Zack Cooper, an Asia security expert at the American Enterprise Institute, said Tokyo needed to come up with big security ideas to appease Trump. “President Trump prizes big deals, so Prime Minister Takaichi should be ambitious. The time for hitting singles . . . has passed.

This week on Net Assessment, we discuss this important research and debate the implications for the national security community. Give it a listen: https://t.co/Q6Bl7YnRQe

National security experts are often right, but almost always over-confident. According to research by Jeff Friedman in @TXNatSecReview, when experts say they are 90% confident of an outcome, they are right only 57% of the time. Yikes! https://t.co/AhxQ5dqNhF

@ZackCooper of @AEI: “Beijing is playing Washington, and doing so with remarkable effectiveness. While other major economies have been forced to make trade concessions to Trump, he has spent the past few months making concessions to China.” @ChinaFile https://t.co/i7rys0xxv6

The pivot / prioritization of Asia continues: "The United States shall regard any armed attack on the territory, sovereignty, or critical infrastructure of the State of Qatar as a threat to the peace and security of the United States."

https://t.co/4KBa6b9ZHw

The team @ChinaFile asked eight of us to assess the state of play in US-China relations and who has the upper hand in the ongoing negotiations. I think it's pretty clear. Beijing is showing its capabilities and biding its time. And it's working.

AEI's @DerekScissors1 and @ZackCooper: Since the late spring, Trump has made concession after concession to Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping and gotten little to nothing in return. https://t.co/puA6SIqGkx

"Since the late spring, Trump has made concession after concession to Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping and gotten little to nothing in return." Agree. Trump hitting allies and partners harder with tariffs than he is China.

I'm just going to leave this here... 🤔 https://t.co/iQu95BpSo4

Multipolarity is an opportunity, not a death sentence, for America. That's my bottom line in this discussion with @EmmaMAshford And here's my longer take on "An American Strategy for a Multipolar World" for her @StimsonCenter compendium: https://t.co/ZrJ24jZlMN

In the last year we have gone from: BEIJING begging WASHINGTON to allow it to buy advanced semiconductors to... WASHINGTON begging BEIJING to allow it to sell advanced semiconductors I give up. 🤦‍♂️

It's refreshing to read such a clear-eyed assessment, free of the nostalgia and unreality that dominates thinking on US Asia-Pacific strategy. Highly recommend.

In short, the time has come to rethink the rebalance. This world will be more complex and dangerous. But American strategists must accept the world they have created and craft realistic approaches to protect US interests in this evolving region. https://t.co/8A3oKWKSYJ

Implication 4: These shifting regional dynamics suggest that nuclear proliferation in Asia is a real and growing risk. If Washington's position in Asia erodes, how would the United States react if some of its allies and partners were to pursue independent nuclear options?

Implication 3: As China’s influence in continental Asia grows, the US might embrace an offshore balancing role. If the United States adopts an maritime balancing strategy, what would this imply for US allies and partners (like Thailand and South Korea) on the Asian continent?

Implication 2: As Northeast Asian security dominates US engagement, Taiwan will become a litmus test. But if the US disengages outside Northeast Asia and then stands aside on Taiwan, would this effectively erode what is left of the US position across the entire Asian region?

Implication 1: As security dominates the economic and governance pillars of US strategy, Northeast Asia is once again dominating Washington’s thinking. Will US leaders support or oppose Asian powers (especially India and Indonesia) playing bigger roles in their sub-regions?

What does this mean going forward? Rather than asking whether these constraints can be reversed, observers should start thinking about how US policy and the Indo-Pacific region will adapt. I see four basic implications that raise hard questions for American strategists:

Americans must recognize that these three constraints are not primarily about foreign views of Donald Trump. They are more fundamental. They are due to shifting US views and foreign perceptions of America.