This paper shows that the limit equilibrium payoff set for stochastic games with imperfect public monitoring expands when the monitoring structure improves in the information order based on a weaker notion of garbling called weighted garbling https://t.co/g9Cpqa8Tgl

How does verifiable information flow through networks? Full disclosure arises only when all players are biased in the same direction relative to the decision maker. Hence, the optimal network is a line where players are ordered by their preferences https://t.co/pNyRhuGDhv

Perfectly patient and monotone preferences on infinite utility streams can allow for strict comparisons of almost all utility streams https://t.co/gHvnLbsdZw

Robust contracts for agents with unknown beliefs https://t.co/BuFRD9adDF

Standard dynamic preference models cannot simultaneously satisfy the properties of time consistency, the separation of time and risk preferences and the ability to accommodate an indifference to the timing of when risk is resolved https://t.co/3g2YarhwyL

What is the efficient provision of public information in frictional search markets? I characterize the constrained-efficient market segmentation when agents use it to direct their search https://t.co/WwAI9EHCRs

The Executive Committee of the Econometric Society has approved an increase in the publication fees for papers in its two Open Access journals, Quantitative Economics and Theoretical Economics. Read more

How does information shape monopoly outcomes under interdependent values? We characterize payoff sets across three classes of information structures. With no restrictions, buyers can obtain the entire surplus even though the seller chooses a price https://t.co/q2xDWGoiCc

We extend Bayesian persuasion to dynamic environments with Markovian states. Optimal info disclosure trades off current vs. future discounted payoffs. We discuss optimal strategies and characterize when the asymptotic value hits its upper bound https://t.co/5yuV2M9yTj

Under which conditions do Bayesian equilibria exist in Bayesian games with general type spaces? The paper shows the existence of a Bayesian equilibrium when information is nested, provided the sets of actions are finite https://t.co/guLB19i17Q

How does one optimally design mechanisms in contexts where evidence is stochastic, possibly because it must first be aquired? https://t.co/0N6T8XQSMX

A model a non-Bayesian agent who adjusts estimates based on past data but misattributes selection bias as systematic error. This naive calibration leads to pessimistic choices, reinforced by feedback loops. Applied to auctions & project selection https://t.co/Hr2iiT7zMM

Do partners always benefit from a more profitable partnership? Not necessarily. This paper shows that higher profitability can prompt strategic exits by partners, leaving all partners strictly worse off https://t.co/QPFgQ50ObT

Theoretical Economics Volume 20, Issue 3 (July 2025) is now online https://t.co/LT8bO4t5mX

How do sequential information choices affect the extent of coordination failure? We show that in the context of global games, the likelihood of coordination failure is invariant to precision, cost, and availability of information https://t.co/d6rTxscgxs

Florian Brandl (University of Bonn), Eduardo Dávila (Yale University), Tommaso Denti (NYU), Kevin He (University of Pennsylvania), Nicolas Sebastien Lambert (USC), Annie Liang (Northwestern University), Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn (UCLA), & Colin Stewart (University of Toronto) 2/2

TE is fortunate to have thoughtful and committed Associate Editors who are essential for the smooth running of the journal. We are pleased to announce the following people joined our team starting July 1st 2025 1/2

We are thrilled to have Pablo Kurlat (University of Southern California) join the editorial board as Co-editor, starting July 1st, 2025. He will be handling papers in a wide range of topics, including dynamic general equilibrium theory, and monetary economics.

We are thrilled to have Mira Frick (Princeton University) join the editorial board as Co-editor, starting July 1st, 2025. She will be handling papers in a wide range of topics, including decision theory, game theory, and the theory of learning.

On June 30, 2025 Todd Sarver and Pierre-Olivier Weill stepped down as Co-editors. We are very grateful to them for their contributions. The journal has greatly benefited from their expertise, thoughtfulness, and efficient handling of papers