Giuseppe Colangelo
@GiuColangelo
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Professor of Competition Law & Economics @UniBasilicata; Senior Scholar @LawEconCenter; TTLF Fellow @StanfordLaw
Joined March 2016
Very disturbed to learn that Amazon has retained me without my knowledge or consent. What will they get away with next? And where are my paychecks?
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You may find the updated version of the paper here: https://t.co/u6BMb25nEO
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Just returned from the annual St. Martin’s Conference of the Czech antitrust authority and received some great news: my paper “Do #ecosystems exist in EU #competition law?” has been accepted for publication in the European Law Review
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Although the debate originates from the longstanding conflict between press publishers and online platforms, the paper’s broader message is that sound policymaking must rest on robust evidence rather than on assumptions or biases.
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By analyzing how several countries have drawn inspiration from the Australian experience, the paper assesses whether the #freeriding rationale underpinning these initiatives is substantiated by empirical evidence.
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The Australian #bargaining #code has become a regulatory model aimed at compelling large online #platforms to negotiate the use of #news content and provide fair remuneration to #publishers.
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My @LawEconCenter paper “News Publishers, Digital Platforms, and Bargaining Codes: Debunking the Free-Riding Myth” has just been published in GRUR International
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From Silicon Valley to New York, innovation thrives when rules are clear. A patchwork of state laws could limit that potential. State AI laws = economic, legal & security risks. New from @geoffmanne and @kristianstout in @NYDailyNews.🔗⬇️
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ICYMI: In comments to the EU, @geoffmanne, @AuerDirk, @GiuColangelo, & @selcukunekbas warn that proposed tech transfer rules try to solve a problem that doesn't exist ("patent holdup") while creating a real one ("patent holdout"). Read the comments below ⬇️
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In comments on the EU's draft TTBER, @geoffmanne, @AuerDirk, @GiuColangelo, & @selcukunekbas argue against a safe harbor for licensing-negotiation groups. The policy could create buyers' cartels and facilitate "patent holdout," harming Europe's innovation ecosystem. 🔗 ⬇️
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Great Promarket piece; and also read Manne & Hurwitz, "Build, Buy, or Both," on what really happened when the merger law was amended in 1950. Rarely has so much been made of so little.
The New Conservative/America First/Hillybilly-whaterver antitrust isn't going to last. As @GusHurwitz argues, "it is beholden to the current president, and many of the targets of conservative antitrust are now viewed with favor by that same president" https://t.co/F5cng5M9wg
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The media says Macron's free-market reforms failed France. The data shows the opposite: he spent more than any OECD country and piled on regulations. The crisis isn't from too much liberalism—it's from too little. Our new post: https://t.co/QsUGaedMcw
siliconcontinent.com
The supply-side reforms that weren't
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The point is, populists abuse the word “competition” so that they can pursue heterodox goals while superficially prioritizing competition. But it’s largely pretext. Their specific proposals make sense only if your foremost priority is bigness, not competition.
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As an example, they say it’s anticompetitive for Apple/Google to copy good ideas from other apps, despite the absence of IP protection. “Copying” is just a pejorative for “competition I don’t like.” So long as it’s not infringing any IP, it’s just healthy competition. …
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This is mostly wrong, but in a subtle way. Antitrust populists do (usually) claim to care about competition and not just bigness, but when you look at what they deem “anticompetitive” it’s often just a big firm engaging in ordinary competitive behavior. …
Plenty of valid criticisms to make of the neo-Brandeisian movement, but to say it cares only about bigness per se and not about competition is not one of them. One of the biggest things Lina Khan did at the FTC was to ban noncompete clauses, for example, which seems relevant.
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Moreover, it contends that introducing a dedicated antitrust safe harbour for LNGs risks undermining the Huawei test, given the difficulty of applying its criteria to a collective of implementers—an issue that could ultimately open the door to new forms of #holdout.
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The paper examines these implementers’ alliances under competition law and explores their implications within the current SEP licensing framework. It argues that the suggested analogies between LNGs and joint purchasing agreements or patent #pools are fundamentally misleading.
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In other words, this is the same hotly debated and much-criticized backdrop that led to the recent withdrawal of the draft Regulation on Standard Essential Patents (#SEPs).
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