According to our analysis, a single Chinese state-owned shipbuilder produced more commercial vessels by tonnage in 2024 than the entire U.S. industry has since World War II. Read our full @CSIS report:

RT @CSISKoreaChair: Missed this week's @CSISGeopolitics discussion on the Axis of Upheaval after the Israel-Iran conflict? 🎥. Catch the rec….

RT @CSIS: A new series from @ChinaPowerCSIS leverages data to analyze China’s economic security vulnerabilities and strengths within three….

Joint Statement from the Quad Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Washington - United States Department of State

Really enjoyed this conversation with my @CSISGeopolitics colleagues on what the Iran conflict tells us (so far) about cooperation between China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. Watch the recording:

RT @CSISKoreaChair: . @brianthart: One of Iran’s key limitations is economic: trade with China pales compared to China’s trade with Gulf st….

RT @ChinaPowerCSIS: TODAY @ 3 PM ET | What do strikes on Iran mean for China, Russia, and N. Korea?.Join @CSISGeopolitics today for a timel….

Looking forward to joining my @CSISGeopolitics colleagues on Monday to discuss what the Iran conflict reveals about the level of cooperation between China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea, and explore the implications of the conflict for China.

RT @CSISKoreaChair: June 30 3 PM ET | What do strikes on Iran mean for China, Russia, and N. Korea? . Join @CSISGeopolitics for a timely pa….

RT @HenryZiemer: Excited to share this report and database on Chinese port projects in LAC! In addition to being the most comprehensive sur….

RT @HiddenReachCSIS: NEW: Chinese companies have invested in dozens of ports across Latin America and the Caribbean. But how much influence….

President Trump’s decision to intervene so significantly against Iran is likely making many in Beijing rethink their assumptions (at least to some degree) about the Trump administration’s willingness to intervene in a Taiwan scenario.

As I’ve recently argued with my colleagues, U.S. actions on other major conflicts (eg Ukraine and the Middle East) significantly inform Beijing’s thinking on the risks of attacking Taiwan.

BUT what *does* likely affect Beijing’s thinking here is that President Trump intervened so significantly and took substantial risks in doing so.

So the tactics and American military power on display here were impressive. But I don’t think they deter Beijing, and I don’t think the MOPs undermine their confidence in their new military compound.

Plus, initial U.S. intel assessments seem to cast doubt on just how successful U.S. strikes were at destroying/degrading Iran’s nuclear program. You could argue the limits of the damage might actually decrease the deterrent effect vis a vis China.

Iran’s military capabilities are not comparable to those of China’s, especially given how degraded Iran’s forces have become. Most importantly, unlike Iran, China *is* a nuclear power. Attacks on central military leadership could provoke a nuclear response by China.

The military complex under construction near Beijing is massive. MOPs are useful for destroying discrete UG targets — not an entire military compound much larger than the Pentagon.

I very highly doubt this. A 🧵 with a few thoughts. Chinese military planners already knew well the capabilities of the B-2 and had no reason to doubt the GBU-57 MOP. So the tactical success of this mission — while impressive — won’t really change their thinking.

According to reports, Xi Jinping will skip next week’s BRICS summit in Brazil. That’s a first but not entirely unprecedented: Xi conspicuously missed a scheduled appearance at part of the 2023 BRICS summit in South Africa. I analyzed that here:

RT @CSIS: A major Taiwan contingency, such as a quarantine, blockade, or invasion, could significantly disrupt the flow of trade through th….