I explain more about why we should care about this "Denial Dilemma" in a new book edited by @HalBrands on "Lessons from the New Cold War". Read my chapter here (for free!):. And the full book here:

As a result, China is likely to respond by pressing Taiwan and the Philippines harder in the gray zone. Yet, US policies will leave Taiwan and the Philippines less able to respond. Will we step in? I doubt it. This will erode the status quo, and confidence in Taipei and Manila.

US officials are also pressing those allies to adopt "denial" capabilities, such as mines and missiles, over larger platforms. Denial capabilities are valuable in some types of conflicts (as I've detailed in Tides of Fortune), but almost useless for deterring gray zone coercion.

The Trump administration is pushing allies and partners -- like the Philippines and Taiwan -- to focus on invasion of "core" metropolitan area rather than "gray zone" scenarios.

I fear that the Trump administration's approach in Asia is leading us into what I'm calling the "DENIAL DILEMMA.". In short, the administration's alliance and defense strategies are in tension, and could actually invite more aggression from China. Here's why. 🧵 (1/5).

RT @JChengWSJ: “After the Iran strikes, I suspect that Chinese leaders will now be more nervous about testing President Trump’s resolve” on….

I’m getting some questions from bewildered friends, so just to clear things up…. No, Nikki Haley and I are not starting a Democratic think tank. THANK YOU FOR YOUR ATTENTION TO THIS MATTER!

So all in all, this was a more reassuring speech than most expected. But it also left a number of questions about the Trump administration's approach to Asia. Read the full essay here @RSIS_NTU:

5) Will the United States stand with Taiwan?. Hegseth focused on Taiwan and pointedly warned that “the threat China poses is real. And it could be imminent.” But he was ambiguous about whether the US would get directly involved, saying his job is to give Trump decision space.

4) Does the United States truly accept the Chinese Communist Party?. Hegseth said there would be no “pressure other countries to embrace or adopt policies or ideologies” but then repeatedly referred to “Communist China.” This left many confounded.

3) Are the European and Asian theatres connected?. Hegseth’s most nuanced response during the Q&A session was on the issue of European contributions to Asian security. But others in the administration seem to disagree. Whose views will win out?.

2) What level of defence spending is the Trump administration demanding of Asian allies?. Hegseth reportedly insisted on 3% or 3.5% of GDP, but Bridge Colby continues to suggest the figure should be 5%. Which is it?.

1) Where does South Korea stand under the Trump administration?. This speech will reinforce concerns in Seoul that the Trump administration no longer views South Korea (which was barely mentioned) as a top-tier ally.

So although the speech was surprisingly unsurprising, this may not be a good thing. Moreover, Hegseth's “vision for the Indo-Pacific” raises five major questions about the administration’s approach – each highlighting a central tension:.

C) That American officials have repeatedly promised to shift focus to Asia, but continue to devote significant attention to the Middle East and other so-called secondary regions. Just look at the force posture shifts ongoing the last few weeks. Middle East > Asia once again. .

B) That American leaders view the region through the lens of competition with China, rather than recognizing Southeast Asian countries as important in their own right. Indeed, Hegseth barely talked about Southeast Asian countries, despite giving the speech in Singapore.

A) That American engagement is overly focused on military cooperation without a robust trade and economic strategy – precisely what regional states desire from the United States. Hegseth noted he is "in the business of tanks, not trade" - this is too true of the US generally.

Unfortunately the speech also played into three recurring criticisms of US strategy in Asia, which have hampered Washington's approach to the region for years.

Overall SecDef exceeded expectations by giving a speech that was more traditional than revolutionary. Portions of the speech were oriented toward an audience of one in the White House rather than millions in Southeast Asia. But the speech was still seen as generally reassuring.

I have a new piece out from @RSIS_NTU on the Trump administration's approach to Asia. This draws on SecDef Pete Hegseth's trip to the region, where he gave the administration's first major speech on its Asia strategy. A quick thread.