hardenedvault @hardenedvault X Profile

hardenedvault

@hardenedvault

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Web3 infrastructure security of infrastructures. Below-OS, Trusted/confidential computing, Zero-knowledge proof, runtime protection, machine's privacy, etc

Joined July 2019

Don't wanna be here? Send us removal request.

hardenedvault

@hardenedvault

3 months

Github/M$ has disabled access to the legacy LKM rootkit Reptile repository used by Vault Range. We’re migrating the code repo to @codeberg_org Sorry for any inconvenience. Happy hacking!.

codeberg.org

LKM rootkit for testing/educational purposes on Vault Range

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hardenedvault

@hardenedvault

4 months

Our mitigation proposal about measurement of MRC cache against BadRAM has been merged in coreboot:

github.com

MRC cache used to be measured as runtime data when it was resided in CBFS before commit 82aa8338c74 ("drivers/mrc_cache: Always generate an FMAP region"). This patch will restore ...

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hardenedvault

@hardenedvault

4 months

Vaultboot is soon to be adapted for embedded devices featuring boot firmware that includes BSP blobs for BL2 and BL31. The latest version:

github.com

* Add an option to measure kernel, modules, and cmdline into tpm * Make verification of boot config signature optional, with an exemplar target * Use openssl(1) to deal with password in tpm2_seal...

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hardenedvault

@hardenedvault

5 months

Self-protection.

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hardenedvault

@hardenedvault

6 months

HOWTO: build ATF (Trusted Firmware ARM) and OPTEE for RK3588 #atf #optee.

hardenedvault.net

HOWTO: build ATF (Trusted Firmware ARM) and OPTEE for RK3588 To better implement the protection of digital assets in embedded systems, we have chosen the RK3588 as the prototype platform.

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hardenedvault

@hardenedvault

9 months

Our mitigation proposal for coreboot: measurement of MRC cache against SPD metadata tampering. #coreboot #spd #badram.

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hardenedvault

@hardenedvault

10 months

OpenBMC Remote OS Deployment: A Simplified Approach

hardenedvault.net

OpenBMC Remote OS Deployment: A Simplified Approach Many BMC implementations can accept a disk image and present it as a read-only USB mass storage device inserted into the host machine, allowing the...

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hardenedvault

@hardenedvault

10 months

SimpleX low-level protocol analysis.

hardenedvault.net

Background The SimpleX Chat Protocol is utilized by SimpleX Chat clients for message exchange.

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hardenedvault

@hardenedvault

11 months

#rfc6979 #dsa.

hardenedvault.net

Background The original implementation of DSA-type signature algorithms (including ECDSA) requires a random number that belongs to the same type of mathematical object as the private key (an element...

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hardenedvault

@hardenedvault

11 months

github.com

Project Vault Range PoC: Know your enemy and yourself to build better defense-in-depth solution! - hardenedvault/vault_range_poc

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hardenedvault

@hardenedvault

11 months

github.com

Project Vault Range PoC: Know your enemy and yourself to build better defense-in-depth solution! - hardenedvault/vault_range_poc

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hardenedvault

@hardenedvault

11 months

We dropped off a new Vault-Range Image V with Reptile Linux rootkit:

hardenedvault.net

Disclaimer VED (Vault Exploit Defense) test image contains only the VED kernel module, and does not contain any security baselines, access control policies and situational hardening solution.

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hardenedvault

@hardenedvault

1 year

SLUBStick risk assessment for embedded systems.#slubstick #embedded #linux #mitigation.

hardenedvault.net

SLUBStick risk assessment for embedded systems The Linux kernel is susceptible to memory safety vulnerabilities due to its size and complexity.

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hardenedvault

@hardenedvault

1 year

Unfortunately, VED can only sabotage the PoC with SLUBStick partially when it's targeting the specific data structure like msg_msg. #slubstick #kernel