In another study, my coauthor and I explored China's creative economy by focusing on the gatekeeping roles of MCNs (Multi-channel networks):.

🚨New pub in @MCSjournal. I examine the dynamics of power and control in China's platform economy. The findings challenge conventional assumptions of autonomy and flexibility in creative work, advocating for a shift toward tethered labor.

RT @EmilieSzwajnoch: Happy to share our new reflexive paper on researching China's sensitive topics in turbulent times that was just publis….

🚨New pub alert!🚨Out now in @jmcquarterly, Gabriel, @qfzhu, and I find that both individual attributes (i.e., news interests, news trust) and the overarching political information environment shape people's active news avoidance.

RT @TwitterDev: Starting February 9, we will no longer support free access to the Twitter API, both v2 and v1.1. A paid basic tier will be….

We also found that source flagging did not always deter news sharing across labeled accounts, since news outlets that clearly identified their affiliations in profiles/usernames (as well as accounts publishing Chinese-language news) did not experience the decline of news sharing.

In the quasi-experimental study, we revealed the corrective role that flagging plays in preventing people's sharing of information from China's propaganda sources. Source flagging also led to a long-term reduction in news sharing, particularly for political content.

New paper alert🌟: 'The effects of flagging propaganda sources on news sharing' in IJPP. Focusing on Twitter’s practice of labeling state-affiliated media, we (with @qfzhu & Gabriel) examined the effects of source flagging on actual sharing behaviors.

We argued the SCSs involve two facets: a normative apparatus encouraging “good” citizens and social morality; and a regulative apparatus disciplining “deviant” behaviors (defined by the state) and enforcing social management.

Citizens in the A/Good category could receive rewards and benefits to lower transaction costs and obtain priority, whereas citizens in the C/Poor category may receive sanctions aiming to revoke eligibility and set restrictions.

We found that local SCSs use standardized procedures to quantify various dimensions of personal life (e.g., 500 indicators) into a common metric (🚨A+ citizens or🚨C- citizens), but potential indicators and scoring mechanisms are substantially flexible.

New paper alert🌟: The making of “good” citizens in Policy & Internet @policyinternet. @yuchenmaybe and I examined the citizen scoring in China's Social Credit Systems through the lens of social quantification.

RT @jburnmurdoch: Five quick tweets on the new variant B.1.1.529. Caveat first: data here is *very* preliminary, so everything could change….

New publication alert! With inimitable @youngrim_hailey and @yuchenmaybe.

RT @BrankoMilan: I just learned today that there is Radio Free Asia (just retweeted one of their tweets). It is a US-govt fully funded oper….

RT @youngrim_hailey: Also, find our #ica21 presentation which was chosen as one of the Top Student Paper winner for @ICA_CAT! @yuchenmaybe….

So thrilled to receive Top Student Paper Award from ICA #Polcom Divisions! Many thanks to my co-authors!.