UselessChris
@aUselessChris
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Blockchain stalker and high risk investor.
Scandinavia
Joined July 2009
Okay so I've received a ton of questions since starting to post these delayed honeypots. Mainly these two:. - How can it be a honeypot when every scan is showing a clean/safe when renounced contract?. - How can I find out that it's a honeypot when the scanners doesn't show it?
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I'd argue that both desperation and rent-free would apply more to people who need to crop pictures to hide the fact that the screenshot on the left isn't me. That's the $WCO wayfinders in a nutshell for you. Can't defend their project using facts and hiding behind blocks 24/7.
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With @VictusGlobal_ seemingly out of the picture, these would be the final stats:. @WChainNetwork received:.$1m. Victus received:.3,023,342,146 $WCO. 30.23% of total supply.51.8% of circulation. Market value of $WCO on delivery:.$1,758,937.88. Discount given to Victus:.43.15%.
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First one down showing that a burnt LP indeed isn't a factor in these cases.
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Add @INFAICommunity $INFAI to tokens to avoid. LP will get drained later on, and I suspect that any real users buying among the fake volume until then will get their bag siphoned. 0x756d2c966eF280D84b1c17dA185146Bb1Aa78B3f.
Scammers always try to get ahead and it looks we have a string of new projects that manage to trick most standard automated audits. So avoid @MarginAiNet $MARGIN as the LP will get drained. LP being burnt is irrelevant in this case. 0x7135476F3D048c97C3E9007f2848372fd8765184.
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Scammers always try to get ahead and it looks we have a string of new projects that manage to trick most standard automated audits. So avoid @MarginAiNet $MARGIN as the LP will get drained. LP being burnt is irrelevant in this case. 0x7135476F3D048c97C3E9007f2848372fd8765184.
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Been a while since I did any predictions on fresh tokens, but barring any panic moves from the team side I'd expect @maze_chat $MAZE to be pushed hard the upcoming week or so before a quick exit on team wallets. Stay safe. 0x4b5AaE28e585a7C28d1A7Bba70BBb5fD376Eabb9.
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Any #Globiance users might want to be vigilant about sharing too much information here. Your personal deposit txns and addresses are not needed to figure out where your funds went.
@saveourplanet_9 @B3lle888 @moberito @Frankixdc @WalterW64317879 @MichelCrypto1 @AmanAze369 @XSwapProtocol @XDC_Network_ @globiance @Oliver_LaRosa Blame games aside, let's get to the bottom of this . and figure out what @Oliver_LaRosa really did with user funds. If you'd like to help, please share (here or via DM) any addresses you know to be associated with Globiance/Oliver, and any other data+information you have.
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14/ On the positive note for $WCO supporters, this does show that 15m $WCO was indeed recovered from the hack, intentional or not. It is however far from the 375m claimed that we have previously concluded would be a mathematical impossibility.
16/ 375m $WTK recovered?. Hard no. With 1.17b sold, it would not even be possible to seize more than 161m. On top of that, any blacklisting done can be seen on-chain. Not a single hacker wallet ever got blacklisted.
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13/ Scenario C:. The hack was an inside job, as all previous published data shows, and migrating anything was pointless as the team could just retrieve the supply again by emptying the migration contract once the process closed.
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12/ Scenario B:. The hacker started moving some funds to Bitrue and intended to continue doing so but then lost the private keys to the remaining 48 wallets. Alternatively, getting struck by a severe case of amnesia or other medical emergency in the early stages of this process.
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11/ Scenario A:. The hacker simply assumed that the project he had managed to compromise and steal from, undetected, over nearly 2 years had acted quickly to block any potential movements and felt it was pointless to even try moving more than those initial 518k $WCO.
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10/ So with all of this in mind, why did the remaining 15m $WCO airdropped never move?. Let's look at possible explanations:.
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9/ As mentioned, most of this $WCO never moved. No attempts to deposit to an exchange, no attempt to migrate. The exception being 4 hacker wallets sending a combined 518,239 $WCO to a fresh Bitrue deposit on BSC. This deposit is labeled WTK hacker Bitrue 12 in The FUnD Files.
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8/ While it can be understandable that mistakes are made during a hasty relaunch, it's very notable that both of the main hacker wallets that operated everything on the Polygon side were airdropped their $WCO. Those would have been incredibly easy to detect and exclude.
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7/ No wallet excluded, no wallet blacklisted. Overall this had little impact though as the majority of the airdropped wallets were probably bridged to the wrong chain by the hacker who seemed unaware of their existence. No attempt was ever made to migrate this supply.
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6/ As mentioned by the team, most of the stolen $WTK was probably sold after being sent to Bitrue within the first few days after being bridged from Polygon. Not all however, and much like with the old bridge contracts, the hacker received a $WCO airdrop to 52 wallets.
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5/ These blacklist and burn transactions did not target the hacker however. All supply blacklisted was airdropped $WCO that got stuck in the old $WTK bridge contracts. And no - the hacker had no way of accessing this as the bridge only allowed transfers of $WTK.
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4/ The $WCO token deployed on Ethereum, BSC and XDC did indeed have a blacklisting function as well as the capability of burning blacklisted supply. Both of these functions were also called by the WCO owner wallet once on each chain before the contracts were renounced.
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3/ As the drama following the bridge hack unfolded, the $WCO team claimed they would blacklist the hacker wallets in order to recover stolen supply. According to the official statement released in 2025, 375m $WCO / $WTK was recovered.
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