1/ I will use this thread to continuously catalog disinformation, misinformation or simply contradicting statements during Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

Jeg går også lidt mere i dybden med min egen fortolkning og deler mine tanker om, hvad vi kan gøre ved problemet, i et opslag på LinkedIn:

Introducing Grok Imagine.

Man kan læse mere selve studiet i min forrige tråd:

Danwatch har skrevet om resultater i min seneste artikel. Jeg undersøger effekten af sanktioner målrettet mod enkelte skibe i skyggeflåden. Den sanktionerede del fortsætter med at sejle – men i et langt mere begrænset omfang.

9/9 This is a preprint — very short, not yet peer reviewed, and methods/results may evolve. Still, I think it’s important to share early findings and open them for input. 👉 Read here:

8/ A bigger concern is “spoofing,” where ships broadcast fake signals. This remains a limitation of AIS-based studies, and something I plan to address in future work.

7/ What if ships just go “dark” more often by switching off their AIS? A very valid concern. I checked. If anything, sanctioned ships have slightly fewer long dark events after sanctions. Likely a result of decreased activity.

6/ Findings: After being sanctioned, vessels .📉 sail shorter distances .📉 make fewer port calls (i.e. entering and leaving ports) .📉 possibly conduct fewer ship-to-ship transfers (STS) - though this result is less robust.

5/ The figure above shows how sanctioned ships changed relative to what we’d expect if they hadn’t been sanctioned (the counterfactual). Notice how, before sanctions (t < 0), sanctioned and control vessels follow the same trend — which gives confidence in the results.

4/ The method: a staggered Difference-in-Differences design (Callaway & Sant’Anna). This compares sanctioned vessels to both never-sanctioned and not-yet-sanctioned ships, indirectly controlling for market-wide demand shifts.

3/ The data: 94 million hourly AIS geolocation records from nearly all crude oil tankers (Jan 2021–Mar 2025). I look at targeted sanctions by US, UK and EU (up to the 16th sanction package). Aggregated into weekly vessel-level observations.

2/ The context: Broad sanctions on RU export like the oil price cap have been criticized as insufficient. At the end of 2024, Western states ramped up vessel-specific sanctions, sharply increasing the number of blacklisted tankers. Even more vessels blacklisted in 2025.

1/ I recently uploaded a preprint on targeted sanctions against Russia’s “shadow fleet” of oil tankers. The results suggest that the most recent sanctions are working: the sanctioned fleet is still active, but in a much more limited capacity.

I have been doing research on informational aspects of conflict since 2017: Disinfo, propaganda, censorship. During the last year and a half I have been expanding through work on the Russian shadow fleet and maritime hybrid warfare. More updates on that will follow ; ).

Just logged on X for the first time in a while. Wow, it’s still alive. Curious how many people in my network are still here. Will post a bit during the coming days.

Det er egentlig en ret interessant udsendelse, særligt internetudbydernes (og "Teleindustriens") forklaring på, hvorfor de ikke har implementeret EU's sanktioner fuldt ud mod de russiske propagandaplatforme.

Journalister fra K-Live (DR) har vist, hvordan russiske statskontrollerede medier, RT og Sputnik, stadig kan tilgås i Danmark på trods af EU's beslutning om at blokere adgangen. Jeg har bidraget med en smule baggrund om medierne.

RT @BBCSteveR: “What wretched question have you prepared?” My surreal Q&A with Alexander Lukashenko last Sunday. He claimed his opponents h….

RT @yohaniddawela: We can now easily access over 18,000 geospatial datasets instantly, for free. Here's everything you need to know about….

Meget positivt at se øget fokus på "skyggeflåden" både i år og forrige år. Skibene er med til at holde Ruslands krigsindsats i gang gennem finansiering. Udover risiko for sabotage og spionage i Østersøen udgør den også en miljømæssig risiko.

En rigtig fin podcast fra Forsvarsakademiet om maritim hybrid krigsførelse. Kan varmt anbefales.