Tweets on Asian security. Senior Fellow
@AEI
. Lecturer
@PrincetonSPIA
. Partner at Armitage Int'l. Wrangler of children. Former Pentagon and White House staffer.
What we are seeing now from Japan is remarkable. In coordination with Washington, Tokyo is taking major steps to prepare for a serious contingency.
In
@WarOnTheRocks
today,
@DEricSayers
and I discuss some of the changes and why they are so momentous.
This is a critical moment for U.S.-China relations.
In recent years there has been a debate about the degree to which the United States can shape China’s major strategic decisions.
I think that debate may be nearing its end. 🧵 1/9
Hey
@washingtonpost
: I fixed your headline.
The real story here isn't the U.S. angering China. The story is China's campaign of economic coercion against Australia backfiring spectacularly. Couldn't have imagined this deal 5 years ago. Give Beijing the credit.
President Yoon wants South Korea to be a "global pivotal state" but Seoul is under-institutionalized on the global stage.
In a new article, I look at the disconnect between South Korea's new focus and the constraints on the format of its engagement. A short thread... (1/4)
Good piece by
@wstrobel
@WSJ
on wargaming about Taiwan scenarios.
I was on Team China with
@becca_wasser
- we sunk 2 US aircraft carriers and destroyed 700 US/Japan aircraft.
But we still only took 1/3rd of Taiwan before our amphibs were sunk and our invasion petered out.
I fear that a serious crisis is unfolding at Second Thomas Shoal.
China appears determined to prevent resupply efforts by the Philippines, as they did most dangerously in 2014. Read a short summary of that case here:
Risky days ahead. Buckle up.
President Biden just announced that he's skipping the East Asia Summit and U.S.-ASEAN Summit in Indonesia. This is a major own goal.
It raises questions about whether the United States has a two-tiered approach to Asia. A quick thread... (1/5)
Where will U.S.-China relations go from here? I think they will worsen, unfortunately.
My guess is that we will look back at this period as the point at which the relationship changed permanently. And not for the better. Buckle up. 9/9
I've spent much of the last week debating Pelosi's trip to Taiwan with other experts and officials.
There is much disagreement on four assessments:
1) Probability of serious incident
2) Probability of war
3) Benefit of visit
4) Cost of rescheduling
I have two pieces today on Pelosi's possible visit to Taiwan.
In the
@nytimes
,
@BonnieGlaser
and I argue Pelosi's trip is not advisable at this time. We worry it could precipitate a crisis and put Taiwan in a difficult position. High risk, low reward. 1/8
The White House just declassified its Asia strategy (or "framework"). Let's talk about the details. A thread:
1) In my view, the initial framing is wrong. The strategy aims "to maintain U.S. strategic primacy in the Indo-Pacific." But is primacy realistic? Or sensible?
For years, Beijing decried "China hawks" for damaging US-China relations. But much of the damage done in the last few months has been by the Communist Party and its Foreign Ministry. Beijing's own propaganda campaign is convincing Americans that we're in an ideological struggle.
Plus, as we
@SecureDemocracy
show in this new analysis, China is actually ramping up its efforts to support Russian narratives about Ukraine.
Beijing is aligning MORE with Moscow, despite the damage that this is likely to do to its reputation abroad.
Extremely significant policy shift:
“As the South China Sea is part of the Pacific, any armed attack on Philippine forces, aircraft or public vessels in the South China Sea will trigger mutual defense obligations under Article 4 of our mutual defense treaty.” -Pompeo (in Manila)
The White House just released the first U.S. strategy for the Pacific Islands!
This is a good move. For too long the United States has under-invested in the Pacific.
So what does the strategy get right and wrong? Here's a🧵with a few initial thoughts...
Want an example of bad alliance management? Read today's WSJ op-ed by SecState and SecDef.
Asking allies to do more is fine. But our focus should be on total capabilities, not cash payments. Op-eds are the wrong way to negotiate with friends. What a mess.
The biggest news out of the Quad may be one of the items that got the least attention: providing space-based radio frequency data across the Indo-Pacific.
@GregPoling
and I explain why this is a big deal via
@WarOnTheRocks
.
HOW allies spend is as important as how much.
We want differentiation and specialization in allied capabilities 👍
We will get duplication and autonomy if allies think we are unreliable 👎
By threatening alliances, US may decrease burdensharing, even if allies spend more.
Is the U.S. policy of strategic ambiguity on Taiwan dead? No. But I think it is on life support. Here's why:
The question now is whether the United States can maintain a policy that its leaders don't follow.
