For the avoidance of doubt: The opinions and analysis I express on this platform are my own and do not reflect the positions of any particular institution. Just in case:.

This is why security arrangements matter: Not because we need to fight wars, but because we need to avoid them in ways that maintain sovereignty. That makes democracy possible. That makes Europe possible. /END.

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Pressure will mount to let Gazprom back in, and with it kleptocratic capital, and to acquiesce to Russian political domination of Moldova, Georgia, the Western Balkans. /12.

It's not hard to see where that leads. European states who cannot rely on collective defense are forced to avoid conflict with Russia not through deterrence, but through compliance. /11.

And when Moscow says that it wants to revisit the European security architecture, what it means is that it wants an architecture in which each country stands alone. In that world, the atomization of European security becomes a powerful tool in Russia's hands. /10.

When Moscow says that it cannot abide a security arrangement for Ukraine that comes at the expense of Russia, what it means is that it cannot abide a security arrangement that deters Russian aggression. /9.

What happens if Moscow decides it wants to slice off part of Estonia? Or disrupt Polish critical infrastructure? It knows it could also face war with the rest of Europe. That's a powerful deterrent, albeit one that Russia tests daily. /8.

To be clear, this is not a clash of IR theories -- constructivism vs offensive realism, or some such. It is a clash of systems. Europe is a community of small and mid-sized states, who create security by pooling sovereignty. Putin's worldview would make that impossible. /7.

As a corollary, any formal or informal alliance that constrains Russia's ability to exercise dominion--or that enables sovereignty by deterring aggression--is, as as far as Moscow is concerned, beyond the pale. /6.

Let's not mince words: when Putin talks about 'collective' or 'indivisible' security, he means that small states in Russia's neighborhood do not have the right to be secure against attack from Russia. Plain and simple. /5.

Once upon a time, under Gorbachev and early Yeltsin, Moscow espoused a view of 'indivisible security' that actually set Europe free. In this view, great powers were not entitled to seek their security at the expense of smaller ones. No more. /4.

It's a mistake, though, to assume that Moscow doesn't mean what it says. The Kremlin has a view of security that is fundamentally incompatible with European views of security. Pretending that this war is about anything other than that--about land, about NATO--is delusional. /3.

It's tempting to see this as a stalling tactic, just as it was to see Russia's 2021 insistence that it have a veto over European security arrangements as a purposeful nonstarter, designed to prevent meaningful negotiations, not to enable them. And there's truth to that. /2.

“We cannot agree that now it is proposed that security issues, collective security, be resolved without the Russian Federation,” Mr. Lavrov said. “This will not work.”. Here we go 'round the mulberry bush, vol. 238. /1.

Translation: Russia has agreed to accept guarantees of (its ability to violate) Ukrainian security.

*though, not so.

A genuinely productive negotiating process will be a complicated and protracted one. But if Trump doesn’t have the patience for that kind of process, or if Putin is able to maneuver him into impatience, Europe will have to push back. /END.

The Trump-led process is predicated on the notion that security can be had without accountability. That may be true for America across the ocean, so that is doubtful. If Europeans are to own their own security, however, they will have to draw their own conclusions. /10.

Meanwhile, even as everyone is talking about security guarantees and “land swaps”, note what we’re not talking about: reparations, accountability for war, crimes, and dealing with the fact that Russia is bent on military dominion in its neighborhood. /9.

Europe and Ukraine will also need to decide what genuine security looks like. They will not trust assurances from Moscow, and they may be learning that they can’t trust assurances from Washington either. /8.

A cease-fire or any other agreement, whether it involves a land swap or not, requires scrupulous attention to detail. In other words, it requires someone other than the current American top team to do the negotiating. But that’s only half the problem. /7.