RT @EroComfort: In the latest episode of The Horn podcast, @alanboswell and @richmoncrieff discuss the changing dynamics in Eastern #DRC as….

RT @EnriPicco: 📢Internship opportunity @CrisisGroup . Join my amazing team working on the Central Africa region🌍.

Strongly recommend this interview with my colleague @SEMATUMBA on N Kivu crisis. Important insights into the impact of M23, role of FDLR and international positions. In Eng and Fr.

RT @RFI: @RFIAfrique @NathalieAmar 🇷🇼 Pour réécouter notre édition spéciale #Rwanda : 30 ans après le #genocide des Tutsis, comment l'État….

RT @EroComfort: For #IWD2024, I’m pleased to share a list of books, articles and podcasts that shed light on women’s roles in leadership, p….

RT @CrisisGroup: 🎧 New episode: 🗣️ @atwoodr and @richmoncrieff.

very interesting and articule big picture piece from @NickWestcott4 .

For more detail, see our published work at.

- At some point, there needs to be thinking on long-term future of the M23 leadership. - There’s also a conversation needed with Kigali over what a security deal can look like without the destructive actions of the M23.

So where does that leave us?. We @CrisisGroup recommend:.- African diplomatic initiatives are relaunched and sustained.- A ceasefire is put into place and Rwanda ends support for M23. - Both DR Congo and Rwanda calm rhetoric.

And Burundi in all this?.Gitega offering strong support for Kinshasa and has its own dispute with Rwanda over harbouring insurgents. Real concern that North Kivu crisis stoking regional rivalries.

Kigali seeks control in its “backyard”. And resources at stake. In any case Kigali seems determined to not let M23 fail and intl pressure so far has not led to them to draw back.

Why Rwanda support to M23?.While denying involvement, Kigali underlines the threat of the FDLR. But FDLR not the force it once was, and its recruitment is boosted by M23 actions, so cannot be sole explanation. In past Kigali has used other means to fight FDLR.

Is M23 part of bigger anti-Kinshasa alliance?.Kinshasa worried as new AFC alliance seeks to widen M23 political base. Some signs that individuals from Katanga area are going to join M23. But important caveat: these are small signs and M23 remains very North Kivu focused.

But the context is different this time around. Southern African force has no funding from the UN and there is less pressure on Rwanda.

How has Kinshasa reacted?.Kinshasa doesn’t want to negotiate from current status quo, so supporting armed proxies (Wazelendo), pulling in allies from Southern Africa. Likely hopes that Southern African forces can fight M23 like in 2012.

What does M23 want?.M23 says supports Tutsis, but few Congolese Tutsis want their backing!.In the longer run, probably seeking amnesty and integration into army on its own terms. But for now, making lots of $ from status quo, despite violent competition with other groups.

Is the M23 likely to invade Goma?.The strategy is to put pressure on Kinshasa, so this can’t be ruled out. But more likely scenario is M23 seeking to push its adversaries away from its core areas, possibly gain toehold in south Kivu.

Why concern, frm AU, UNSC, US and Fr?.Civilians flee bombs, trench warfare, war thru fighter jets, drones and surface-to-air missiles raise concerns frm the AU, UN Security Council, U.S. and France. The rising tone between Rwanda and DR Congo is also worrying.

The M23 pressuring the capital city of DR Congo’s North Kivu province, Goma. I talk to Hold Your Fire! podcast host & @CrisisGroup VP @atwoodr about what this means, based on recent research with my colleague @SEMATUMBA. 📷 Thread from the pod. —-----.