RT @Kyiv: Kyiv covered in thick smoke after a 10-hour Russian attack. It's hard to breathe. 400 drones and 18 missiles, including ballistic….

Ukrainian music. This is how you support us by streaming. And it won’t be hard because this guy is amazing. Frainbreeze & Denise Rivera - Memory Of You

На жаль, лише спротив середовища здатний зупинити терор через масштабне зниження його ефективності. Якщо ви робите щось змістовне на шкоду країні уйобку – дістаньте зброю та навчіться нею користуватися.

That all just to say that my wife is an angelic superhero with infinite compassion and eternal patience.

Nothing quite compares to raising a Zoomer and a Gen Alpha. Two generations speaking the same memes in two different languages. United only by their disdain for everything you say.

RT @United24media: 🕯️ 22-year-old metro police officer Mariia Dziumaha was killed in Russia’s July 10 missile strike on Kyiv. Described as….

RT @United24media: A Russian drone made it all the way to Chernivtsi. It was shot down, but during the blasts, hospice staff rushed critic….

RT @United24media: 🔴 BREAKING: An EU translator working with President Zelenskyy was dismissed over suspected spying for Russia, despite ea….

8/ .Bottom line: .The myth of cyber omnipotence persists. Papers like this are useful. But we must stop mistaking tactical failure for strategic potential. Cyber is powerful – but it’s neither magic, nor even weaponry.

7/ .Cyber ops can support wars – but they don’t win them. Ukraine's resilience proved this. russia’s cyber failure isn’t just about infighting. It’s about inflated expectations, magical thinking, and overhyped marketing.

6/ .This paper joins a long line of solid research trapped in a flawed premise: that cyber is a game-changer if only better executed. I continue to argue the opposite: cyber’s limitations are structural, not just organizational.

5/ .Even at its most destructive – e.g., NotPetya or Industroyer – russian OCOs caused annoyance and distress, not victories. Impact was lateral, not decisive. With all respect to the authors, coordination wouldn’t have changed that.

4/ .Cyberwarfare has always promised more than it delivers. It’s good for espionage, harassment, psychological ops – but rarely delivers powerful *first-order effects* like tanks, bombs, or even electricity shutdowns.

3/ .Yes, interagency friction is real. Russian cyber units trip over each other often. But the deeper issue isn’t *how* they deconflict or coordinate (which they don’t) – it’s *what* cyber operations can achieve in the first place.

2/ .The authors suggest that russia’s limited cyber impact in Ukraine stems from poor coordination between APTs – not from any lack of capability. In their view: no synergy = no strategic effect. But again and again this framing needs challenging.

1/.“Disjointed Cyber Warfare” ( dives into the internal cyber dysfunction of russian intelligence agencies arguing their rivalry weakens russia’s cyber effectiveness, which authors deem full of inhibited potential. A thread on this persistent fallacy.

RT @saintjavelin: Kyiv tonight. 💔 Russia’s overnight attack killed two women and injured over a dozen. Fires broke out across the city. T….

RT @MFA_Ukraine: Today, on July 9th, the life of little Dmytryk was cruelly taken by a Russian drone strike on a home in Pravdyne, Kherson….

“Say what you will about organized cyber crime, at least it’s organized”.

RT @Liveuamap: Overnight Russia launched 728 Shahed-type drones, 7 Kh-101 cruise missiles and 6 Kh-47M2 Kinzhal aeroballistic missiles, - U….