Fix： In Move, function visibility is divided into three types: the default is private (accessible only within the module), public (accessible to all modules), and public(package) (accessible only to modules within the same package). Therefore, simply removing "public" and

Issue： The get_treasuryCap function returns a TreasuryCap object that allows minting new tokens. However, because this function is declared as public, it can be accessed by any module. Moreover, since the vault is implemented as a shared object, this design flaw enables anyone

🚨 Move Smart Contract Bug Hunt 🚨 A new Move Bug Challenge has begun! There's a security issue in the following Move code that can lead to arbitrary mint tokens. Let's find it!👇

Security isn't a feature; it's the bedrock. Our partnership with @Turbos_finance, the ultimate DEX and trading gateway on Sui that facilitated 8B+ volume, is a shared commitment to this ethos. Together, we're setting a new security standard for @SuiNetwork. By combining our

Congratulations to @tntxdotai on the successful completion of their inaugural smart contract audit. In a space where 'code is law', a rigorous security review is not just a step, but a foundation.🛡️ Our team at @exvulsec was impressed by your commitment to safety. Wishing you a

We're proud to announce the successful completion of a comprehensive smart contract audit for @OpenverseGlobal's core asset, Bitgold ($BTG). Thrilled to support the security and growth of the Openverse ecosystem. Onwards! 🚀

🚨ALERT @balancer has been attacked,which has been lead to 6,587 $WETH 6.85K $OSETH 6.59K $WETH 4.26K $wSTETH stolen to address 0xAa760D53541d8390074c61DEFeaba314675b8e3f. https://t.co/4htUQd9KGT

Big moves require best-in-class security. Congrats to @Yalaorg on their huge month. we @exvulsec team is on deck to ensure their $270M TVL and all future developments—from MiCAR compliance to AI agents—are secure from the ground up. Excited for this partnership!

Fix： Unify minting logic under a consistent proportional rule and reject deposits into invalid states. Only allow a 1:1 mint if both vault balance and token supply are zero.

Issue： When all deposited assets are slashed and the recorded deposited_tokens value drops to zero — but pre-existing VRT shares remain — the next deposit will be minted as if the vault were empty. This causes the new depositor to receive VRT 1:1 for their deposit, ignoring

🚨 Solana Smart Contract Bug Hunt 🚨 A new Bug Hunt begins! 🕵️‍♂️ Somewhere inside this Vault’s minting logic, something doesn’t quite add up. The code looks clean…, but a hidden condition is about to break everything. This Vault contract contains a logic flaw in its mint

We’re excited to announce our collaboration 🤝 with @OpenverseGlobal, a next-gen Layer 0 protocol redefining the infrastructure for global digital assets. Security fuels innovation — and we’re proud to support Openverse in building a safer and more interoperable Web3 future.

New audit report out — this one’s for @yalaorg 🤝 We’ve completed Yala’s smart contract audit ✅ and will continue working closely with the team to further enhance its security foundation. 🛡️ Check our audit report here: https://t.co/eUvVl9MHyw

Fix: The fix is to add assertion.

Issue: This function requires administrator privileges, but there is a problem with the check here. Contains will check whether ctx.sender exists and return a bool value. It does not make an assertion, which causes the permission check to fail.

🚨 Move Smart Contract Bug Hunt 🚨 Even the most secure language can have security risks. In the following code, there is a vulnerability that can steal tokens. Let's find it together.👇

🚀ExVul and Kaia Foundation will jointly appear at the Kaia special side event of the 2025 Shanghai International Blockchain Week on October 25! ExVul Founder @ma1fan will join industry leaders to discuss the future of blockchain — exploring new frontiers in security,