My Op Ed with Professor James Heckman @heckmanequation .

Free download for 50 days from the publisher:.

A downside of China’s promotion tournament is local protectionism, as reflected in the local governments’ allocation of procurement contracts and equity investments. Just in Print at Journal of Public Economics, with Ming Li (CUhK Shenzhen) and Zenan Wu (Peking University).

Many thanks to the referees and editors, as well as numerous discussants and colleagues who have helped improving the paper. 5/5.

Relative to the gains of replacing short-term contracts with either of the two long-term contracts, this welfare gap is smallest when reclassification risk is high. 4/5.

After estimating the key ingredients of a life-cycle model, we find that,.under a variety of assumptions, GLTHI achieves welfare that is at most 4% lower than for the optimal contract. 3/5.

German long-term health insurance (GLTHI) represents the largest.market for private long-term health insurance contracts in the world. We show that GLTHI’s contract design coincides with the optimal dy-.namic contract for individuals with constant lifetime income profiles. 2/5.

My paper with Juan Pablo Ata, Martin Karlsson and Nicolas Ziebarth “German Long-Term Health Insurance: Theory and Evidence” is finally out at the Journal of Political Economy. The first 50 people can get the free PDF of the paper from the link below:.

Finally, we document spatial inefficiencies and industry-wide overcapacity as potential downsides of industrial policies. 6/6.

3 What are the impacts of these policies on firm behavior, including entry, production, and productivity growth? We also explore the political economy of industrial policy, focusing on top-down transmission mechanisms, policy persistence, and policy diffusion across regions. 5/6.

1 What are the economic and political foundations of the targeted industries? .2 What policy tools are deployed?How do policy tools vary across different levels of government and regions! , as well as over the phases of an industry's development? 4/6.

Combining these newly constructed industrial policy data with micro-level firm data, we document a set of facts about China's industrial policy that explore the following questions: 3/6.

We extract info on policy objectives, targeted industries, policy tones (supportive or regulatory/suppressive), policy tools, implementation mechanisms, and intergovernmental relationships, etc. 2/6.

In the new NBER WP with Ming Li and Guangli Lu, both of CUHK Shenzhen, we use LLMs to classify China’s industrial policies from 2000 to 2022 at the most granular level: 1. Down to city level; 2. Including multidimensional info about policy details. 1/6.

None was effective. 1. Cost SMS backfires; 2. Health SMS is ineffective for households that underestimate the health damage of coal heating. 3. Social Comparison SMS is only effective for a small proportion of households who were concerned about their neighbors’ heating choices.

1. Cost SMS campaign, to address overestimation of electricity expenses; 2. Health SMS campaign, aimed at addressing underestimation of health damage associated with coal heating; 3. Social Comparison SMS campaign, to inform households about the popularity of electric heating.

In a recent paper with King King Li and Peiyao Shen, we examine whether informational nudges can induce households to switch from dirty indoor Coal heating to electric heating in northern China:.

Let us see how that goes. US-China decoupling is happening, at the cost of both economies. The world is worse off as a result. I wish for a better solution to the twin imbalances. 10/10.

GDP growth targets are now placed as secondary to improving people's livelihood (民生). The official tune is all for boosting domestic consumption and improving people's livelihood. 9/10.

Third, service consumption is now moved to unprecedented importance, recognizing the importance of service sector to relieve employment pressure. 8/10.