A quick 🧵 (1/6)
It pains me to write this, but I'm worried about the new AUKUS plan.
I have been very impressed by recent U.S. progress with Japan, Philippines, and Pacific Islands.
But I think this plan has several design flaws. A short thread explaining my concerns...
A decade ago I took a class on “International Strategy” from Tom Christensen, which helped convince me a PhD would be a useful endeavor.
I never would have imagined that I’d be headed back to Princeton today to teach that course. Sometimes the world is an amazing place.
So now the Chinese Communist Party is openly threatening U.S. think tanks.
We've stood with Michael Kovrig and ICG. We'll stand with NED, NDI, IRI, HRW, Freedom House, and others.
This will backfire against Beijing.
With news breaking that the United States, Japan, and South Korea are agreeing on a "commitment to consult" -- here's a comparison with the consultation commitment wording in actual U.S. treaty alliances.
Thanks to the excellent
@Connor_Fiddler
@AEIfdp
for pulling this together!
In a new report, I argue that the nature of alignment in Asia in changing. The era of coalitions is upon us.
3 big shifts:
unipolarity ➡️ multipolarity
alliances ➡️ alignments
multilateralism ➡️ minilateralism
A thread on my
@ISEAS
essay, their new poll, and the implications...
We have a new U.S. strategy for Asia!
Tony Blinken just outlined five pillars in Indonesia:
1) Advance free and open Indo-Pacific
2) Forge stronger connections
3) Promote broad-based prosperity
4) Build more resilient region
5) Bolster security
If the administration is serious about shifting its attention to the Indo-Pacific, the first thing it has to do is show up. And listen.
The center of gravity in the competition with China is the alignment of regional states. We have to stop shooting ourselves in the foot. Fin.
These four emerging coalitions will be separate:
-Geostrategic (Quad+?)
-Economic (G7?)
-Technological (T12?)
-Governance (D10?)
But all have two countries in common: the US 🇺🇸 + Japan 🇯🇵
The burden we need to share is coalition strategy and prioritization, not cash transfers.
Does America have a China strategy? I don't think so.
A strategy usually has ends, ways, and means. We have adopted a strategy focused on competition - which is a way, not an end.
Today in
@ChinaFile
and
@ForeignPolicy
I make the case for a new approach.
The best part of working in Washington DC is when friends, colleagues, and mentors take on critical tasks in government.
To everyone headed in tomorrow and in the days that follow: Your success is our success. Work hard. Do good. Make us proud. And thank you for serving! 🇺🇸
Observers should not expect progress from tomorrow's Sullivan-Yang meeting. It was scheduled before the Ukraine invasion and as recent reporting indicates, the two sides appear as far apart as ever.
A story of U.S. engagement in Asia in three acts.
Act 1: Today, U.S. released an Indo-Pacific update that begins, “President Donald J. Trump has made U.S. engagement in the Indo-Pacific region a top priority of his Administration.”
But it looks like China's approach to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine may be the ultimate test.
It is weakening Russia and strengthening cooperation among democracies. So some in China have suggested that Beijing change its approach.
For many years, U.S. policy was premised on the goal of convincing China to become a “responsible stakeholder” – to “work with us to sustain the international system that has enabled its success.”
I often complain about lack of US execution in Asia, but Biden has had three big and unexpected wins so far:
- Quad vaccine initiative
- Philippines VFA
- US-UK-AU subs
Now let’s articulate a positive regional strategy (including on trade!) and we’ll really be cooking with fire.
Although some in the Trump administration rejected this approach, President Trump still signed the “Phase One” trade deal – we now know it was a massive failure.
Some in the Biden administration hoped climate could be an area of cooperation.
There is merit to testing this logic, as a number of us argue below. Either Beijing will moderate its approach. Or we will at least have shown the world that we tried.
But I have to admit that I think the odds of success are low.
(For up to the minute data, head to our Ukraine Dashboard, which tracks Russian and Chinese messaging on Ukraine. You'll see lots of disinformation from both about biological weapons labs.)
Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi trolling the Trump administration:
“when I first heard this figure of $113 million I thought I heard wrong. At least it should be 10 times higher, for a superpower with $16 trillion of GDP.”
Let the games begin...
Australia acquiring nuclear-power submarines?
In 2013, I explained why this made sense (alongside
@IskanderRehman
and Jim Thomas at
@CSBA_
):
- More endurance✅
- Larger payloads ✅
- Quieter at speed✅
Will the U.S. deploy its own SSNs to Australia too?
What is the logic behind America’s China strategy?
