Ren v2 is coming. We are heads down on it with a team of seven chads and are confident as ever that it will have a more outsized and sustainable impact on DeFi than Ren v1. We not only intend to address the more obvious protocol design and governance lessons that our community.

The deadline to submit claims is July 3.

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The notice is also posted at the liquidation website

Grant Thornton, the voluntary liquidator of Dappbase Ventures Limited, has posted the creditor notice below. All creditors are notified to submit their claims within 21 days using the official form available here: Ren v2 development and the Ren

📣 Grant Thornton, the joint liquidators for Dappbase Ventures, have posted the official creditor notice below. 👉 All official notices and communications to creditors in relation to the liquidation will be made through the liquidation website 🔒 Ren v2

Thank you to all those who fought for onchain privacy.

Great day for crypto — and Ren v2. Tornado Cash is legal. Onchain privacy is a human right, and important for DeFi to flourish. Expect privacy pools to heavily complement v2. The first real-time blockchain launched its public testnet. Feels like a good place for BTC, doesn't.

Today is the last day to withdraw REN from @binance. 👇.

If you hold REN on @binance, you must withdraw by Feb 12, 2025, at 03:00 UTC. After that, withdrawals will no longer be supported. Ren v2 is coming — hang onto your tokens to participate, contribute, and be part of the next chapter.

@X

Our @X account was compromised earlier today and has now been restored.

Check out the framework below to read more about this optimization problem. And stay tuned to hear how we'll be addressing it in Ren v2.

Ideally, fees would remain low for productive liquidity and rise exponentially for unproductive liquidity.

E.g., arbitrage becomes less rational as gas prices go up because of an NFT mint bloating the mempool. Similarly, providing productive liquidity for traders that generate MEV becomes less rational as the continuous fee rises to disincentivize unproductive liquidity elsewhere.

The problem is that it doesn't make sense for all users to pay the same fees. Some are more valuable to the bridge — or are more sensitive to fee changes — than others. This leads to an inefficient fee market.

In single-threaded runtimes like the EVM, transactions are executed sequentially, forcing users to compete for priority access to state. In general-purpose Bitcoin bridges, threshold signers' collateral can be limited, forcing users to compete for priority access to liquidity.

You've heard about global and local fee markets, but how are they relevant to general-purpose Bitcoin bridges? 🧵.