n33k Profile
n33k

@neeksec

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Following
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Security researcher @ambergroup_io. Views are my own.

Joined September 2021
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@neeksec
n33k
2 months
As a result, the attacker could mint a massive amount of liquidity with just one token A. The attacker then burned a portion of their liquidity, draining the pool.
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@neeksec
n33k
2 months
The attacker crafted a liquidity value that caused checked_shlw to return a small value. In the subsequent div_round operation, this small value resulted in a division that returned 0, but due to rounding up, div_round returned 1. The final required amount of token A was only 1.
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@neeksec
n33k
2 months
Due to a coding error in checked_shlw, the overflow check fails, allowing a large, invalid liquidity value to pass through, causing the intermediate product to be truncated.
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@neeksec
n33k
2 months
However, if the liquidity is too large and the product exceeds 192 bits, the upper 64 bits overflow and are truncated. To prevent this, checked_shlw performs an overflow check before executing the shift.
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@neeksec
n33k
2 months
get_delta_a is used to calculate the required amount of token A when adding a specified amount of liquidity within a price range. In the calculation, liquidity is first multiplied by the price range delta. The resulting product needs to be shifted left by 64 bits(Uniswap v3 math)
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@neeksec
n33k
2 months
Looks like the bug is on the a token side of the calculation, according to their recent patch.
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@neeksec
n33k
2 months
I was wrong on this one. Move will revert if the u256 is too large to represented as u64.
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@neeksec
n33k
2 months
After investigating the Cetus exploit transaction, I believe I have identified the root cause of the bug. The issue stems from a type casting from u256 to u64 within the get_amount_by_liquidity function.
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@neeksec
n33k
2 years
RT @hibillh: I'm grateful that we were able to take 3rd place in the #BlazCTF competition. Kudos to my team @chiachih_wu @ashleyhsu_eth @neโ€ฆ.
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@neeksec
n33k
2 years
Iโ€™m honored to be the Lead Judge of @ajnafi Audit Contest on @sherlockdefi. Happy auditing, Watsons!.
@sherlockdefi
SHERLOCK
2 years
Another day, another Audit โ€ผ๏ธ. All the best to the participants of the @ajnafi Audit Contest ๐Ÿซก. ๐—”๐—ท๐—ป๐—ฎ also shared the ๐—š๐—ฟ๐—ถ๐—ฒ๐—ณ๐—ถ๐—ป๐—ด ๐—ฃ๐—ผ๐˜€๐˜ ๐— ๐—ผ๐—ฟ๐˜๐—ฒ๐—บ shortly after the Contest started yesterday. Links below ๐Ÿ‘‡
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@neeksec
n33k
2 years
RT @Quill_Academy: ๐Ÿ“ข Announcement: Meet the master CTF crafters for QuillCTF-Dubai. ๐Ÿ”ฅThese CTF legends have crafted the toughest and the moโ€ฆ.
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@neeksec
n33k
2 years
RT @pashovkrum: Did you think randomness "just doesn't work" on the blockchain? There actually are some solutions but all have trade-offs.โ€ฆ.
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@neeksec
n33k
2 years
Iโ€™m the lead judge in current Perennial Fix Review contest on @sherlockdefi. @perenniallabs had arranged multiple rounds of auditing. Itโ€™s not easy to find bugs now. However, Sherlock is not lacking intelligent minds. Canโ€™t wait to see the brilliant discoveries from you!.
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@neeksec
n33k
2 years
Climbing the leaderboards and achieving milestones @sherlockdefi
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@neeksec
n33k
2 years
Tagging the sponsor @alloprotocol.
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@neeksec
n33k
2 years
I began my smart contract auditing journey on @sherlockdefi six months ago. It has been an incredibly thrilling experience. This time, I am the lead judge of Allo V2 and really looking forward to your discoveries.
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