In a new article, the fantastic
@EmilyYoungCarr
and I analyze four different schools of thought:
1) Responsible Stakeholder
2) Communist Collapse
3) Constructive Cooperation
4) Managed Competition
A short 🧵 on our findings...
In a new piece,
@SheenaGreitens
and I ask what roles U.S. allies and partners might play in a conflict with China over Taiwan.
It would, or course, depend on the exact scenario, but we conclude that this is probably the best case for Washington:
Some personal news: After four great years
@CSIS
, I'm heading over to
@AEI
! Big thanks to
@kath_hicks
, twitterless Mike Green, and the rest of the CSIS team! Excited to kick off a few big projects on U.S. strategy and alliances in Asia, including a new book!
Let's be 100% clear: If POTUS cancels portions of his Asia visit it will do real damage to the U.S. argument that we are a reliable partner.
Visits matter in Asia. Including cancelled ones. We can argue about whether that should be the case, but that's the reality.
Every game is different but this one served as a reminder that in some ways an invasion of Taiwan is easier for us to defeat than:
- Blockade
- Missile bombardment
- Outlying island seizure
Thanks to Eric Heginbotham and
@MarkCancian
for including me.
The Phase One deal is failing. The administration promised a "distrust and verify" approach, but China is $40B behind on promised purchases. And data shows the pandemic isn't the whole explanation.
Derek Scissors and I explore what's next
@RealClearWorld
Even now that it appears Pelosi will go to Taiwan tomorrow, I don't think a conflict is inevitable.
In fact, I think it is quite unlikely. We should not panic.
But the risks are real. And they compound with every crisis. So I hope all sides manage the next few days responsibly.
China's foreign ministry spokesperson is accusing the United States of having a "Cold War mentality" for cooperating with the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.
I'm no Cold War historian, but I don't remember Washington and Hanoi having a comprehensive strategic partnership... 🤔
Excited to be joining
@rosenbergerlm
and team as
@SecureDemocracy
co-director!
We’ve got a lot of work to do to help safeguard our democracy against foreign interference. So do our friends.
Big thanks to
@AEI
for encouraging this important bipartisan work.
We’re delighted to welcome
@ZackCooper
as ASD’s co-director! He’ll work with
@rosenbergerlm
to lead our bipartisan team dedicated to countering authoritarian interference in democracies, in addition to his role
@AEI
.
Long-term U.S. policy remains ambiguous. No one knows what the U.S. will do if Taiwan is attacked in 5 years.
But I think it is quite clear what Biden would do if Taiwan is attacked tomorrow.
How long can the U.S. maintain a policy that its leaders don't follow? (6/6)
Wow. Congress is getting serious about oversight and reporting requirements on the Indo-Pacific in the 2020 NDAA.
Here’s a list of some NDAA reporting requirements related to Asia:
What is "Integrated Deterrence"? I think I figured it out...
Integrated deterrence proponents stress four themes:
1) Incorporating non-military tools
2) Involving allies and partners
3) Application across full spectrum of conflict
4) Rapidity of decision-making and innovation
The United States and China got their "report cards" from Southeast Asia this week via
@ISEAS
's 2021 Survey.
This should be required reading for anyone focused on dynamics in Asia. How did we do? Let's take a look...
The State Dept made a smart shift on China's maritime claims. Today
@WarOnTheRocks
,
@BonnieGlaser
and I examine five possible options now "on the table":
-Economic sanctions
-Increased patrols
-Direct support
-Capacity building
-Collective statements
Where I think my assessment differs most from some others is on the cost-benefit of the visit.
I think the upside is small and the potential downsides substantial. So I thought rescheduling would have been wise.
But many other experts disagree on all four points above.
Are sanctions meant to compel a Russian withdrawal from Ukraine or use brute force to hurt Putin?
Policymakers usually frame sanctions as a coercive tool, but I suspect they will operate more as brute force.
This creates a war termination challenge. Here's why... (1/7)
Controversial view: We should stop using the term "great power competition"
Why?
- Conflates China + Russia (btw, not a great power)
- Implies values are secondary to power
- Minimizes ally/partner roles
Here's my piece for the "Bad Ideas" series
@CSIS
:
There are numerous political and technical challenges ahead, but that is natural since many of these reforms would have been hard to imagine just a few years ago.
Great work by Japan and the U.S. government on these alliance resourcing, posture, and capability initiatives.
Looking for some light summer reading?
Here's a quick summary of the key Indo-Pacific provisions in the House and Senate National Defense Authorization bills from
@Connor_Fiddler
and me for
@AEIdeas
. Clearly tons of interest in Asia on the Hill!
