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Matthew

@embee_research

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Security Researcher, Creating and Sharing Educational Content.

Australia
Joined July 2022
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@embee_research
Matthew
1 year
A Beginners Guide to Tracking Malware Infrastructure . New post with 11 Examples (Including Cobalt Strike and Qakbot) that you can use to query and track C2’s, Open Directories and More🔥. (Special thanks to @censysio 🥳). #threatintel #malware.
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@embee_research
Matthew
2 months
RT @cyb3rops: I’ve noticed that some people misread my posts about AI. So let me try to be as clear and sober as possible:.I’m not saying t….
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@embee_research
Matthew
2 months
RT @felixm_pw: With some guidance from @DebugPrivilege I've found a way to easily dump clear text implants even while they sleep. Bad day f….
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@embee_research
Matthew
2 months
RT @thezedwards: Our team at Silent Push has been hard at work on the largest report we’ve ever made public – and along with Reuters – toda….
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@embee_research
Matthew
3 months
RT @silentpush: Did you know that registration emails can be used to hunt for #malware infra?. If an actor uses a unique email when registe….
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@embee_research
Matthew
4 months
RT @silentpush: We're seeing lots of similar #phishing domains to those reported by @_JohnHammond 🚨. The actors are using consistent naming….
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@embee_research
Matthew
4 months
RT @silentpush: Quick Tip for Hunting #LegionLoader Domains With #WHOIS Records🏹. LegionLoader actors have recently been creating #C2 domai….
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@embee_research
Matthew
4 months
RT @silentpush: Hunting Tip - Tracking #ValleyRAT Delivery Domains via ICP License Codes🔥. ValleyRAT has recently been reported using fake….
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@embee_research
Matthew
5 months
RT @silentpush: Quick Tip for Hunting #Lumma Domains By Checking WHOIS Records 🏹 . Lumma actors often create #C2 domains in (likely automat….
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@embee_research
Matthew
5 months
RT @vxunderground: Hi, I've seen a lot of noobies lately discussing their productivity. They're comparing their work ethic or research skil….
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@embee_research
Matthew
8 months
Nice and Simple Scattered Spider Pivots - Thanks to Initial Intel and previous posts from @TLP_R3D . 1⃣ Regex Pattern And Server Header .2⃣ Regex, Server Header and ASN .3⃣ Regex, Dates, ASN and Name Server . Utilising Domain Search and Web Scanner from @silentpush
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@TLP_R3D
Chris Duggan
8 months
🔥After a Long Break - New #ScatteredSpider . Domain: revolut-okta[.]com.IP Address: 80.78.27.6.AS Owner: ABSTRACT, FI
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@embee_research
Matthew
8 months
10/ The payloads appear to be zip files containing a legitimate exe and a (likely) sideloaded dll. Sadly, the sample wasn't publicly available, and VT didn't have a clear verdict on what it was. So we'll leave the analysis here and continue another day :)
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@embee_research
Matthew
8 months
9/ We can continue to apply the same concepts (identifying and searching strings) to locate additional pieces of the infrastructure. We can also search on the final URLs and determine the payloads.
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@embee_research
Matthew
8 months
8/ This leads to a bunch of new and interesting results. Some of them are almost identical (but with different file names) and others follow the same general logic but with quite different code.
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@embee_research
Matthew
8 months
7/ Pivoting on the Second Stage Content 👀. The second stage downloader contains a relatively unique combination of strings. We can pick some and query them to find similar code. I chose to use bitstransfer, expand-archive and start-process.
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@embee_research
Matthew
8 months
6/ We can find out more by searching the domain found in the downloader code. This reveals that the payload is another downloader. The code tries to download a zip and exe via bitstransfer, and then creates a run key for persistence.
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@embee_research
Matthew
8 months
5/ This works well - and shows many sites hosting similar suspicious content. Here we can see another site hosting the same text, but with a slightly different payload. The download function is the same, but the URL in the downloader is different.
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@embee_research
Matthew
8 months
4/ Now let's try and find similar sites. The previous text is relatively unique - so we can use it as a pivot point. Anything in the text tab can be searched - so let's try the "Press Windows Button "" + R" string.
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@embee_research
Matthew
8 months
3/ The "malicious" code can be found inside of the DOM content tab. This reveals that the payload is a simple powershell downloader
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@embee_research
Matthew
8 months
2/ The content tab shows the full fake captcha text as well as the text prompt to copy and run malicious code. Later - we'll use this same text to pivot to related URL's.
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