gen_analysis Profile Banner
General Analysis Profile
General Analysis

@gen_analysis

Followers
1K
Following
164
Media
45
Statuses
100

Automated AI Safety and Red Teaming Tools

San Francisco
Joined January 2025
Don't wanna be here? Send us removal request.
@gen_analysis
General Analysis
5 months
🧨 Caution: Cursor + Supabase MCP will leak your private SQL tables — it’s only a matter of time. In our latest test, a simple user message was enough to make Cursor leak integration_tokens to the attacker who submitted it. Here’s the anatomy of the breach 🧵 (1/6)
17
65
659
@HavaeiRez
Rez Havaei
1 month
We said no to two acquisition offers. Here is why: In the past year most of our competitors in the AI security/safety space have gotten acquired. Feels like consolidation season! Lakera acquired by Check Point Software (~300M) Pangea Cyber by CrowdStrike (~260M) Prompt
0
2
12
@gen_analysis
General Analysis
1 month
Send us an email if you need dedicated hosting for our guardrails!
0
0
1
@gen_analysis
General Analysis
2 months
GA Guards deliver almost 400× faster performance than GPT-5 (Lite: 0.016s vs 11.275s; Base: 0.029s) and 15–25× faster than cloud guardrails.
0
0
2
@gen_analysis
General Analysis
2 months
On GA Long-Context Bench, GA Guard Thinking scores 0.893 F1, GA Guard 0.891, and GA Guard Lite 0.885. Cloud baselines struggle: Vertex reaches 0.560, AWS misclassifies nearly all inputs with a 1.0 false-positive rate, and Azure records just 0.046 F1 (see the full results on our
1
0
1
@gen_analysis
General Analysis
2 months
We evaluated GA Guards on public moderation suites such as OpenAI Moderation, HarmBench, and WildGuard. Across all three, our models consistently outperform major cloud guardrails and even surpass GPT-5 (when prompted to act as a guardrail) while running far faster.
1
0
1
@gen_analysis
General Analysis
2 months
The lineup: GA Guard (4B) – our default, up to 15x faster than cloud providers. GA Guard Lite (0.6 B) – ultra-fast (up to 25x faster) with minimal hardware. GA Guard Thinking (4B) – hardened for high-risk domains. GA Guards are trained to detect 7 categories of harmful
1
0
1
@gen_analysis
General Analysis
2 months
We are open-sourcing the GA Guard models — the first family of long-context safety classifiers that have been protecting enterprise AI deployments for the past year.
6
5
46
@gen_analysis
General Analysis
2 months
Questions or need help? info@generalanalysis.com – let’s secure your agents end-to-end.
1
0
6
@gen_analysis
General Analysis
2 months
Why This Breaks Everything (5/6) Once the spoofed conversation lands: Unlimited control – attackers can call any MCP endpoint (payments, cloud, GitHub, you name it) Full privilege escalation – every action runs with your credentials, no extra auth step Hidden in plain sight
1
0
9
@gen_analysis
General Analysis
2 months
Full-Conversation Attack (4/6) With this exploit, the attacker can put words into the user's mouth and call any arbitrary tools from their Claude desktop app. The attacker packs a seven-turn dialogue—alternating “attacker” and “owner” lines—into one SMS. Each line is tagged
1
0
8
@gen_analysis
General Analysis
2 months
The Metadata-Spoofing Attack (3/6) An attacker can send an imessage, injecting escaped is_from_me, date, and sender tags into the body. The attacker crafts a fake multi-turn conversation by doing so. If you ask Claude to rewrite that payload, it spits out natural-language
1
0
10
@gen_analysis
General Analysis
2 months
How iMessage MCP Feeds Claude (2/6) Every SMS/MMS is parsed by the iMessage extension into a JSON object { content, date, sender, is_from_me: true/false } The object is sent directly to Claude with no signature or provenance checks. That raw blob is all Claude sees when
1
1
12
@gen_analysis
General Analysis
2 months
Warning: Claude + iMessage MCP Jailbroken to issue unlimited Stripe Coupons (1/6) A few months ago we showed how Cursor + Supabase MCP can leak your entire SQL database. Now there’s a more powerful threat: by abusing Claude’s iMessage integration, an attacker can spoof your own
17
88
930
@gen_analysis
General Analysis
4 months
💣 Full-Conversation Attack (4/6) With this exploit, the attacker can put words into the user's mouth and call any arbitrary tools from their Claude desktop app. The attacker packs a seven-turn dialogue—alternating “attacker” and “owner” lines—into one SMS. Each line is tagged
0
0
1
@gen_analysis
General Analysis
4 months
🔍 The Metadata-Spoofing Attack (3/6) An attacker can send an imessage, injecting escaped is_from_me, date, and sender tags into the body. The attacker crafts a fake multi-turn conversation by doing so. If you ask Claude to rewrite that payload, it spits out natural-language
1
0
2
@gen_analysis
General Analysis
4 months
📲How iMessage MCP Feeds Claude (2/6) Every SMS/MMS is parsed by the iMessage extension into a JSON object { content, date, sender, is_from_me: true/false } The object is sent directly to Claude with no signature or provenance checks. That raw blob is all Claude sees when
1
0
0
@gen_analysis
General Analysis
4 months
We've released an open source MCP guard to secure your MCP clients against prompt injection attacks like these. Install with three commands for free! https://t.co/EO1EVH98bD
0
0
1
@gen_analysis
General Analysis
4 months
Secure your MCP clients against prompt injection attacks in Cursor, Claude Code, and Claude desktop with three commands for free. $pip install generalanalysis $ga login $ga configure and you are secure!
10
20
366