My new piece
@WarOnTheRocks
analyzes the White House's China strategy.
I've heard five critiques:
1) Too confrontation for admin critics
2) Too restrained for CCP critics
3) Too transactional for allies
4) Too values-based for Trump
5) Too late to matter
I wonder whether historians will describe this as the end of the "Inter-Cold War" period.
"Post-Cold War" no longer fits as US-China ties break:
- Cancelled visits
- Trade war
- SCS incident
- Chip hacking
- VP speech
1991-2018 looking more like the "Interwar Period" 1919-1939.
I'll have much more to say soon, but for now here's my Reviewer 2 comment:
The National Security Strategy does not mention Zack Cooper (not even a footnote!). I can only imagine that this must have been an oversight by the authors so I recommend that they revise and resubmit.
For the sake of clarity, I think the probability of China's response triggering a serious incident (akin to a fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis) is low - maybe 20%. But my confidence level is also low.
I feel more confident that a major conflict is unlikely. But it is not impossible.
We need a strategy to protect rules, relationships, and resources in the South China Sea, and Southeast Asia more broadly.
FONOPs are necessary, but not sufficient,
@GregPoling
and I argue in
@ForeignPolicy
.
The PRC's twitter propaganda is SO bad. Example
#284
:
PRC embassy invokes one of Aesop's fables, which ends: "The tyrant can always find an excuse for its tyranny."
Who is the tyrant? The wolf.
What does PRC embassy say China is? The wolf.
🤦♂️
h/t:
@thomaswright08
In
@ForeignAffairs
today,
@AdamPLiff
and I argue that US leaders need to shift from talk to action in Asia.
Nearly 10 years ago, Obama promised that the US would rebalance to Asia. How have we done? The results are mixed, at best. A short 🧵
The Defense Futures Simulator is here!
Want to know how defense strategy translates into defense spending? Well we have a website for you.
Over the last year,
@AEI
@CSIS
and
@WarOnTheRocks
jointly built a defense simulator, which is now live.
Asia nerds: We read the 2021 NDAA so you don't have to!
The Pacific Deterrence Initiative (Sec 1251) will get lots of attention, but there are 40+ other sections that touch directly on U.S. strategy, alliances and partnerships, or competition with China.
For the fourth time in just over a year, Joe Biden has made a statement that appears to recalibrate US policy on Taiwan.
What should we make of this? My five key points...
Join us Tuesday at 1 PM for the rollout of the Pentagon’s 2020 China Military Power Report!
Chad Sbragia, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for China, will walk us through the report and discuss some big changes to this year’s version.
To close out 2020,
@HalBrands
and I explain why there won’t be a single “alliance of democracies” to counter China.
1) This is a far more multipolar competition than the Cold War.
2) Coalitions will form around issues, not fixed blocs. (1/3)
Excited to get back in the (virtual) classroom teaching the theoretical foundations of US-China dynamics
@GeorgetownCSS
and
@PrincetonSPIA
this semester.
Security scholars tend to be pessimists, but what an exciting time to be studying Asian security - so much great new work!
This month marks 10 years since the Pivot to Asia.
How have we done? In a new report,
@AdamPLiff
and I assess to Pivot's successes and failures.
We conclude that the basic strategy remains correct. But implementation has been spotty, at best. (1/2)
Out today,
@HalBrands
and I assess six strategic tradeoffs for deterrence in Asia via the Marshall Papers
@CSIS
:
1) Survivability vs Lethality
2) Conceal vs Reveal
3) Close-in vs Stand-off
4) Speed vs Sustainability
5) Sovereignty vs Efficiency
6) Gray zone vs High intensity
Think the US-Australia alliance is in great shape?
Look at this brutal polling on how young Australians see the United States. Time to get back to basics on the alliance.
Hard to read, but great work by
@natashaskassam
and the team
@LowyInstitute
. Link:
This looks bad. I was with Michael at a conference in Beijing this summer, along with other academics / think tankers. We don't know the details, but if he was arrested in response to Meng Wanzhou's arrest, it will have a chilling effect among experts.
Lloyd Austin called the new agreement with the Philippines a “very big deal” - he’s right
Here is my take for
@NewsHour
on the implications and what challenges lay ahead
The U.S. and the Philippines reached an agreement today expanding the American military footprint in the country.
To analyze what this means for America’s goals in that region,
@GeoffRBennett
spoke with
@ZackCooper
.
