TheoreticalEconomics
@EconTheory
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Theoretical Economics, a journal of the Econometric Society, publishes research in all areas of economic theory. All content is freely available.
Joined February 2011
We extend Bayesian persuasion to dynamic environments with Markovian states. Optimal info disclosure trades off current vs. future discounted payoffs. We discuss optimal strategies and characterize when the asymptotic value hits its upper bound
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Under which conditions do Bayesian equilibria exist in Bayesian games with general type spaces? The paper shows the existence of a Bayesian equilibrium when information is nested, provided the sets of actions are finite
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How does one optimally design mechanisms in contexts where evidence is stochastic, possibly because it must first be aquired?
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A model a non-Bayesian agent who adjusts estimates based on past data but misattributes selection bias as systematic error. This naive calibration leads to pessimistic choices, reinforced by feedback loops. Applied to auctions & project selection
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Do partners always benefit from a more profitable partnership? Not necessarily. This paper shows that higher profitability can prompt strategic exits by partners, leaving all partners strictly worse off
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Theoretical Economics Volume 20, Issue 3 (July 2025) is now online
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How do sequential information choices affect the extent of coordination failure? We show that in the context of global games, the likelihood of coordination failure is invariant to precision, cost, and availability of information
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Florian Brandl (University of Bonn), Eduardo Dávila (Yale University), Tommaso Denti (NYU), Kevin He (University of Pennsylvania), Nicolas Sebastien Lambert (USC), Annie Liang (Northwestern University), Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn (UCLA), & Colin Stewart (University of Toronto) 2/2.
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TE is fortunate to have thoughtful and committed Associate Editors who are essential for the smooth running of the journal. We are pleased to announce the following people joined our team starting July 1st 2025 1/2.
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We are thrilled to have Pablo Kurlat (University of Southern California) join the editorial board as Co-editor, starting July 1st, 2025. He will be handling papers in a wide range of topics, including dynamic general equilibrium theory, and monetary economics.
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We are thrilled to have Mira Frick (Princeton University) join the editorial board as Co-editor, starting July 1st, 2025. She will be handling papers in a wide range of.topics, including decision theory, game theory, and the theory of learning.
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On June 30, 2025 Todd Sarver and Pierre-Olivier Weill stepped down as Co-editors. We are very grateful to them for their contributions. The journal has greatly benefited from their expertise, thoughtfulness, and efficient handling of papers.
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We are thrilled to have Federico Echenique (University of California, Berkeley) join the editorial board as Editor, starting July 1st, 2025. He will be handling papers in a wide range of topics, including matching, mechanism design, and decision theory.
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On June 30, 2025 Simon Board stepped down as Editor. We are very grateful to him for his contribution. The journal has greatly benefited from his hard work and thoughtful editorial decisions.
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Choice or competition? We show that every "good" matching mechanism fails the monotonicity requirement that no individuals be hurt by integration
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Can participants detect an authority straying from its announced rules? Transparency trades off with strategy-proofness, stability, and efficiency. Yet the paper finds partial guarantees: stability can be enforced, while efficiency usually cannot
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Can time inconsistency lead to chaotic equilibria or complex cycles? I explore this question using a simple model of dynamic policymaking. #TimeInconsistency #ChaosTheory #EconTheory
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How best to incentivise prompt disclosure? We formalise this question and show that the answer has a deadline structure. We apply our results to the design of unemployment insurance schemes
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Theoretical Economics Volume 20, Issue 2 (May 2025) is now online
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Search-and-matching models often assume a steady state. We prove that a non-stationary equilibrium exists, with search pool populations evolving. A key tool: we generalize Schauder’s fixed-point theorem to address discontinuous value functions
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