I am excited to share that my JMP "The role of immigration in a deep recession" is now published in the European Economic Review. I started it in 2016!as part of my Master's Thesis. I can't express how grateful I am to so many colleagues & friends who helped me with it. Long🧵

Hoy publicamos con @socialfedea una revisión del impacto de la inmigración en el mercado de trabajo, centrado en la evidencia para España. Incluimos una actualización del impacto sobre el empleo (skill-cell), comparando los efectos 05-13 vs 13-25.

RT @nadaesgratis: El Programa de Doctorado en Economía de UC3M: ¡Feliz Cumpleaños! Vía @nadaesgratis #Economía.

Playing as local this year at the SAEe. Nice to host such a great conference and happy to see so many friends! #SAEe2024 @FEE_UIB

RT @kikollan: 🔥 ¿Qué pasa con la vivienda en España?. Los precios han subido un 47% en compra y un 58% en alquiler desde 2015. Mientras ta….

The WP can be found here:.

We calibrate the model and use simulations to derive several testable predictions backed up by data from Spain. Interestingly, some key empirical facts cannot be rationalized in a counterfactual scenario where the TWA does not screen workers.

Although the hold-up problem in our model can be solved with transfers from poaching clients to the agency, such transfers are illegal in most EU countries. Policies that allow for transfers may help reduce the type of distortions we identify.

This hold-up problem leads to inefficient assignments, prolonged TWA employment spells, and insufficient job creation, especially for low-skilled workers.

We show that the the TWA in our model can generate missallocation, especially for lower-skilled workers:. User firms have incentives to poach "the best" workers-> ⬇️ TWA’s recruitment investments -> some agency workers are not assigned to their most productive roles.

TWA plays 2 roles in the model:.- Facilitates matching btw workers and firms. - Screens workers and certifies assignment quality.

We develop a 2-period model with a TWA, with the match quality depending on jobs and workers unobserved heterogeneity. In particular, firms fill both “stepping-stone” jobs (wich end up in permanent positions) and “dead-end” jobs (with no long-term prospects).

🚨New WP🚨.Temporary Agency Work and Labor Misallocation, with @RaquelCarr75730 & B. Jerez .How does an intermediary in the labor market (LM) affect lab. market allocation? We focus on temporary agency work (TAW) and explore the theoretical mechanisms that operate. 1/7🧵

RT @nadaesgratis: VII Workshop de la Spanish Network in Macroeconomics Vía @nadaesgratis #Economía.

RT @EconomicsUc3m: #uc3nomics is back!!.📢 Do Temporary Help Agencies help? .🚡Are they a trampoline or a trap for low-skilled workers? .@Raq….

Here the link for the paper (Open Access).

This was an exciting, challenging but enjoyable journey. Thank you for all the inputs that I received during the process!.

Finally, results are robust to:.- Wage flexibility. - Setting differences in bargaining power btw natives and immigrants. - Accounting for the full economic cycle (and not only the GR). - Introducing aggregate uncertainty.

Main policy implication: Stringent immigration enforcement can harm the labor market during recessions by removing a crucial adjustment mechanism, especially amid frequent negative shocks or in rigid labor markets.

But there is also a trade-off in the presence of immigrants during the GR: because their wages are lower, the model implies a negative job-creation effect. However, the positive return migration channel dominates.

In the model, jobs are persistent bc there is a fixed cost to create them:.➡️ Layoffs do NOT entail job destruction.➡️ Voluntary quits (e.g. immigrants leaving the country in the GR) free up jobs for other workers!. Wage rigidity (by delaying job creation) amplifies the effects.