Johannes Schneider
@jsndr
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I like incentives. professor of economics @jku_econ
Linz
Joined October 2010
🥳.
Why fund highly novel research? It can improve the evolution of knowledge by guiding future researchers. We propose a model in which researchers decide which questions to address and at what intensity to search for the answer based on existing knowledge.
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RT @RevEconStudies: "Can communities sustain cooperation when players can add or erase signals from their records? .Sufficiently long-lived….
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RT @EconomicsUc3m: How to incentivize those standing on the shoulders of giants?. 📢Check it out at our new post at. .
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RT @EconomicsUc3m: Super excited to introduce you this year's job market candidates at @EconomicsUc3m !..We have tw….
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16/ Full paper here: Comments welcome here or through other channels! . See you reading on the beach!/end.
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15/ More work to do: 👷 Evolving preferences, monitoring, asymmetric information in communities of fate.
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14/ Policy Implications 🏛 Brokers close to the friend endorse the enemy more than those more centrist. Brokers with intermediate distance from the friend perform better than extreme or centrist ones.
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13/ For centrist brokers ⚖️, the relational contract changes gradually in the intrinsic value of power. A marginal decrease in that value implies a marginal decrease in the enemy's endorsement.
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12/ For brokers close to the friend bang-bang: either the commitment contract works 🤝, or only stage Nash 🤷♂️ (full polarization + full support for the friend). Which one depends on the intrinsic value of power.
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11/ But is the principal promise of endorsing her enemy only credible if the principal has commitment? . Not really! We also study relational contracts 🤝.
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10/ The Ally Principle Revisited 📜 Traditional ally principles suggest always endorsing your closest ally. Our findings nuance this: while initially sound, long-term success often requires embracing and moderating the enemy.
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9/ Embracing Phase 👐 But only once the enemy needs incentives. Because the friend genuinely picks better policies the broker prefers the friend ceteris paribus (hence the exclusion phase)
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8/ The Mechanism 🗳 The broker uses future endorsement promises to moderate the enemy. This strategy is particularly effective when the principal and friend have closely aligned agendas.
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The Broker-Optimal Commitment Contract 🔄 Two phases: initial exclusion (the cordon sanitaire), its inevitable collapse, and persistent endorsement of the enemy for moderation after that.
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6/ Embracing 🫂: when the enemy wins power for the first time, there is a surprising shift where the principal embraces the enemy . The cordon is then gone forever 🧐.
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5/ Cordon Sanitaire 🛡: Initially, the broker tries to exclude the enemy from power. To that, the broker supports her friend. But the power broker is not all-powerful and this strategy eventually collapses.
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4/ Examples 📚 Coalition governments, corporate divisions, or any setting where competing agendas must find common ground. Now lets get into results: which is the optimal behavior of our power broker?.
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3/ Real-World Application 🌍 From parliamentary democracies dealing with extremist parties to CEOs managing diverse divisions, our model reflects real-world strategies for handling radical elements within organizations.
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2/ A Community of Fate 🤞: We look at a fixed organization (broker, friend, and enemy) and a repeated power struggle. The broker is weak: she can't ban the enemy 4ever from making decisions--at times fate brings the enemy to power.
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