have severely underperformed on the battlefield."
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"Hamas is in the tunnels. Its leaders and weapons are in the tunnels. The Israeli hostages are in the tunnels. And Hamas’s strategy is founded on its conviction that, for Israel, the critical resource of time will run out in the tunnels."
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Untying the Gordian Knot: Why the Taliban is Unlikely to Break Ties with Al-Qaeda |
@asfandyarmir
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Unseen Scars: The Plight of POWs Held by Russia—and the Ongoing Struggle of Those Released |
@cossackgundi
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"Much like the reckless spending of the Obama administration’s surge, the United States and NATO are rushing arms and material assistance into Ukraine with less-than-ideal oversight and end-use monitoring."
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"Early testing with Fight Club, in a constructive simulation called Combat Mission, showed that civilian gamers with no military training outperformed military officers with years of experience."
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.
@KofmanMichael
recently returned from a visit to Bakhmut—the scene of months of intense fighting during the war in Ukraine. He joins us to share his analysis of the ongoing battle.
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“It was a study of the battle of Kyiv. The most decisive battle of the modern era.”
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The war in Ukraine is replete with lessons on modern war. But some of those that are too often ignored are actually deeply important—like how challenging it can be just to feed a force engaged in large-scale combat operations.
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War is always hard, but in N Korea the ground combat option is particularly vexed by geography, physics & propaganda
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The IDF has the military superiority necessary to dismantle Hamas capability. But it's an open question if there will be enough time.
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Hypersonic missiles, direct ascent anti-satellite weapons, AI-enabled missile defense, directed-energy weapons—what emerging technologies will have the greatest impact on strategic stability?
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"These tunnels have been built consistently over time by Hamas, and Hamas has over the years also integrated underground warfare more and more into its overall strategy."
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The US military's deception capabilities have atrophied. They need to be restored.
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War has an enduring nature. So does the experience of those who come home from it.
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Almost immediately after Russia's invasion of Ukraine, an audio livestream featuring news and analysis of the war began broadcasting via Twitter, continuing 24/7 ever since. The creator joins this episode of the Urban Warfare Project Podcast.
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Lt. Gen. Jonathan P. Braga, commander of US Army Special Operations Command, and best-selling author
@peterwsinger
join this episode of the
@IrregWarfare
Podcast. Listen now!
@USASOCNews
0
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In this episode of the Urban Warfare Project Podcast,
@SpencerGuard
describes details of the urban sites targeted in the October 7 Hamas attacks , examines the attackers' tactics, and extracts lessons on urban warfare—all based on his firsthand research.
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Urban Warfare Project Podcast: What Can the IDF Do about Hamas Tunnels?
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