Marcus Botacin Profile
Marcus Botacin

@MarcusBotacin

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CS Assistant Professor at Texas A&M @TAMUEngineering; PhD @SECRET_UFPR @UFPR; CE/CS Master @Unicamp_IC; #Malware Research; Also: @[email protected]

College Station, Texas, USA
Joined April 2015
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@MarcusBotacin
Marcus Botacin
3 years
[Big News] I started as CS Assistant Professor @ Texas A&M @TAMUEngineering I'm looking for new collaborators and new students to keep researching malware and systems security. Get in touch!
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@MarcusBotacin
Marcus Botacin
2 months
RT @HouSecCon: In this episode Michael and Sam are talking to malware researcher Dr. Marcus Botacin. Dr. Botacin discusses his journey from….
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@MarcusBotacin
Marcus Botacin
2 months
See you in the next offering.
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@MarcusBotacin
Marcus Botacin
2 months
All the vulnerabilities were disclosed to the developers. Many of them (unfortunately not all) answered and even fixed them, which is great!.
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@MarcusBotacin
Marcus Botacin
2 months
I recorded some of the classes, if you are interested:
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@MarcusBotacin
Marcus Botacin
2 months
But don't worry. The students were able to patch many of those vulnerabilities and to verify many other patches, such as those escapes:
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@MarcusBotacin
Marcus Botacin
2 months
In a more sophisticated attack, one team was able to abuse an intent to move the window to the foreground while screenshoting it via accessibility services.
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@MarcusBotacin
Marcus Botacin
2 months
The previous attack was ran against a mobile app. What happen when the app is protected by a password? Well, students could bruteforce it.
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@MarcusBotacin
Marcus Botacin
2 months
In the worst case, one could remotely trigger user deletion by manipulation the client-side requests.
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@MarcusBotacin
Marcus Botacin
2 months
So why not setting it to the maximum value possible?
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@MarcusBotacin
Marcus Botacin
2 months
Another classical attack: MITM. One team identified an application (game) whose credits were set at the user side and not validated.
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@MarcusBotacin
Marcus Botacin
2 months
OK, sometimes the students exaggerate on how much payload they add to the requests.
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@MarcusBotacin
Marcus Botacin
2 months
Or to steal cookies. That moment when your students come to you with a panel of stolen session cookies.
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@MarcusBotacin
Marcus Botacin
2 months
In a more ellaborated attack, one could use XSS to turn an input form into a complete keylogger.
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@MarcusBotacin
Marcus Botacin
2 months
More than one team found XSS cases, in diverse websites.
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@MarcusBotacin
Marcus Botacin
2 months
Another classical problem identified by the teams were XSS, that can be still widely found online.
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@MarcusBotacin
Marcus Botacin
2 months
And then the access is greanted, thus leaking data of a variety of users.
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@MarcusBotacin
Marcus Botacin
2 months
In those applications, one can modify the request parameters to bypass authentication schemes.
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@MarcusBotacin
Marcus Botacin
2 months
Other classical problems include pure client-side configurations, whose change is not validated by the server, allowing easy manipulation.
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@MarcusBotacin
Marcus Botacin
2 months
This allowed them to find classical security issues, such as directory traversals leading to the access of supposedly private data.
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@MarcusBotacin
Marcus Botacin
2 months
The students become pretty good at Google Dorks, such that they found many interesting things.
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