Competing vigorously, and drawing some very clear lines on vital interests, is clearly required. China has troubling ambitions, and we need to respond. But doing so by trying to crack their system would be a tremendous strategic misjudgment.

Seeking victory through pressure is a really bad idea. The route to success is the same as the Cold War: Systemic dynamism. A dozen urgently needed reform campaigns at home--and keeping friend + ally support--are far more important to the outcome than anything we do *to* China.

6. Pursuing such societal warfare carries tremendous risks, especially with a great power already paranoid about US intentions. The Reagan record for example is as much about dangerously spurring Soviet fears as it is about pressure that won the Cold War.

consistent in the pressure it imposed, and it wasn't US pressure that caused the Soviet collapse. The idea that detente was a lifeline to the USSR has been convincingly debunked by many historians. If anything, it accelerated the eventual loss of faith in the Soviet system.

4. And if we "succeed," what comes next? These theories don't say. The USSR-to-Putin's-Russia example shows that forcing system change doesn't equal lasting security. 5. The Cold War teaches the opposite lesson advocates of pressure seem to think. In a nutshell: The US wasn't.

China is vastly more capable and resilient than the USSR. Chinese officials like their prospects, unlike Soviet ones by 70s. Many domestic US interests still oppose comprehensive societal warfare. Most of all, friends and allies won't go along--too many depend on trade w/China.

2. One increasingly prevalent argument calls for victory through pressure: We should seek not to compete but to win and do it by placing the Chinese system under tremendous pressure. 3. Such a Cold-war style, across-the-board pressure campaign simply isn't plausible--.

1. China is an aggressive power that poses risks to US and allied interests. I don't downplay the reality of the rivalry or suggest that "we just need to get along." But even taking seriously the challenge posed by China, we still have to decide what we do about it.

Delighted to share a new article on US China strategy. I argue that proposals to apply maximum pressure on China to set the stage for a change in its system are infeasible and dangerous.My case in brief:.

Some will see the ebbing of the current order as a return to a "natural" state of unconstrained self-interest. That would be dangerous. The norms + institutions of int'l order can have critical stabilizing effects--which we'll need more than ever in the volatile era now emerging.

One doesn't have to agree w/everything in this effort to see it as a powerful + important catalyst of the kind of thinking we need. An example: Many will argue that the proposals for UN structural reform are infeasible--but that level of boldness is something we now need.

More than I thought 5 or 7 years ago, the credibility of the existing order and US policies toward it now strike me as under severe threat. The US faces a clear requirement: Develop a concept for a more shared and human-focused order or watch its legitimacy continue to fray.

A note to highlight the new Quincy Institute Better Order project:.I'm not a signatory--there were some points I couldn't endorse--but was honored to participate + strongly endorse the importance of the effort + the need to conceive of a revised order.

RT @hcssnl: 🇺🇸 What are the prospects for U.S. national renewal? Whoever wins, America will still need to turn itself around, writes @RanaF….

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This is a short piece, designed to get the argument started. Lots of key issues touched on in there that need more debate. But we need to have that debate, and think about what it would mean to speak more openly about endgames, before it is too late.

I point to the risks of pushing forward with endless competition for its own sake, lay out some of the potential benefits of being more explicit about what a post-rivalry world looks like, and briefly suggest what changes that would suggest for US policy.

One issue with US China strategy is the lack of an endgame or theory of success. There's a strong case that thinking in terms of long-term objectives is not worth the time . I make the opposing case in a new essay.

And each escalation helps establish a new principle: "We cannot allow Ukraine to fail, even in a partial way, and must take continually greater steps to assure that doesn't happen." This view appears to be in the driver's seat, which implies an extremely dangerous trajectory.