This
@pewresearch
report is important, but painful to read as an American.
67% of South Koreans, 66% of Japanese, and 36% of Aussies say U.S. power and influence is a major threat to their countries. Concern high in NATO too. Ouch.
"Free and Open" Indo-Pacific defined by
@SecPompeo
:
Free =
🔸Protection from coercion
🔸Good governance
🔸Fundamental rights / liberties
Open =
🔹Access to seas and airways
🔹Peaceful resolution of disputes
🔹Fair and reciprocal trade
🔹Investment
🔹Transparency
🔹Connectivity
Out now in the U.S. Naval War College Review: Hal Brands and I outline the four strategic options available to the United States in the South China Sea.
Come work with me!
We
@AEI
are hiring a research assistant to work on Indo-Pacific issues with Mike Beckley, Eric Sayers, and me. We've had a track record of wonderful RAs, all of whom have gone on to do great things, so apply here:
1) Pelosi likely thinks the trip is stabilizing. Deterrence is eroding, so a visit demonstrates commitment.
But I think Xi is most likely to act when backed into a corner. So I'd prefer we focus on quietly bolstering our and Taiwan's capabilities. Less rhetoric, more action. 3/8
Every once in a while you get a chance to work on something really important and educational. This is one of those pieces for me.
I'm SUPER excited to have this piece out with DASD(!)
@lindseywford
in
@TXNatSecReview
. We spent years working on it. [1/10]
The House and Senate NDAAs include many important provisions on Asia.
Lots of bipartisan agreement on the region’s importance, including the Pacific Deterrence Initiative and Indo-Pacific Reassurance Initiative.
Here’s my short summary of what to watch:
Xi Jinping championed four principles at the UN today:
▪️Justice 🤔 Xinjiang?
▪️Rule of law 🤔 Hong Kong?
▪️Cooperation 🤔 Wolf Warrior diplomacy?
▪️Real action 🤔 IP theft?
The CCP should embrace these principles itself before advocating them abroad.
Great to be back in Taiwan and getting a chance to spend time with old friends here and discuss both recent US-Taiwan cooperation and the work we still have ahead of us.
Glad to welcome our friends from
@CSIS
back to
#Taiwan
. I hope this visit will help CSIS, a leading think tank, gain deeper insight into Taiwan, as we work with the
#US
& other international partners to enhance democratic resilience & uphold peace & stability in the
#IndoPacific
.
Has a Biden doctrine emerged yet? I don't think so.
Instead, Biden is combining elements of his last three predecessors' doctrines:
- Bush's freedom agenda (pro-democracy)
- Obama's don't do stupid sh*t (pro-restraint)
- Trump's American first (on trade) [1/2]
Act 2: U.S. declines to send the President, Vice President, or Secretary of State to the East Asia Summit or ASEAN meetings.
Here’s who led U.S. delegation to EAS in last decade:
2010: SECSTATE(S)
2011: POTUS(P)
2012: P
2013: S
2014: P
2015: P
2016: P
2017: S
2018: VP
The Trump administration is pursuing two separate Asia policies: 1) Trump's approach, 2) his administration's. This can't last.
My take on "A Tale of Two Asia Policies" in
@WarOnTheRocks
:
President Trump was apparently quite clear in 2019:
"Taiwan is like two feet from China... We are eight thousand miles away. If they invade, there isn’t a f*cking thing we can do about it." (2/6)
So U.S. policy is to remain ambiguous, but those who would actually make these decisions have themselves been quite clear about their intentions.
I think these have been gaffes—not intended policy changes—but as
@JonahDispatch
notes, they add up. (5/6)
Act 3: ASEAN leaders “unhappy” Trump skipped meeting, downgrade own attendance at ASEAN-U.S. Summit.
In response, U.S. “diplomat” criticizes ASEAN for trying to “embarrass the President” and says “this will be very damaging to ASEAN-U.S. relations.”
I know some folks are reading a lot into the "secure and prosperous" wording in readouts of President-elect Biden's calls with Asian leaders.
Just a friendly reminder: "secure" and "prosperous" are not new -- they were the top terms Obama used to describe the pivot's aims.
There are some critical announcements this week about key Asian treaty allies. But how is the U.S. doing elsewhere in the region?
Last week we got a report card from the 2024 ISEAS Survey. And it isn't great news. A short thread... [1/9]
Incredibly excited that
@KoriSchake
is joining
@AEI
as the director of foreign and defense policy studies (and my boss).
Such a fantastic move. A great scholar. A great policymaker. Thrilled to have her leading our team. (1/2)