The Trump admin is proposing a 7% cut to @NNSANews nonproliferation programs—diverting funds to likely unnecessary nuclear weapons work. Doesn't sound like much, until you see the long term trend...

If anyone at Los Alamos' password is "Alamos," probably best to change it. https://t.co/N71ETqPsW1

National legislation based on #ICSANT is a crucial element of #nuclearsecurity architecture. Pleased to discuss with Sudan 🇸🇩 #UNODC_CBRN Terrorism Prevention Programme’s assistance with this Convention (supported by 🇨🇦🇪🇺🇺🇸), as part of @iaeaorg’s INSSP meeting.

Even if recent remarks on nuclear testing were ambiguous, their impact could be significant. The U.S. has not earned the benefit of the doubt—and even vague suggestions of renewed testing risk fueling alarm and mistrust.

Testing again would also be a domestic political mistake. With weakened safeguards for public health and the environment, do we want to risk returning to the days of finding strontium-90 in baby teeth? The people most harmed could be the very voters the administration depends on.

A U.S. nuclear test today would be a show of force at the expense of stability. It would invite other countries to follow suit and erode confidence in the scientific foundation that keeps the US deterrent credible.

The U.S. does still test its nuclear weapons—by taking them apart, examining components, running experiments, and conducting non-nuclear tests. This is how we maintain confidence in the stockpile without explosions. Resuming explosive testing would undermine this practice.

In the 33 years before the U.S. halted nuclear testing in 1992, countries conducted over 1,000 tests. In the 33 years since? Roughly 20. The global moratorium—and the treaty backing it—has curbed both the spread and sophistication of nuclear weapons worldwide.

Russia withdraws from the Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement https://t.co/ctGmUOkzpE The commitment not to use PMDA plutonium for military purposes appears to remain in place

"Trump Says U.S. Will Begin Testing Nuclear Weapons: President says he has instructed the Pentagon to test ‘on an equal basis’ with Russia and China" https://t.co/SCxc4rA20Y via WSJ. Would be a blunder of historic proportions that must be blocked.

NTI's @Nickolas_Roth highlighted the delicate nature of the Zaporizhzhia plant's power infrastructure, saying, "For much of this year, the site has relied on a single functioning transmission line instead of multiple redundant connections. That creates a single point of failure:

Reliable off-site power is essential to cooling reactors and spent fuel, and its loss leaves the facility dependent on backup diesel generators with limited fuel supplies. This creates a single point of failure that could lead to a catastrophic accident if generators are disabled

The reported sabotage of the last external power line to Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant underscores the extreme fragility of nuclear safety and security in a conflict zone. 🧵 ⤵️ https://t.co/tB90zuUPyS

Beyond design-basis threat

"IAEA head says important to continue discussing nuclear security, non-proliferation with Russia" A nonproliferation regime where nobody engages with the country with the most nuclear weapons and materials isn't much of a regime.

ON THIS DAY IN 2007 #ICSANT – a key instrument against #nuclearterrorism – entered into force. @UNODC’s #CBRN Terrorism Prevention Programme assist States with adhering to/effectively implementing ICSANT thanks to funding of 🇨🇦🇪🇺🇺🇸. More info: https://t.co/yxAqYfQcou #UNODC_CBRN

If you are looking for something to do on Monday morning...@NTI_WMD, @ManagingtheAtom https://t.co/jLm7hLRm6Z

https://t.co/6yRWe1Btdv

Hold on…did you say radioactive wasps?!

I’m so relieved: “The report said there is no leak from the waste tanks, and the nest was likely radioactive through what it called “onsite legacy radioactive contamination” from the residual radioactivity left from when the site was fully operational.”

Independent oversight of nuclear safety and security in the United States is quietly eroding.