(1/2) $PM deep dive out. As the cigarette business dies, a smoke-free portfolio rises from the ashes - that’s what investors seem excited about

RT @icemancapital: New Post out on $FEVR.LN . TLDR: Market too pessimistic on long term growth prospects, margin recovery and portfolio ada….

RT @mnolangray: A global map of soil quality. What stands out?

RT @corry_wang: When it comes to investing in a new technology, the hard question is rarely whether that new technology will create incredi….

RT @dctanner: Who’s actively writing @the10thmanbb level in-depth analysis these days? I’d like to commission a write up on Teqnion. It can….

RT @54thParallel: Really, really, really good chart from Sparkline Capital. Even if you grow revenue/earnings by 1000% over two decades, mu….

RT @ReustleMatt: Every business story has lessons. But why not learn them through the fun lens?. I present you Take-Two Interactive (TTWO)….

$TRP

RT @1MainCapital: $IWG is the most mispriced business I own. If it was listed in the US, I think stock would be 2x current levels. 13x run….

(2/2) I think I have a differentiated view relative to implied expectations about the value of that smoke-free portfolio – in particular how HTU excise taxes might change. I walk through that in the piece.

RT @icemancapital: (1/n) 3rd post out on $FLT today. It’s a fantastic payments success story. Ron Clarke, took this business from near bank….

$CSU Optimal Blue deal looks wild. If that $100mn of EBITDA (T12M to Feb) is maintained, that's a levered a-tax IRR of nearly 40%. Even if EBITDA fell 30% (and never recovered) I'd get a levered a-tax IRR of 23%. Dayummmmmm

Since all the cool kids are doing it.

(14/n) If you’re curious to learn more (and get into detail) check out the post, and if you have a compelling short thesis (from this valuation) hmu! All dissenting opinions welcome.

(13/n) Hell, my punitive “no growth” scenario values this at just 25% below the current price, where a reasonable base case (they miss EBIT guidance by 50%) is +100% current price. IMO the risk/reward is compelling.

(12/n) Admittedly, GOOS put out ridiculous 5Y guidance that I think they have ~no hope of hitting. But even if they miss that 5Y guidance by 50%(!), I think this business is worth >2x where it’s trading today.

(11/n) Their only competitive adv. is brand. They’ve been working on that for 60+ years and have an amazing steward of that brand in the CEO seat. I think the power of the brand will help them execute on another decade of profitable growth.

(10/n) Business is in a great financial position (plenty of capacity to grow + return capital), and this space tends to hold up really well in recessions. The median y/y decline in sales in 2009 for the comp group was just -1.2% & luxury brands held up even better

(9/n) On top of these strategic initiatives, return of international travel is a clear tailwind. Something like 40-50% of GOOS NA/Europe rev came from int’l tourists pre-COVID. Int’l tourism is rebounding, and if it normalizes I think that alone could add 20% to last years rev

(8/n) IMO, new summer/spring categories increases BOTH rev & margins. Using MONC as an analog again, GOOS has similar op. margins in their strongest quarter but much worse in summer months – paints a picture of the size of the prize if they become an all-season brand